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Oral Tradition seeks to provide a comparative and interdisciplinary focus for studies in oral literature and related fields by publishing research and scholarship on the creation, transmission, and interpretation of all forms of oral traditional expression. As well as essays treating certifiably oral traditions, *OT* presents investigations of the relationships between oral and written traditions, as well as brief accounts of important fieldwork, a Symposium section (in which scholars may reply at some length to prior essays), review articles, occasional transcriptions and translations of oral texts, a digest of work in progress, and a regular column for notices of conferences and other matters of interest. In addition, occasional issues will include an ongoing annotated bibliography of relevant research and the annual Albert Lord and Milman Parry Lectures on Oral Tradition. *OT* welcomes contributions on all oral literatures, on all literatures directly influenced by oral traditions, and on non-literary oral traditions. Submissions must follow the list-of reference format (style sheet available on request) and must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope for return or for mailing of proofs; all quotations of primary materials must be made in the original language(s) with following English translations. Authors should submit two copies of all manuscripts. Most contributions will be reviewed by at least one specialist reader and one member of the editorial board before a final decision is reached. Review essays, announcements, and contributions to the Symposium section will be evaluated by the editor in consultation with the board.

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Editor's Column

This first issue of 1993 marks the beginning of the eighth year of publication for *Oral Tradition*, and with the new year comes a resolution and a change in policy. Readers will notice that this issue contains an extensive *Books Received* listing in its final pages. This digest, and those to follow at regular intervals, will constitute an invitation for specialists in various fields to contribute a brief review of approximately 500-1000 words on any of the volumes listed. *OT*'s editorial charter unfortunately does not permit redistribution of the books themselves to reviewers, and so we feel that the profession would be better served by opening up the journal to short reviews—more expeditiously done by a variety of scholars—than to continue strictly with occasional review-essays. This does not mean that the longer genre, complete with discussion of other relevant works, is no longer welcome; on the contrary, we heartily encourage such submissions. But the time seems right to offer another level of review as well, in order to more appropriately and fully serve the needs of an interdisciplinary readership.

Let's keep the rules for brief reviews as simple as possible. Please contact *OT* (via letter, telephone, or e-mail; addresses below) to arrange to have one or more titles reserved for you and to inform us when to expect your manuscript, and therefore when to schedule publication. Since the evaluations will be brief, please be sure to provide your audience with a concrete overview of the work under consideration, as well as with your judgments about the worth of its contribution. We look forward to working with you on this new project.

With this issue we also present another cluster of essays, this one on ancient Greek poetry. It was of course this area in which Milman Parry began his epoch-making research, and, as Mark Edwards' survey essays on Homer and Oral Tradition have shown (*OT*, 1[1986]:171-230; 3[1988]:11-60; 7[1992]:284-330), ancient Greek has been the most active field in the scores of language areas affected by his and Albert Lord's Oral-Formulaic Theory.

This cluster illustrates some of the major directions that scholarship on Homer and his colleagues have taken since Parry's original work. Egbert Bakker begins the symposium with a fundamental critique of the model of communication that underlies Western thinking about language and texts; what he has to say about the Greek situation will certainly apply much more widely. The same is true for Keith Dickson, who follows an earlier essay on "A Typology of Mediation in Homer," (*OT*, 5[1990]:37-71) with this treatment of "Nestor Among the Sirens,"

and of James Pearce, who extends the study of oral tradition to the later Greek poet Theocritus. William Sale rounds off the cluster with Part I of a detailed consideration of formulaic diction in Homer and the Old French *Chanson de Roland*, using mathematical analysis to show how these two poets compose similarly; the second installment will appear in a future issue of *OT*.

The latter three essays in this issue extend the discussion to very different areas, as is *OT*'s custom and editorial policy. Raymond Person describes the homiletic activities of an American cleric who was truly "on the cusp" between orality and literacy, the frontier preacher Alexander Campbell. In a lively essay that tackles significant and far-reaching problems for numerous disciplines, Eric Montenyohl then surveys methods for translating the experienced reality of oral traditions to the silent confines of print. Ursula Schaefer's 1991-92 Lord and Parry Lecture closes the volume by urging a reassessment of medieval texts with roots in oral tradition, specifically from the vantage point of reception theory.

Upcoming issues will feature articles on rap music, Hispanic ballads, the Finnish *Kalevala*, Arabic bridal songs, Tibetan oral traditions, the performance of Old English poetry, and many other topics. On the horizon are special collections on Native American and African traditions.

Finally, the Center is pleased to announce the creation of a "non-textual" medium for discussion of topics having to do with oral tradition and related forms. This electronic symposium, named ORTRAD-L, provides a forum for exchange through the agency of academic computer networks. To subscribe, simply send to the address LISTSERV@Mizzou1.bitnet (or LISTSERV@ Mizzou1.missouri.edu) the following command: sub ortrad-l your full name. Three weeks into ORTRAD-L's existence, we have some 200 specialists from dozens of fields exchanging ideas and bibliography in what seems to be a very productive context. Please join us.

We look forward to pursuing these developments, and especially to your assistance with the new book review policy.

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Editor

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Ancient Greek Oral Traditions

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Activation and Preservation: The Interdependence of Text and Performance in an Oral Tradition

Egbert J. Bakker

Background

In recent discussions of the metaphorical aspects of human experience, attention is drawn to the way in which we in Western culture conceive of language and linguistic meaning. As Reddy (1979) has shown, language in our culture is conceived of in terms of a *conduit* or a *container*, a vehicle for the transmission of messages (the "content" of the linguistic "container"). This "conduit metaphor" is, in Lakoff's and Johnson's (1980) sense, a genuine "metaphor we live by": the conception of ideas as objects, of linguistic expressions as containers of these objects, and of "communication" as the transmission of these packaged ideas, is pervasive in all folk or pretheoretical conceptions of language. To an even greater extent it governs the largely unquestioned assumptions about language and meaning in the linguistic theories of the twentieth century, with their sharp dichotomy between form (structure) and content (meaning, function), and their tendency to reduce speech to an abstraction of what it really is; a characteristic example is Roman Jakobson's famous "Closing Statement" (1960), where speaking is equated with "sending," the transmission of signals from a *sender* to a *receiver*.

This conception may be our culture's real experience of language, but as has often been pointed out, it is incomplete and inadequate. The present paper intends to discuss some aspects of language use where this inadequacy is especially striking. As a background and starting point for this discussion, I would like to suggest that the conduit metaphor and related conceptualizations result from the unconscious equation in Western culture of linguistic expressions with *written* linguistic expressions, a conclusion that would imply that the functions and properties we attribute to language are abstractions, based on the functions and properties of written

communication in our literate culture. As far as theoretical linguistics is concerned, this is all the more ironic, since from its structuralist beginning, twentieth-century linguistics has been "axiomatically" concerned with the absolute primacy of speech over writing. But the failure to "defamiliarize" our cultural and professional habits and preconceptions (that is, to make them meaningful by consciously thinking about them) certainly does not apply to linguists alone.

Information

Very simply and generally, the function of written texts in our culture (and hence the source of the conduit metaphor) is the *transmission of information*. The writer of a text may have a multitude of reasons for writing the text, and the text, accordingly, may have as many purposes and functions; but stripped to its bare essence, a text is a channel through which information of some sort flows from the writer to the reader. The notion of information is one of the most elusive concepts of our Western notional apparatus and hardest to pin down. To a certain extent everything that reaches our minds by way of language or through the senses is "information" and to that extent the concept is automatically used by almost anyone; "information" in Western culture has reached the status of a "dummy" concept, universally applicable and applied, and in many cases waiting to be complemented by more specific information.

The notion of information can reach its generic status as a default concept precisely because it is so important: it specifies what we think communication really *is*, and as such it lies at the heart of our (academic) ways of analyzing texts, language, and meaning. Information as a semantic concept in Western culture is strongly associated with *knowledge* and is typically conceived of as something that is maximally meaningful and salient when it is *new*, where "new" can be defined as "adding to our knowledge" and therefore not "known" before. The newsworthiness of "information," furthermore, is typically something that is unstable: information is new at first and adds to our knowledge, but once it has been "processed" by the cognizing human mind, it rapidly turns into old and known.[1] The knowledge-based conception of information, with the ensuing

[1] From Lyons (1977:33), an authoritative introduction to the issues discussed here (authoritative, that is, precisely because it testifies to the assumptions that I am trying to defamiliarize): "'Communicative' means 'meaningful for the sender.' But there is another sense of 'meaningful'; and for this we will reserve the term 'informative' and the cognate

distinction between "new" and "old" information, has resulted in many conspicuous features of Western "informational" mentality. Of these we need but mention the preferred *newsworthiness* of texts (in fact the first and foremost prerequisite for communication at all), the mandatory *originality* of (literary) texts, and, generally, the conception of *repetition* as something to be avoided.

Old information may suffer from a lack of salience, we find, but in practice the repetition of what was said earlier cannot be avoided. In modern linguistics and discourse analysis, for example, the structure of linguistic expressions (from isolated sentences or rejoinders in conversation to extended coherent texts) is analyzed as a sensible compromise between "new" and "old," on the basis of general perceptual principles (e.g., Givón 1979:348-49): from the point of view of cognition, new sensory information (a salient perceptual stimulus, a *figure*) can only be processed against a background of already processed (known) visual information (the *ground*).[2] Similarly, a "text" (or even "sentence") can only be experienced as meaningful when the new information it contains is couched in what is already known:[3] a text that consists exclusively of "new" information is incomprehensible, too much at variance with the reader's existing knowledge, whereas a text that contains only "old" information is considered to be dull, predictable, and therefore not worth reading.

Without challenging the perceptual and cognitive principle on which the modern analysis of the "information structure" in texts is based, I wish to question the automatic connection between visual information-processing and knowledge, and the association of "old information" with what is "known," perceptually non-salient, and therefore dull: indeed what is "known" (and therefore "old information" in terms of knowledge) can be highly salient in terms of perception. The concept of information, I

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expressions 'information' and 'inform.' *A signal is informative if [...] it makes the receiver aware of something of which he was not previously aware.* 'Informative' therefore means 'meaningful to the receiver.' If the signal tells him something he knows already, it tells him nothing" (emphasis added).

[2] See for example Krech et al. 1974:264: "As we look at the parts of any differentiated field, we notice that almost invariably one part (the *figure*) stands out distinctively from the rest (the *ground*)."

[3] Notice that "focus," a term that is widely used in linguistics to refer to that part of sentence that contains the "new information," derives from the domain of vision and perception.

suggest, is grossly underspecified, in that it is indiscriminately applied to both perception and knowledge.

A more cautious and precise use of the term is suggested by the dynamics and complexities of *speech*, ordinary everyday speech in general, and the speech of oral epic traditions in particular. I believe that the notion of information and its "transmission," and the distinction between "old" and "new" information, being essentially based on written communication, does not do full justice to these complexities. Furthermore, I believe that the notion of information, being based on written communication in *our* culture (transfer of knowledge), is anachronistic, or inappropriate, when applied to written texts in older, or other, cultures than our own. Let us first turn to speech.

Activation

In actual speech-events, information need not be new to be effective—in fact, effective speech need not be information at all in the sense that new knowledge is transmitted to a hearer. Speakers do much more than just transmit new information to one another, and the speaker whose conversational skills do not go beyond the "informative" level is the ultimate bore. What speakers (socially behaving humans) are typically concerned with is not attacking each other with new information, but with what has been called *interpersonal involvement*, a state of mutual rapport between humans that is to a large extent tied up with their language behavior (e.g., Tannen 1989:9-35). Contrary to what (most) linguists and philosophers claim, what speakers typically say (or *do*) is not the assertion of facts or the expression of beliefs, but in the first place either a symptom of the mutual involvement they have reached with their addressee, an attempt to reach it, or (in less felicitous cases) an attempt to hide the lack of it. Thus it is the notion of involvement, more than anything else, that embodies the inherent unity of the typical speech event, and that has gotten lost in our literacy-dominated conceptions of communication, with their characteristic segregation between writer and reader, writer and world referred to, text and world, form ("container") and content (message).

As far as involvement and rapport are concerned, anything is permitted, even saying things that have to be categorized in the conceptual system of Western informational semantics as "old" information and therefore dull. Speakers may even debase themselves to the point of saying the same thing twice, or using idioms, prefabs, and formulas that are in all

respects modeled on previous speech, the logician's ultimate horror and seemingly the apex of meaninglessness. What matters to speakers, however, is the establishment of a common ground, which consists of their minds and those of their listeners being set on the same topic. It is this involvement that makes speech coherent and meaningful, not as information, but, much more essentially, as an instance of human behavior.[4]

Interpersonal involvement is not just a social phenomenon; it is in the first place a matter of consciousness and experience. Speaking as a cognitive process means, in the perspective of the linguist Wallace Chafe (e.g., 1987; in press), the focusing of a speaker's consciousness on a given idea, and the subsequent turning of this piece of conscious experience into observable sound, or speech. Focusing on an idea means that this idea is *active* in the speaker's consciousness. The activation of a concept in order for it to be turned into speech is obviously not a solipsistic, private affair: the very point of the activation is that the same, or a sufficiently similar, idea is activated in the listener's consciousness, irrespective (and this is important) of whether it is judged to represent information that is new to him or her. What matters in speech is not whether something is new or old information (knowledge) but the dynamic cognitive process of *activation*, the appearance in the speaker's and listener's consciousness of an idea out of inactivity.

We see, then, that beside the usual dichotomy between "old" and "new" information, a new distinction begins to emerge, that between active and inactive concepts.[5] The active-inactive distinction does not necessarily supplant the new-old distinction: in "involved" discourse, too, people add things to each other's knowledge, obviously. But the new distinction is an essential addition, in that it can be very meaningful for "old information" to be active in people's minds, or to *become* active. The new distinction has a totally different experiential load (or perhaps we should say that it has an experiential load at all), which ultimately amounts to the distinction

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[4] For a similarly "anti-informational" approach to human speech behavior, see Smith (1978:85ff.). Instead of "involvement," however, Smith uses a less altruistic concept to characterize general human speech behavior: manipulation and power ("We perform verbal acts as well as other acts, that is, in order to extend our control over a world that is not naturally disposed to serve our interests" [85]).

[5] I have to add here that Chafe's conception of "activation" is more elaborate and sophisticated than would appear from the necessarily sketchy presentation in this article. For one thing, Chafe distinguishes *three* states for a given piece of "information": active, inactive, and the intermediate state of being *accessible*. (See Chafe 1987; in press, ch. 6).

between *present* and *absent*: what is active in both the speaker's and listener's mind is present in a real sense, as a shared experience and thereby a source of involvement; what is inactive, on the other hand, is absent, out of the perceptual and experiential scope of the speech participants.

After this short discussion of involvement, consciousness, and activation in ordinary speech, let us now turn to an oral epic tradition, specifically the Homeric tradition of ancient Greek epic.

Re-enactment

Epic in societies that are not, or not yet, governed by literacy and information, like ours, is obviously not just "poetry," in the sense of a literary genre; it is not even *oral* poetry, for the simple reason that this term suggests a special type of what *we* think is poetry, that is, written poetry (see Nagy 1990a:18), and thereby reveals a literate bias. Rather, and from the point of view of the epic singer and his audience, epic is speech *par excellence*, a strong intensification of the cognitive features (including the imagination) and social dynamics of the ordinary spoken word.[6]

To begin with, an oral epic, like the *Iliad*, in its essential quality of speech and performance, is activation in the full sense of the term, a dynamic appearance out of absence.[7] The epic performance can be considered as the *re-enactment* of an event sequence that is crucial enough to be foundational for the collective experience of the community. More than that, the re-enactment of the epic story is a reactivation, a re-creation of the epic past in the here and now of the performance shared by the performer and his audience. The reactivation of the epic in performance creates a strong overarching sense of involvement in which the entire community participates, by the simple fact that the re-enacted, reactivated epic world and its heroic and dramatic features are in everyone's mind during the performance, a collective psychic state for which there is ample

[6] For the reversed argument concerning speech and poetry, see Friedrich 1986, who argues that all ordinary language is inherently intensely poetic, a basis on which he states that "poetry" is where language reaches its most typical expression, its "quintessence of linguistic form" (27). Both arguments, to be sure, amount to one and the same thing, in that the boundary between "poetry" and "speech" is not a clear-cut one.

[7] It has to be stated at this point already that this performance quality is independent from whether a *written text* of the *Iliad* exists or not; see further below.

evidence in classical sources.[8]

Speech in general is always modeled on previous speech, without being felt as repetitious by speakers. For grammar, we have to notice, is a *traditional* vehicle, and tradition consists in the *re-instantiation* (reactivation, re-creation) of a given token, rather than in the *repetition* of any "first" (normative, original) token.[9] Similarly, the speech of the epic re-enactment is always modeled on previous re-enactments. This means that as far as the collective experience of the community is concerned, an epic performance is never the first one in a series, a totally "original" enterprise, in the Romantic (and equally Western) sense of poetic creation *ex nihilo*. But it also means that the epic re-enactment is in no way "secondary" with respect to any "original" predecessor: like language itself, traditional epic is a re-creation each time it is performed, rather than a mere repetition (e.g., Foley 1991:56-57) and this applies to the numerous formulaic "repetitions" within the epic no less than to the epic story as a whole.

If epic, in its essential quality of speech, intensifies ordinary speech, then it should also increase the problems related to the notion of "information" as a means to characterize language behavior and "communication." From the fact that the epic performance is never the first one, it follows, obviously, that the audience knows beforehand what will be re-enacted in the performance (a simple point that has been made numerous times for many epic traditions). In terms of knowledge and "informational semantics," therefore, the *Iliad* is definitely old information, lacking to a

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[8] The classic statement on the irrational aspects of the public performance is of course Havelock 1963. One of the more accessible ancient sources is Plato's *Ion*, a short dialogue dealing with the pro and contra of the art of the rhapsode (the professional performer of [Homeric] poetry). In general, the ancient rhetorical tradition abounds with remarks on the effects that language (or better its user) can produce on a listener, remarks that testify to the predominantly performance-based view of language in antiquity (even *late* antiquity) as opposed to our own text-dominated conceptions.

[9] The insight that "repetition" (or re-instantiation, formulaicity, idiomaticity) is crucial, not incidental, to grammar and speech is gaining ground in modern linguistics. Central here is the awareness of "routinization" as a pervasive feature of speech: a given expression may prove so useful as a method of coping with a given recurrent speech situation that it becomes standardized, and the model of future expressions to be uttered under similar circumstances. This process of what the linguist Paul Hopper (1988) calls *grammaticalization* reaches its strongest form in idioms and formulaic rejoinders, that is, in precisely the type of expression that defies grammatical analysis in "traditional" structuralist theory. In a wider perspective, the insight that language is modeled on previous language is crucial in the work of Bakhtin.

very large extent what in modern terms would be the newsworthiness and salience of new information that adds up to our knowledge-base. This applies in any case to the global level of the "plot" of the epic, but probably also to lower-level events, like individual killings in battle narrative (though not necessarily to all), and it applies most certainly to the characters, even the minor ones, in the epic story. To take a simple example, the death of Achilles' friend Patroklos, the turning-point in the plot of the *Iliad*, is, in terms of information, known and "old"; at any rate, it is known that Patroklos will die, and his death is anticipated numerous times in the preceding parts of the *Iliad*. Patroklos' death is indeed very different from the sudden and unexpected finding of a new body in P. D. James or a Tony Hillerman mystery novel, the ultimate in carefully introduced new information in written fiction.

But that does not mean that the death of Patroklos is less moving or effective in the story of the *Iliad*. On the contrary, Patroklos' death and its anticipation is effective, not as information that was not known before, but as an experience experienced again. Just as the skillful manipulation of new information in the modern mystery novel is highly typical of our information-craving literate culture, so we may say that anticipation of the reactivation/re-enactment of what is "known" is the quintessence of verbal experience in an oral society, where "new" is associated with appearance and activation in the experiential here and now, rather than with knowledge and information. Something need not be "new information" to be effective, and much that is old information in terms of *knowledge* is highly salient in terms of *perception*.[10] It seems to be useful, then, to question the automatic extension of the notion of information from knowledge to perception; and as far as (Homeric) epic is concerned, it may even be preferable to abandon the concept altogether and to use conceptual categories that seem to be more suitable for the analysis of speech: qua information, the *Iliad* is dull, qua re-enactment, however, it is thrilling.

But the notion of activation is not limited to re-enactment in performance and the continuous salience of successive re-creations of an epic; it is also associated with *remembrance*, and this brings me to what I call the poetics of fame.

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[10] Experiments in cognitive psychology have also confirmed that even in the case of the experience of stories whose outcome should be transparent to subjects, "suspense" is by no means ruled out; see Gerrig 1989 (I owe this reference to David C. Rubin.)

Preservation

The repeated mentioning of a hero in an epic tradition is much more than the mere repetition of a name. Mentioning a hero, especially with one or more epithets added to his name, is a *re-instantiation* of the concept of this hero, a small-scale re-enactment within the encompassing framework of the epic re-enactment as a whole.[11] Repeated mention of a hero is not just the activation and reactivation of the idea of a person in the performer's and the listeners' minds; rather, it is the repeated activation of the *theme* that the concept of the hero represents.[12] This "theme" is conjured up (activated) by each new mentioning of the hero in question, not only in the current performance but also in all the other re-enactments of the same epic, or of *other* epics in which the hero also occurs.[13] The result of repeated mention is a continuous state of activation (in the consciousness of members of the community and of the community as a whole) of the idea of the hero and the themes (indeed stories, epics) associated with it. This state of activation is the glory that poetry can confer: repeated mention establishes a hero's fame, or, in the Greek term, his *kleos*.[14]

A hero mentioned with any frequency is rescued from the forgetfulness that results from inactivity and absence from people's consciousness. He is present, not only privately in the individual minds of the poet and the members of the audience during the performance, as a consequence of their being involved in it, but also publicly in the community as a whole, not only as it witnesses and experiences the

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[11] Cf. also Foley's (1991) notion of "traditional referentiality" as a metonymic concept: a given token contracts a *pars pro toto* relation with the traditional idea of which it is an instantiation.

[12] On the connection between "theme" and the traditional epithet attached to a hero's name, see Nagy 1990b:23.

[13] The paradigm example here is Odysseus' epithet *polutlas* ["much-suffering"], which is associated with the theme of Odysseus' homecoming (*nostos*), but which is added to Odysseus' name throughout the *Iliad*, that is, where events are related that happened, chronologically, *before* Odysseus' *nostos*. In Nagy's words (1990b:23): "The *Iliad* is recording the fact that Odysseus already has an *Odyssey* tradition about him."

[14] In what follows I have no intention to add to the extensive discussions that Nagy (e.g., 1979; 1990a) has devoted to *kleos* in early Greek poetry; my aim is merely to provide a motivation for *kleos* in terms of the dynamics of speech.

performance, but also *in between* performances, during everyday life. In other words, as a real compensation for physical death, he is immortal in a sense, due to the power of speech, a compensation that is termed *kleos aphthiton* ("imperishable fame").[15]

You get *kleos aphthiton* when people just talk about you, an index of the fact that you are an idea that is easily activated in people's minds.[16] This state of continuous near-presence, the very opposite of the undesirable condition of being forgotten, has to be fed by a continuous series of activations (mentions) in public performance. The singers in these performances are in a real sense "ministers of *kleos*"; it is their skill in transforming activated and reactivated concepts into effective special speech that makes them the collective memory of their community, and as such they are in close contact with the divine. In fact, it is the daughters of *Mnemosyne* ("Remembrance"), the Muses, who have to be invoked by the poets. These invocations, it must be noted, tend to occur when the poet is concerned with *exhaustive* and/or *exact* mentioning, for example when it comes to the presentation of lists (or *catalogues*) of chieftains, including their epithets, biography, and genealogy, that is, the fullest re-instantiation of their tradition that is possible within the framework of the full-length re-instantiation of another hero's tradition (Achilles' tradition in the case of the *Iliad*).

It is the Muse, an external personification of mental faculties like memory and imagination in the psychology and poetics of archaic Greece, who stands at the basis of activation and remembrance in the poet's mind and who in that capacity is a safeguard against forgetfulness, and eventually absence and death. What is activated is saved from *Lêthê* ("Forgetting") and is thus *a-lêthês* ("free from *Lêthê*"), an adjective that in later Greek comes to mean "true."[17] The truth of epic tradition, however, is very far removed from the philosopher's notion of true and false statements: what is

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[15] E.g., Nagy 1979:117-19; 1990a:201-4; 225-27; on compensation, Nagy 1979; 1990a:151.

[16] Chafe would call this "accessible," an activation-state in between "active" and "inactive" (see also note 5 above). But whereas in Chafe's data ideas are most often "accessible" because of previous mention within the same discourse, in the case of the epic tradition, ideas are continuously accessible (e.g. "Achilles") because of recurrent mention in *previous* discourses.

[17] On *Lêthê* ("oblivion," "forgetting"), *Mnêmosunê* ("remembrance"), and *alêtheia* ("truth"), see Nagy 1990a:58-60.

true in the epic tradition is what is active and thereby "present" or easily activated and thereby "near." Even more importantly, "true" is what is *preserved* by being *repeatedly and officially active* in the ongoing series of epic performances. The epic tradition, then, is concerned above all with *preservation*, preservation through activation as a recurrent process that is strongly grounded in the dynamics of speech.

The Interdependence of Text and Performance

The poetics of fame is thus quintessentially oral, but I wish to emphasize that the fame scenario I have been describing is by no means incompatible with the existence of a written text. It has sometimes been stated, and very often it has been tacitly assumed, that everything that is characteristic of an oral tradition is lost irretrievably the very moment the tradition gets written down. This proves quite wrong and another example of the treacherous ways in which we Western academics are stuck with certain one-sided and culture-bound preconceptions concerning language, meaning, and, above all, texts.[18] The crucial connotation that comes with the concept of "text" was discussed above in terms of "information" and knowledge: a text in our culture is something that has to be *read* by someone, and furthermore, we like to think of this reading as something that makes sense—what we read as literate beings should be "informative," or otherwise we are wasting our time on known information. In short, we conceive of texts in terms of the transmission of what is new information to a reader.

The production of texts in archaic Greece, however, was not concerned with new information; in fact, it was not even concerned with readers at all in the sense in which Western culture speaks of "readers." Whoever produced a text in, say, the seventh century B.C. was not concerned with what we would call the expression or communication of ideas: if he wanted to "express" or to "communicate," he would not have known how to do so in writing; maybe he would not even have realized that one can use writing for these purposes at all. Writing was instead an act of

[18] Of interest here is the insight that is being developed and elaborated upon in medievalist circles to the effect that "orality" and "literacy" are not antonyms, but rather blend with each other in various ways. The key concept here is represented by Zumthor's term "vocality" (*vocalité*), meant to characterize the essential voice and speech quality of (early) medieval poetry in performance. The fullest discussion of "vocality" to date is Schaefer 1992.

fixation, the codification of what is "known" already. The physical result of this fixation, the written text, be it an inscription on stone or pottery, or signs on papyrus or wood, can be seen as a *representation*, a substitute of the activity that led up to its existence, and this activity is nothing other than speech. The necessary authoritativeness of this speech—casual speech is not worth recording—inevitably lent authoritativeness to the representation of this speech as text. Inscriptions, for example, were not meant to be, nor used as, bearers of information, to be read by passers-by; rather, these texts served the purpose of embodying the authority of the original statement.[19]

Who writes in Archaic Greece, then, is concerned not with the transmission of messages to readers (the text being a container for these contents), but with the fixation, and thereby the *preservation*, of what binds container and content together into an indissoluble whole, that is, speech. Similarly "reading" a text that is meant to represent (authoritative) speech is very different from processing information and adding it to one's knowledge-base. If a text owes its existence to the authority of a (public) statement, then "reading" the representation of this statement is nothing other than the *re-enactment* of it, or better its reactivation.[20] It appears, then, that the usual distinctions between "speaking" and "writing" and "writing" and "reading" begin to break down: if speaking is a matter of cognition, of the activation of ideas in one's consciousness, as was stated above, then "reading" is a matter of the "*re*-cognition" and reactivation of these same ideas, both in the reader's and in the listeners' consciousness.[21] Writing and reading, in short, are related to each other as performance and re-performance.

This applies, I suggest, with full force to the writing of the *Iliad*. Whoever did this, or gave orders for it to happen, did not thereby turn the

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[19] Cf. Thomas 1989:46-48, 60-61. See also Havelock's conception of inscriptions as documents of a "craft literacy," "in which the public inscription is composed as a source of referral for officials and as a check upon arbitrary interpretations" (1963:39, 53n7). For "early" manuscripts in general and their use, see Clanchy 1979.

[20] See the interesting discussions of Svenbro (1988), who connects the reading of inscriptions in archaic and classical Greece with Nagy's ideas on *kleos* (the voice of the reader being an instrument in the preservation and distribution of *kleos*).

[21] I owe the play on cognition and recognition to the meaning of one of the Greek verbs for "reading": *anagignôskein* ("to know again," "recognize"); see Svenbro 1988:30, 183-84, Nagy 1990a:171.

Greek epic tradition into literary communication in our sense; nor did he intend to abolish the public performance tradition of the Homeric epics. On the contrary, he wanted to secure this tradition by regulating the ongoing flow of performances and supplying them with a firm basis, in the form of a written, authoritative, text. The writing of the *Iliad* did not constitute the "first" literary text, with a strong footing in the oral tradition; nor did it constitute the often mentioned "culmination" (as well as "end point") of the epic tradition, in the form of a "last" epic performance. The writing of the *Iliad* was not a "literarification" of an oral tradition, unless one sees this process as indissolubly connected with the "oralification" of a text. The original text was meant to represent the *Iliad* in its essential quality of speech and performance, and to be as such a normative model for re-enactment. As the fixation of an ideal performance, the original text of the *Iliad* was an attempt (successful we may say!) to establish a *canon*, a means to exert power over future performances in the Homeric tradition.[22]

The writing of the *Iliad*, then, is necessarily linked up with what is obviously most crucial about an epic tradition: speech. Instead of killing the epic tradition, the writing of the *Iliad* actually reinforced it, by strengthening the already strong mutual bond between the two interrelated concepts that are more than anything else constitutive of the epic tradition— activation and preservation. If epic speech in performance amounts to the activation of concepts (stories, themes, whole epics) in order for them to be preserved, then the writing down of the epic tradition (itself necessarily a way of speaking already) amounts to the preservation of these same concepts in order for them to be activated, an activation that in its turn will serve the purpose of preservation, that is, the purpose of epic speech in general. "Writing" and "reading" in this scenario turn out to be far removed indeed from the sending and receiving of messages and information. Instead of being the segregated components of the modern (literate) transmission-event, both writing and reading in the epic tradition are a matter of performance, the latter being a succession of reactivations of the former, which in turn is a reactivation itself in an ongoing series of re-instantiations of the tradition. "Writing" and "reading," then, strengthen and regularize the recurrence that is inherent in (epic) speech.

We can only speculate on the exact reasons why the performance of

[22] Of interest here is Bäuml's (in press) discussion of the function of texts in Carolingian Christianization politics. On "canons," "value," and "power," see Smith 1983. See now also Nagy's re-examination (in press) of the so-called "Pisistratean recension" of the text of the *Iliad*, a presentation with which the present discussion finds itself in concord in a number of ways.

the *Iliad* came to be written down, and on how "literary" these reasons may have been. Sociologically oriented responses to this question might be prompted by Nagy's ideas on "Panhellenization," a rising sense of "generic Greekhood" in the seventh century, with the ensuing need of common property binding all Greek tribes together, like Panhellenic games or a "national" epic statement. From this perspective, the writing of the Homeric epics is seen as the result of a gradual textual fixation, a "cumulative process, entailing countless instances of composition/ performance in a tradition that is becoming streamlined into an increasingly rigid form as a result of ever-increasing proliferation" (Nagy 1979:8; cf. 1990a:52ff, in press). Such ideas go against the grain of a philological discipline whose very identity has always been the notion of personal authorship, and many classicists, I suspect, will find more congenial a conception in which a master poet made the most ambitious poetic statement he could make, in the form of a written (dictated) text.

In any case, the frequently recurring opinions to the effect that the writing of the *Iliad* was an act of volitional poetic expression and literary communication have to be taken, in my opinion, with much circumspection. Such opinions, if anything, testify to how difficult it is to get rid (or even become aware) of our academic preconceptions regarding language, meaning, and text when it comes to the study of oral traditions.[23]

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Nestor Among the Sirens

Keith M. Dickson

χρὴ ξεῖνον παρεόντα φιλεῖν, ἐθέλοντα δὲ πέμπειν.
(*Od.* 16.74)

I[*]

At first glance, two traits uniquely characterize Nestor in the Homeric poems: longevity and the command of persuasive speech.[1] That these features are in no way peculiar to him, but instead common to the type of figure Nestor represents within the narrative tradition, will be clear from a brief reflection on the values that determine both the moral horizons of the epics and the typology of characters that inhabit and are controlled by those horizons. Especially within the society of warrior elite in the *Iliad*, in which the highest premium is put on physical strength, the weak either die ingloriously—the stuff of which others' κλέος [fame] is made—or else

[*] This paper is the result of work done as a participant in the 1989 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on Oral Tradition in Literature held at the University of Missouri-Columbia under the direction of John Miles Foley. It has also benefitted from the advice of members of an informal draft group at Purdue University. Special thanks to John Kirby and Anthony Tamburri.

The text of Homer used in this study is that of the standard Oxford edition. English translations (meant more as an aid to the Greekless than as definitive renderings) are those of Lattimore 1961 (with some revision) for the *Iliad* and my own for the *Odyssey*.

[1] On the figure of Nestor, see especially Vester 1956, and also the more restricted studies of e.g. Cantieni 1942, Davies 1986, Lang 1983, Pedrick 1983, and Segal 1971, along with remarks in Frame 1978:espec. 81-115 and Whitman 1958. On Nestor's rhetorical prowess, see especially Vester 1956:14-17.

they learn how to talk.[2] What conventionally distinguishes old men from young ones, in fact, is precisely the contrast between rhetorical skill and martial prowess. The type of the Counselor is virtually isomorphic with that of the Elder: Nestor himself, Priam, Phoinix, Aigyptios, Halitherses, Mentor, Ekheneos, Euryklea, Eurynome—all are elderly, all affect things almost exclusively through their words. The traditional link between old age and rhetoric is indeed clearest of all in those cases in which command of speech appears precociously in young men like Diomedes (*Il.* 9.53-59), Poulydamas (*Il.* 18.249-53), and Thoas (*Il.* 15.281-85), the Aitolian fighter—in whom the gift always calls for explicit comment.[3] Further, this helps account for why elderly figures in Homer are assigned their places in the narrative through reference to a relatively narrow constellation of roles—Counselor, Herald, Prophet, Nurse—around which an equally well-defined cluster of traits—memory, sorrow, rhetoric, circumspection, sagacity, goodwill—tends to gravitate. In a world in which a harsh but lucid economics of κλέος prevails, enjoining the violent exchange of life here and now for quick death with everliving fame in the speech of the community, old men and women either remain peripheral to the main events or else influence them in a detached way, as intercessory figures more in the service of the (abstract) story than the concrete narrative itself.[4]

If the attribution of advanced age and command of speech is not an especially unique one, it remains true that Nestor is the most conspicuous embodiment of these traits in the poems. Both in fact are represented in his person in almost exaggerated form, and to complementary degrees of

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[2] For a general introduction to the moral world of the *Iliad*, see most recently Schein 1984:espec. 67-88; Nagy 1979.

[3] Cf., e.g., *Il.* 3.108-10; *Od.* 3.124-25, 4.204-5; Vester 1956:14-16; Dickson 1990. Note also the formula . . .ἐπεὶ πρότερος γενόμην, καὶ πλείονα οἶδα# [since I am older, and know more] (*Il.* 19.219, 21.440) used in association with elderly figures; on which see also below and note 44.

[4] On the distinction between these terms, see Genette 1980:25-29, who defines *story* as "the signified or narrative content . . . [of which] an example would be the adventures experienced by Ulysses from the fall of Troy to his arrival on Calypso's island," and *narrative* as "the signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text itself," for example, "the speech given by the hero to the Phaeacians in Books IX-XII of the *Odyssey*." See also Bal 1985 and Rimmon-Kenan 1983 for clear presentations of the narratological framework from which these terms are borrowed. On the nature and function of intercessory figures in Homer within the matrix of this framework, see Dickson 1990 and references therein.

exaggeration. To his extraordinary longevity—well more than twice that of any of his associates at Troy (*Il.* 1.250-53; cf. *Od.* 3.245-46)—corresponds his no less remarkable tendency to logorrhea. As a member of a group in which exceptional action in war wins undying glory in what others say, Nestor has clearly outlived his occasion. All his strength has left him (*Il.* 8.103); never again will he fight with fists or wrestle, compete in spear-throwing or in swiftness of feet (*Il.* 23.621-23), since his limbs are unsteady and his arms "no longer swing light" from his shoulders (626-28); and his sole *aristeia* on the battlefield would have cost him his life but for the timely intervention of Diomedes (*Il.* 8.78-112). To Nestor alone in the *Iliad* is the hemistich χαλεπὸν δέ σε γῆρας ὀπάζει# [hard old age attends you] (*Il.* 8.103) applied, along with its allomorph χαλεπὸν κατὰ γῆρας ἐπείγει# [hard old age presses you down] (*Il.* 23.623); an alternate version of the formula—χαλεπὸν δ' ἐπὶ γῆρας ἱκάνει# [hard old age has come upon him]—appears once in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 11.196), where it is used of the aged Laertes. The related colon χαλεπὸν δέ ἑ δεσμὸς ἔδαμνα# [hard bondage was breaking him] is found with reference to Ares subdued by no stronger a necessity, bound to his death in the chains of the giants Ephialtes and Otis (*Il.* 5.391). The image of binding figures also in Akhilleus' description (*Od.* 11.497) of the waning rule of his old father Peleus, οὔνεκά μιν κατὰ γῆρας ἔχει χείρᾱς τε πόδας τε [since old age fetters him hand and foot].

Since he cannot fight, Nestor has learned (only too well) how to talk. Mastery of speech—even if combined with the inability to keep its length under control—is in fact the feature with which his longevity is most often associated. For these are indeed closely interrelated traits. His description in *Iliad* 1 expressly links his great age with his skill as a speaker (*Il.* 1.247-52):

§1

τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ
ἡδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε, λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής,
τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή·
τῷ δ' ἤδη δύο μὲν γενεαὶ μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
ἐφθίαθ', οἵ οἱ πρόσθεν ἅμα τράφεν ἠδ' ἐγένοντο
ἐν Πύλῳ ἠγαθέῃ, μετὰ δὲ τριτάτοισιν ἄνασσεν

. . . and between them Nestor
the sweet-spoken rose up, lucid speaker of Pylos,
from whose lips the voice flowed sweeter than honey.
In his time two generations of mortals had perished—
those who grew up with him, and the ones born to them

in sacred Pylos—and he ruled among the third generation.

The individual elements of this characterization merit some close analysis, even if this initially involves a digression from the main point at hand, namely the issue of longevity and logorrhea. The aim of such an analysis is to identify a cluster of shared qualities, an associative set that represents the connotative range of traits and attributes predicated of Nestor along with other characters (and even certain things) in the narrative tradition out of which the Homeric poems arise.

The adjective ἡδυεπής [sweet-spoken] is a *hapax legomenon* in Homer, though it is picked up and repeated in the *Hymns* with reference to the Muses (*Hym.* 33.2) and the poet himself (*Hym.* 21.4); we will return to this shortly, as well as to other associations with sweetness. The hemistich λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής# [lucid speaker of Pylos] is virtually reserved for Nestor; in this form it figures once elsewhere (*Il.* 4.293), when the old man musters his troops for battle. An allomorphic colon, λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής# [although a lucid speaker], appears on three occasions (*Il.* 2.246, 19.82; *Od.* 20.274), always with concessive (and often sarcastic) force, to characterize speakers—Thersites, Agamemnon, Telemakhos—who are regarded as anything but lucid. Nestor alone enjoys the epithet without any irony.[5] Finally, the "natural" connection between diminished physical prowess and heightened rhetorical skill is made explicit in the description of the Trojan Elders in the *Teikhoskopia* (*Il.* 3.150f.), of whom it is said γήραϊ δὴ πολέμοιο πεπαυμένοι, ἀλλ' ἀγορηταὶ | ἐσθλοί [Through old age they fought no longer, but were excellent speakers still]. Their speech is sweet, Homer says, like the sound of cicadas (#τεττίγεσσιν ἐοικότες).[6]

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[5] *Pace* Pucci 1977:40, note 34, who comments: "The ironic portrait of Nestor in *Il.* 1.247ff. even suggests a mild devaluation of this rhetoric [i.e. the traditional association of speech with honey]." Drawing attention to the "accumulated series of 'sweet' epithets" used of Nestor in this passage, Pucci concludes that this "hyperbole seems to make fun of the simile in its positive form." It is unclear on what basis this judgment is made.

[6] Note also the associations, implicit in Homer but evident from the later tradition, among shrill tone, lucid speech, poetry, and the cicada (τέττιξ). With the description of the Trojan Elders in the *Teikhoskopia*—τεττίγεσσιν ἐοικότες, οἵ τε καθ' ὕλην | δενδρέῳ ἐφεζόμενοι ὄπα λειριόεσσαν ἱεῖσι [clear as cicadas who through the forest | settle in a tree, to issue their delicate voice of singing] (*Il.* 3.151f.)—compare Hesiod (*Erga* 582f.): καὶ ἠχέτα τέττιξ | δενδρέῳ ἐφεζόμενος λιγυρὴν καταχεύετ'

In turn, the connotative range for the adjective λιγύς [lucid] (alone or in its various compounds) is a fairly extensive and at first glance even a heterogeneous one, comprising reference to birdsong (2X), the sound of whip (1X) and wind (6X), shrill weeping or keening (5X), the song of Sirens (1X) or Muses (1X), the lyre's piercing tone (7X) and the clear voice of heralds (6X). The underlying basis for these uses seems to be a specific quality of sound, its high pitch and amplitude, which lends it a special transparency: λιγύς is the noise that pierces, the voice that carries far to penetrate and command attention. Moreover, in the case of birds, Sirens—themselves birdlike creatures[7]—Muses, weepers, heralds, and lyres, the adjective also designates a shrillness experienced as aesthetically pleasing and even seductive.[8] The association of pleasure with weeping and the dirge may seem anomalous in this group, until it is remembered how much less tentative Homeric culture is than ours in acknowledging the genuine satisfaction that comes from expressing sorrow. Grief is no less sustenance than food or drink, and thus no less fully enjoyed, as the responsion between dining and lamentation clearly shows. With a line such as αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τάρπημεν ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος [Now when we had taken our pleasure of eating and drinking] (*Il.* 11.779; *Od.* 5.201) compare, for example, αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥα γόοιο τετάρπετο διὸς Ἀχιλλεύς | καί οἱ ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἦλθ' ἵμερος ἠδ' ἀπὸ γυίων [When brilliant Akhilleus had taken his pleasure of sorrow | and the passion for it had left his mind and body] (*Il.* 24.513), and ἡ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν τάρφθη πολυδακρύτοιο γόοιο [But when she had taken her pleasure of tear-filled sorrow] (*Od.*

ἀοιδήν [and the chirping cicada | settles in a tree and pours down its lucid song]; cf. also *Scut.* 393f. In Plato (*Phaedr.* 262D), cicadas are οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται [prophets of the Muses], although the Homeric critic Aristophanes of Byzantium (*Epit.* 10.7) also draws attention to their proverbial longwindedness. Aristophanes (*Nu.* 984, *Eq.* 1331) and Thucydides (1.6.3) mention the afterlife of the once popular fashion of tying hair in a knot fastened by a gold brooch in the shape of a cicada—the height of style for men at the turn of the sixth century, but clearly outmoded and somewhat ridiculous two generations later.

[7] See e.g. Pollard 1965:137-45.

[8] See Stanford 1958-59:2.407 (on *Od.* 12.44): "λιγυρός and λιγύς describe the kind of sound that the Greeks liked best: it is identified by Aristotle [*De audibilibus* 804a25ff.] as consisting of sharpness (ὀξύτης), fineness (λεπτότης) and precision (ἀκρίβεια)."

19.213;251, 21.57).[9] A similar need is apparently fulfilled in both cases.

The specifically aesthetic pleasure produced by things qualified as λιγύς deserves further comment; the term's reference to (human or divine) voice and music in fact amounts to well over three-quarters (31 of 40X = 77%) of its uses. Speakers such as Nestor (2X), Menelaos (*Il.* 3.214), and heralds in general—often in the colon κηρύκεσσι λιγυφθόγγοισι (5X), filling the space after the A1 caesura—account for twelve of its occurrences; twice it modifies the song of Sirens (*Od.* 12.44) and Muses (*Od.* 24.62), respectively; and seven instances describe the lyre. Its use with the φόρμιγξ or lyre shows the highest degree of regularity, appearing always in the endline formula φόρμιγγι λιγείῃ# (*Il.* 9.186, 18.569; *Od.* 4.254) or, with change of case, φόρμιγγα λίγειαν# (*Od.* 8.261;537, 22.332, 23.133). The reference to the Muse in *Odyssey* 24 combines keening with poetic song, since the passage recounts the weird, divine voice heard by the Akhaians at the funeral of Akhilleus, and so serves once again to advert to the pleasure derived from the transmutation of grief into ritualized utterance. The attribution of λιγυρὴ ἀοιδή [lucid song] to the deadly Sirens in Book 12 of the same poem is an interesting one; as others have pointed out, the terms in which they are described are precisely those elsewhere reserved for the Muses themselves.[10]

As representative of the type of Elder and Counselor, whose command of persuasive speech is central to his *ethos*, Nestor plays a prominent role within this group. It will be remembered that the epithet ἡδυεπής, applied uniquely to him in the Homeric poems, also bears affinities with Muses and music, even if these first appear explicitly only in the *Hymns*—where they are hardly to be taken for innovations. The connection is strengthened by the traditional resonance of the statement (*Il.*

[9] Compare also the A2 hemistich ὀλοοῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο# [when we have taken our pleasure of the sorrowful dirge] (*Il.* 23.10;98; cf. κρυεροῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο# at *Od.* 11.212), and τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο# [he stirred in all of them the passion for mourning] (*Il.* 23.108;153; *Od.* 4.183; cf. *Od.* 4.113, 16.215, 19.249 = 23.231); with which compare the extensive (7X, 14X) formula αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο [But when they had put aside desire for drink and food]. On lamentation and epic poetry, see Nagy 1979:94-117.

[10] See e.g. Buschor 1944; Pucci 1979 and espec. 1987:209-13.

1.249) that serves to "introduce" him in the *Iliad* narrative:[11] τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή [from whose lips the voice flowed sweeter than honey]. The line as such is unique in Homer, though it is echoed in the *Hymns* in the reference (*Hym.* 25.5) to whomever the Muses love, "from whose mouth the voice runs sweet" (γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέεν αὐδή#). Within Homer himself, it bears the closest formulaic resemblance—even if its content seems at first unrelated—to a pair of lines that both advert to the incomparable sweetness of certain passions, along with the forgetfulness their pleasure entails. In *Iliad* 2, in lines that are repeated nine books later (2.452-54 = 11.12-14), Athene moves swiftly among the Akhaian host, putting strength into each man's heart to fight without respite. As a result of her activity (453-54):

§2 τοῖσι δ' ἄφαρ πόλεμος γλυκίων γένετ' ἠὲ νέεσθαι
ἐν νηυσὶ γλαφυρῇσι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.

Now battle became sweeter to them than to sail
in hollow ships to the dear land of their fathers.

A certain irony rounds this passage off, for it precedes the famous *Catalogue* of men who left that land in ships to wage sweet war at Troy, and directly follows the nearly disastrous *Peira* of Agamemnon, whose immediate effect was to send the troops running back to their ships to set sail again, this time in pursuit of a "homecoming beyond fate" (ὑπέρμορα νόστος, 155). The second line—with μέλιτος in the same metrical position (B1-C1), though its order in relation to γλυκίων is inverted— occurs in the course of Akhilleus' bitter rejection of the anger (χόλος) that precipitated the death of his friend. May strife vanish from among gods and men, he says (*Il.* 18.106-08), and especially anger (109-10):[12]

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[11] The argument that the "unprecedented and elaborate" (Lang 1983:140-41) description of Nestor at *Il.* 1.247-53 is evidence that he does not originally belong "to the Trojan War story, or even . . . the *Iliad* itself," and thus serves as a means of introducing him to an unfamiliar audience, is not especially convincing. It rests on an assumption of (implicitly textual) uniqueness and integrity, of "first appearances" and fixed versions, that may well be inappropriate to oral literature. See also Cantieni 1942, Vester 1956:2-7.

[12] Plato (*Phil.* 47E) quotes these lines as evidence of the pleasure that often attends even the most painful human passions, which in turn serves as an indication of the soul's variance with the body.

§3 ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται ἠΰτε καπνός.

. . . which far sweeter than honey dripping down
swells like smoke in the hearts of men.

These passages indeed appear to have little bearing at all on the voice that "sweeter than honey" flows from Nestor's mouth; and in fact, closer parallels than these do exist. The sweet passion that causes a deferral of return home, however, and—more directly—the liquid flow of honey dripping down, raise issues that will later call for our attention.

The cola out of which the line τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή is constructed show a number of allomorphs within the text of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that help specify the associations Nestor's voice enjoys, especially with other fluid things.[13] The B1 hemistich μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή#, for instance, responds first with a variety of formulas of varying length—from simple C2 cola (adonean clausulae) to hemistichs that back into the beginning of the third foot—all descriptive of the natural flow of liquids:

§4

. . . ἔρρεεν αἷμα#	(*Il.* 23.34)
. . . ἔρρεε δ' ἱδρώς#	(*Il.* 23.688)
. . . προΐει καλλίροον ὕδωρ#	(*Il.* 2.752)
. . . ὅθεν ῥέεν ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ#	(*Il.* 2.307)
. . . λιμενὸς ῥέει ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ#	(*Od.* 9.140)
. . . κατὰ δὲ ψυχρὸν ῥέεν ὕδωρ#	(*Od.* 17.209)
. . . κατὰ δὲ νότιος ῥέεν ἱδρώς#	(*Il.* 11.810, 23.715)
. . . πρόσθεν ἷεν καλλίρροον ὕδωρ#	(*Il.* 12.33)

Just like blood, water, and sweat—to which should also be added the wine (*Il.* 6.266, 10.579, 16.231, 24.306) and tears (*Il.* 13.88;658, 18.32; *Od.* 5.84;158, 8.86;93 = 532, 16.214) that drip (λείβειν) along with honey or gall—the voice too has a kind of substance, a smooth material body simultaneously fluid and consistent, causing an almost tactile pleasure in the

[13] Formulas for αὐδήν / αὐδῆς# in line-final position most often (7 of 12X) occur as a hemistich stretching back to the B1 or B2 caesura and filled with a noun (usually a proper name) in the genitive case (expressing source) plus ἔκλυεν αὐδ-# (*Il.* 13.757, 15.270; *Od.* 2.297, 4.831, 10.311;481, 14.89). They are not of special relevance for an appreciation of *Il.* 1.249.

listener.[14]

Nestor's liquid speech also exhibits honeyed sweetness: it is μέλιτος γλυκίων. Sweet in Homer are chiefly the things that soothe and lull and sate, or else that move one towards such fulfillment. Nearly half (7 of 15X) of the occurrences of the adjective γλυκερός in its various inflections in the poems are predicated of sleep, with the remainder distributed among music (*Il.* 13.637; *Od.* 23.145), food (*Il.* 11.89), water (*Od.* 12.306), homecoming (*Od.* 22.323), and milk (*Od.* 4.88). Here again in most cases the image of liquid softness prevails. This is especially true of sleep (ὕπνος), which additionally accounts for nearly two-thirds (12 of 21X) of the instances of γλυκύς and its forms. Sweet sleep not only comes upon one (ἐπέλθοι: *Od.* 5.472; ἱκάνοι: *Il.* 1.610; *Od.* 9.333, 19.49), wells up (ὄρουσεν: *Il.* 23.232), holds (ἔχε: *Il.* 10.4; ἕλοι: *Od.* 19.511), and releases (ἀνῆκεν: *Il.* 2.71; *Od.* 7.289, 18.199), but it is also something poured out over sleepers—cf. ἐπὶ {κατὰ} ὕπνον ἔχευεν# [poured sleep upon {down over}] (*Od.* 2.395, 18.188; cf. 12.338) and [ὕπνος] #νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς [painless {sleep} poured all around] (*Il.* 14.253, 23.63)—like thick fluid, like the lovely but sinister mist (ἀχλύς) that covers the eyes of the dying (*Il.* 5.696, 16.344, 20.321;421; *Od.* 22.88). Its smooth touch, no less than water slaking thirst or song that fills the ear, gives delight; mortals rest "taking pleasure of sweet sleep"—#ὕπνῳ ὑπὸ γλυκερῷ ταρπώμεθα {ταρπήμεναι} (2X, 3X)—just as of food and lamentation.

Sweet too is desire (ἵμερος), which amounts to one-fifth (4 of 21X) of the uses of the adjective γλυκύς. Here again we find forthright acknowledgment of the pleasure of giving expression to sorrow, for the largest share (11 of 28X = 39%) of all instances of ἵμερος and its forms in Homer are limited by the noun γόος [lamentation] in the genitive case, usually (6X) in the A1 formula τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο# [stirred in all of them desire for mourning] (*Il.* 23.108;153; *Od.* 4.183, 16.215, 19.249, 23.231), with substitution twice of τῷ δ' ἄρα πατρὸς [for his father] (*Il.* 24.507; *Od.* 4.113) in the space between the A1 and B2 caesuras. Sexual passion (*Il.* 3.139;446 = 14.328 = *Od.* 22.500,

[14] On the metaphorical association of honey with "the divine essence of poetry" in Hesiod, see Pucci 1977:27-29. He comments (28) that "the viscosity of honey represents the thick body of words, the materiality of sound in rhythmic lines, the pleasantness of song and music," and in a footnote (40, note 33) calls attention to the frequency, especially in later poetry, of the metaphor of poetic speech as a flowing of honey. See in general Tornow 1893 for a history of the metaphor.

Il. 5.429, 14.198) and music (*Il.* 18.570;603; *Od.* 1.421 = 18.304, 18.194) account for six and five occurrences, respectively, with the rest given over to food (*Il.* 11.89) and the exquisite skin of gods (*Il.* 3.397, 14.170).

The sweetness expressed by the first element in the compound ἡδυ—επής shows much the same distribution as γλυκύς and its forms, though it incorporates additional reference to the human voice. Of thirty-seven cases of the adjective ἡδύς, including the compound ἡδύποτος (1X), the majority (16X = 43%) refer to wine. Sleep accounts for five instances, and nearly one-quarter (9X) are given over to description of the sound of laughter—most often (6X) in the C2 formula ἡδὺ γέλασσα—# [sweetly laughing], twice with the adverb in line-initial position. It is unclear whether the reference to its savor denotes the experience of the agent or its sound in the ear of the listener, but this distinction is probably not an important one in either case; both may well be intended simultaneously.

Finally, Nestor's voice is honeyed or surpasses even honey's sweetness. Many of the connotations honey traditionally enjoys have already been touched on: its taste, the pleasure it gives, the flow of its dense liquid body. Once more, the distribution of the noun μέλι and its adjective μελιηδής follows what should by now be a familiar pattern of associations. Fully half of the time (22 of 43X), wine is the referent; food—fruit, cheese, grass, honey itself—amounts to more than a quarter of the uses, with the remainder given over to life (3X), sleep (2X), and twice again to the voice. The first of these two instances (*Il.* 1.249) is the one that has served as our point of departure, namely the "voice sweeter than honey" that flows from Nestor's mouth. The second comes full circle to return us to the issue of poetry and the Sirens, since it appears in a passage (*Od.* 12.187) in which they call their own sweet-toned (μελίγηρυς) voices "honeyed."

Before exploring this last connection, a brief synopsis of our survey so far is in order. The individual elements in the lines (*Il.* 1.248-49) λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής | τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή descriptive of Nestor open out on a broad but fairly well defined network of conventional associations in the poems. Among the most prominent are images of clarity of tone, sweetness, fluidity, and seductive allure. The old man's voice is a clear, honeyed stuff poured out, and in this resembles the flow of sleep no less than poured water or wine. In its clarity and liquid sweetness lies the pleasure it brings—again like sleep, food, and drink, but also with affinities to music, laughter, lamentation, and erotic desire. One last association, still to be fully explored, links Nestor's

voice—through the "sweeter than X (honey/homecoming)" pattern mentioned above (see §§2-3)—to lines that suggest a kind of forgetfulness or deferral of true aim. The connection already mentioned between the honeyed speech of Nestor and that of Muses and Sirens only makes this suggestion that much more intriguing.

The main point of comparison here is the degree to which the terms of the description of Nestor's command of speech assimilate it to poetic utterance.[15] We have already seen that it shares with poetry its lucid (λιγύς) quality, its sweetness (γλυκύς, γλυκερός, ἡδυ-επής), and—through the image of honey (μέλι, μελίγηρυς)—the fluidity that characterizes the songs of Muse, Poet, and Siren in the broader tradition (cf. *Hym.* 21.4, 25.5, 33.2).[16] That the types of Bard and Elder overlap in some respects should not be very surprising, of course. To begin with, as I hope to have shown elsewhere,[17] the boundaries between characters or character-types in the oral narrative tradition of the poems are themselves quite fluid and thus easily traversed, since they are determined more by the exigencies of context and story than by allegiance to *ethos*—more familiar to us, but not free from suspicion—as a fixed essence qualitatively distinct from the events out of which it arises. In this sense, character is just a functional element, a locus of narrative potentials, much like any other event or description in the course of the story.

This isomorphism of Poet and Elder is further strengthened by the moral horizon of the epics, to which we referred at the beginning of this essay. Deprived of the usual and sanctioned means for inclusion in the

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[15] In this context, the reference to the myth of the Thracian bard Thamyris in the course of the description of Nestor's fleet in the *Catalogue of Ships* (*Il.* 2.594-600) is perhaps worth noting. On his way from (Thessalian or Messenian?) Oikahia, Thamyris encountered the Muses and Dorion in the Western Peloponnese and, in response to his boast that he surpassed even them in singing, was deprived of his gifts: αἱ δὲ χολωσάμεναι πηρὸν θέσαν, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὴν | θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο καὶ ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστύν [And in their anger they maimed him, and took away divine | song, and made him forget how to play the lyre]. The location of the event in the territory under the rule of Pylos at least suggests ancient connections between this region and the Muses. For explication of the myth, see the scholia *ad loc.* and the article by Höfer in Roscher 1924-37, s.v. "Thamyris."

[16] See above, note 14.

[17] See Dickson 1990. On the related issue of "character doublets" in Homer, see Fenik 1974:172-207.

κλέα ἀνδρῶν [sung glory of men] by the infirmities of age—since his strength is feeble and his arms "no longer swing light" from his shoulders (*Il.* 8.103, 23.621-28)—Nestor is compelled to be the bard of his own tale. He cannot rely on others within his community to perpetuate his fame, for he has outlived every contemporary witness to his glory as a fighter,[18] as much as two generations prior to this splendid war at Troy. As a result of this, he has become an *autaoidos* or "self-singer," self-constituted, a lone figure strung between the contrafactual mode of "If-only-I-were-now-as-I-was-when . . ." on the one hand,[19] and seemingly endless runs of autocitation on the other.[20] He occupies a place somewhere midway between a present in which only his words command attention any longer and a past that stretches back into some vanishing-point in otherwise unsung heroics, namely into the vast and unrecorded realm of the tradition itself—with which, in the dynamics of the poems, he often verges on identification. From this place pours a voice like honey, both lucid and sweet, consistent but nonetheless fluid, touched by implicit sorrow for the irretrievability of youth, and at one and the same time alluring and also interminable.

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[18] On the dependence of κλέος on the presence of a witness, see, e.g., Detienne 1967:9-27. For a discussion of the problematic assumptions that underlie this contingency of the truth of what is heard on what has once been seen directly, see the terms of Homer's invocation of the Muses in *Il.* 2.484-86, and Pucci 1980.

[19] Note the formulaic εἴθ' ὡς ἡβώοιμι βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη [If I were young now, and the strength were still steady within me . . .], reserved for Nestor three times in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 7.157 = 11.670 = 23.629) and used twice (*Od.* 14.468;503), deceptively, by the Old Beggar in the *Odyssey*. Cf. also the lines αἲ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον, | ἡβῷμ' ὡς ὅτ' . . . [Father Zeus, Athene and Apollo, would that | I were young, as when . . .] (*Il.* 7.132-33), introducing Nestor's recollection of the Battle of the Pylians and Arkadians, which closes with the reassertion #εἴθ' ὡς ἡβώοιμι . . . .

[20] See Vivante's description (1970:24) of Nestor as "a pathetic witness of past and present, an old man for whom heroic prowess is but a memory or a dream." He remarks later (190), with reference to Nestor's account in *Iliad* 11 of the rout of the Moliones, that the old man "speaks about himself as about another person seen and admired long ago. There is no link between his youth and old age. Might we detect a touch of irony in his ostentation?"

II

The next (and second) step in assessing the validity of some link between the speech of Nestor and the song of Muses or Sirens requires a shift of perspective from isolated words, cola, and lines—by which we have been guided so far—to the level of generic scenes. This shift is an important one methodologically, for a number of reasons. First, the sweetness, the fluidity, and the allure of honey, wine, sleep, desire, music, mourning, voice, Nestor, Muse, and Siren in themselves merely establish a paradigmatic set of attributes frequently predicated of all these nouns in Homer. They form a connotative network of associations that are suggestive and rich but at the same time at best perhaps only virtual. A truly functional homology among them can be shown, by definition, only in terms of how they actually operate in the course of the poems, namely in terms of the actions they promote and the common effects these actions have. If nothing else, to demonstrate their similar or identical narrative function will help corroborate the parallels that we have already isolated at the level of the traits they all share. That is to say, and to select just one instance from many, if wine is not only fluid and sweet like sleep but also, within the narrative, works like sleep to induce (say) forgetfulness or a relaxing of vigilance, then the features they both share are not simply metaphorical, but instead have the status of functional elements—one might even say, of agents—that can retard, advance, or deflect the story along one path or another. This clearly occurs (again, to pick one among several instances) in the case of Polyphemos drunk and vulnerable in his cave in *Odyssey* 9 and Zeus lulled by sleep on the hill above the plain in the course of the *Dios apatê* in *Iliad* 14. Here wine and sleep are functional homologues of each other. Moreover, an analysis in terms of the function and common effects of nouns whose metaphorical range is isomorphic may adduce further evidence in support of the claim, already made, that oral narrative—and possibly narrative in general—is above all else characterized by the priority of story over *ethos* and description, namely by the degree to which the story is the determining factor in the construction of narratives, and thus the primary and final motivation for whatever occurs within them. In this sense, even simple adjectival modifiers (λιγύς, γλυκύς, ἡδυεπής) could enjoy the same functional status in the text as do characters and actual

events, namely as loci of narrative potential.[21]

The type-scene for Visitation—describing the arrival, recognition, greeting, and entertainment of a guest—is among the clearest of the scenes in Homer whose regular contours formulaic analysis has helped to map. As Edwards has shown, building on the work done by Arend in his influential *Die Typischen Szenen bei Homer* (1933), the pattern of Visitation amounts to an elaboration on elements within a more generic type of scene, to which Arend gives the name Arrival (*Ankunft*).[22] It encompasses in turn a well-defined set of discrete narrative units that allow for a certain amount of variation within a fixed syntagmatic order. The complete pattern is as follows:[23]

§5 (1) a visitor stands at the entrance
(2) someone (generally the host) sees him
(3) the host gets up from his seat
(4) the host takes his hand and greets him
(5) the host conducts him inside
(6) the host offers him a seat (usually in a place of honor)
(7) food and drink are served
(8) conversation ensues

Each of these elements, with the exception of §5(7) and (8), generally fills

[21] This would seem to follow from the argument (see Foley 1991) that even minimal formulaic elements in orally composed literature bear the considerable weight of "inherent meaning" thanks to their evocation of familiar ethical types and story patterns that belong to the larger and implicit whole from which particular narratives derive. On the distinction between "inherent" and "conferred" meaning, and its implications for a poetics of oral traditional literature, see Foley 1991:2-37.

[22] See Edwards 1975:61-62, Arend 1933:28-63. Arend analyzes the Arrival Scene into (1) *Einfache Ankunft* (28-34), (2) *Besuch* (34-53), and (3) *Botschaft* (54-63). The syntax of *Einfache Ankunft*, the basic type, essentially comprises the description of a character's (I) setting out, (II) arrival, (III) encounter with the person sought, (IV) taking a position beside him, and (V) speech. In the *Besuch* Scene, element IV is elaborated by the description of the character's reception. Arend (34f.) contrasts *Einfache Ankunft* with *Besuch* as follows: "in den Ankunftsszenen tritt der Ankommende sogleich näher (T[eil]. IV) und bringt sein Anliegen vor (T[eil]. V), in den Besuchszenen aber werden vorher ausführlich Aufname und Bewirtung geschildert, vor T[eil]. V treten also verschiedene neue Erzälungsteile" (quoted also by Edwards [1975:62]).

[23] This list is adapted from Edwards (1975:62), who in turn freely translates Arend's analysis (1933:35).

no more than a single verse; and the same is true of the entire sequence (4)-(6), which often appears as the formula (*Il.* 11.46;778; *Od.* 3.35) ἐς δ' ἄγε χειρὸς ἑλών, κατὰ δ' ἑδριάασθαι ἄνωγε [and took him by the hand, led him in and told him to sit down]. The offer of food in §5(7) generally allows for the greatest expansion, and may range from an almost cursory mention—e.g., ξείνιά τ' εὖ παρέθηκεν, ἅ τε ξείνοις θέμις ἐστίν [and properly set out hospitality, as is the guest's right] (*Il.* 11.779), in which the final gnomic hemistich (cf. *Od.* 9.268) explicitly marks what precedes it as the "zero degree" of hospitality, so to speak—to elaborate descriptions of the utensils and their setting, the preparation and serving of the meal.

In his 1975 study, Edwards deftly charts the wide range of variations —in the form of omission, juxtaposition, condensation, and expansion— admissable in this specific pattern and in those of Arend's more comprehensive types, with a view towards resolving apparent "inconsistencies" in the text of Homer. Insufficient attention has been paid, however, to a less common but significant divergence from the pattern of Visitation. The arrival of a visitor at another's home follows the fixed and predictable syntax outlined above in §5 only when (as in most cases) the host's offer of entertainment is welcomed and accepted. When it is not—in a narrative pattern that can be called Hospitality Declined—the regular sequence is interrupted and issues are raised that are represented as more compelling than the social (and religious) obligations that bind guest and host together. This allomorphic type-scene has special bearing on the figure of Nestor and his functional relation to Siren and Muse.

The simplest instance of the pattern of Hospitality Declined in the poems, and the one that most closely conforms to the sequence in §5, occurs in *Iliad* 11. Patroklos has been sent by Akhilleus to discover the identity of the wounded soldier whom Akhilleus saw rush by in a chariot (607-15). In the course of his errand, Patroklos arrives at Nestor's tent (644-48):

§6	(1)	Πάτροκλος δὲ θύρῃσιν ἐφίστατο, ἰσόθεος φώς.
	(2)-(3)	τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν ὁ γεραιὸς ἀπὸ θρόνου ὦρτο φαεινοῦ,
	(4)-(6)	ἐς δ' ἄγε χειρὸς ἑλών, κατὰ δ' ἑδριάασθαι ἄνωγε.
	(*)	Πάτροκλος δ' ἑτέρωθεν ἀναίνετο εἶπέ τε μῦθον·
	(*)	"οὐχ ἕδος ἐστί, γεραιὲ διοτρεφές, οὐδέ με πείσεις . . ."

. . . and Patroklos stood, godlike man, in the doorway.
Seeing him, the old man rose from his shining chair,
took him by the hand, led him in and told him to sit down,
but Patroklos from the other side declined, and said:

"No chair, old man nurtured by Zeus; you won't persuade me . . ."

The sequence proceeds as far as Nestor's courteous insistence that his guest take a seat (6), at which point its normal course is interrupted when Patroklos turns the offer down. Refusal to Sit in fact marks all other instances of Hospitality Declined in the poems, as in the scene (*Il.* 23.198-211) in which the messenger Iris politely rejects the same invitation from Zephyros and Boreas at the House of the Winds. Although this passage lacks the complete set of elements listed above (§5), its conformity to the basic pattern of Arrival at the Threshold—Recognition—Rise of the Host—Request to Sit is obvious (201-205):

§7

	(1)	. . . θέουσα δὲ Ἶρις ἐπέστη
	(1)-(2)	βηλῷ ἔπι λιθέῳ· τοὶ ὡς ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσι,
	(3)/(6)	πάντες ἀνήϊξαν, κάλεόν τέ μιν εἰς ἑ ἕκαστος
	(*)	ἡ δ' αὖθ' ἕζεσθαι μὲν ἀνήνατο, εἶπε δὲ μῦθον·
	(*)	"οὐχ ἕδος· εἶμι γὰρ αὖτις ἐπ' Ὠκεανοῖο ῥέεθρα . . ."

. . . and Iris stopped running and stood
on the stone sill; but when their eyes saw her,
all sprang to their feet, and each asked her to sit beside him.
But she in turn refused to sit, and she said:
"No chair; for I'm going back to the streams of Ocean . . ."

Three other scenes are also worth consideration in this context, no less for the issues they raise than the formulaic responsion they exhibit. On his way to visit Andromakhe in *Iliad* 6, Hektor turns aside to enter the house of Alexandros; he pauses at the door of their room and rebukes the coward for hanging back from the fight, a charge Alexandros does not dispute. Helen then contributes some words of her own by way of self-reproach, and concludes by offering Hektor the hospitality of a seat (354 = §5:6): ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν εἴσελθε καὶ ἕζεο τῷδ' ἐπὶ δίφρῳ [But come now, come in and rest on this chair]. His response is to decline (360-62):

§8

μή με κάθιζ', Ἑλένη, φιλέουσά περ· οὐδέ με πείσεις·
ἤδη γάρ μοι θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται ὄφρ' ἐπαμύνω
Τρώεσσ' . . .

Don't make me sit, Helen, though you love me. You won't persuade me.
For already my heart is hastening to defend
the Trojans . . .

Hektor's refusal here is in fact preceded some one hundred lines earlier by a similar scene (*Il.* 6.258-68) in which he firmly turns down Hekabe's offer of wine—ἀλλὰ μέν', ὄφρα κέ τοι μελιηδέα οἶνον ἐνείκω [But stay while I bring you honey-sweet wine] (258)—on the ground that to drink it would make him "forget strength and courage" (cf. *Il.* 22.282) and thus deflect him from his present aim (264-65):[24]

§9 μή μοι οἶνον ἄειρε μελίφρονα, πότνια μῆτερ,
μή μ' ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.

Lift me no honeylike wine, honored mother,
lest you unnerve me, and I forget strength and courage.

Finally, the same overall pattern informs Priam's initial refusal to sit with Akhilleus in *Iliad* 24. Here Akhilleus' offer echoes Helen's in §8—#ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ κατ' ἄρ' ἕζευ ἐπὶ θρόνου [But come, sit down upon this chair] (522 = §5:6)—and the old man's response is cast in much the same language used then by Hektor (553-54):

§10 μή πώ μ' ἐς θρόνον ἵζε, διοτρεφές, ὄφρα κεν Ἕκτωρ
κεῖται ἐνὶ κλισίῃσιν ἀκηδής . . .

Don't make me sit on a chair, Zeus-nurtured one, while Hektor
lies abandoned among the shelters . . .

On the matter of formulaic responsion, it should be noted that the #οὐχ ἕδος ἐστί {εἶμι} colon is unique to the two passages (*Il.* 11.648, 23.205) quoted above (§§6-7), and that the cola #μή με κάθιζε (*Il.* 6.360 = §8), #μή μοι οἶνον ἄειρε μελίφρονα (*Il.* 6.264 = §9) and #μή πώ μ' εἰς θρόνον ἵζε (*Il.* 24.553 =§10) appear nowhere else in either poem. The closing hemistich οὐδέ με πείσεις# (*Il.* 11.648, 6.360 = §§8-9) is of course fairly ubiquitous (6X, 1X), and therefore not of much significance here. Beyond responsion at this level, however, these passages also share a number of narrative features in common.

To begin with, in two scenes (§§6-7) the arrival of the visitor comes during the course of a meal already in progress. The appearance of Patroklos at Nestor's tent is preceded by a fairly long description (*Il.* 11.618-43) of the return there of Nestor and Makhaon just shortly

[24] On the similarity between these two scenes as indices of Hektor's *ethos*, though not in terms of their formulaic responsion, see Redfield 1975:121-22.

beforehand, along with their ensuing entertainment and conversation. It could be argued here that his refusal of hospitality is partly motivated by narrative constraints, since the repetition of two meal scenes back to back within such a short space of verse would be tedious or awkward. This claim is not without some merit but in itself is not particularly convincing, for reasons to be taken up presently. Iris likewise visits the house of Zephyros while the Winds are engaged in feasting, a fact indicated by a single line (*Il.* 23.200-01)—again, an instance of the type-scene in its "zero degree." This is not true of Hektor's brief visit (§8) with his brother, since his arrival merely interrupts routine domestic chores: Helen supervising the weaving, Paris toying idly with his bow (*Il.* 6.321-24). The scene between Priam and Akhilleus in *Iliad* 24 is remarkable in a number of respects that have been studied closely elsewhere.[25] For our purposes here it is enough to note that his arrival coincides with the end of a meal (whose preparation is not described) enjoyed by Automedon and Alkimos (471-76), but in which the hero himself has not partaken.

Far more pertinent than any alleged desire on Homer's part to avoid repetition of meal scenes in too close proximity to each other—for after all, he was presumably under no constraint to start them eating dinner before the guest arrives—is the narrative function of that guest in each of these passages, along with the contrast of priorities revealed by the guest's refusal to be entertained. The visitor in all cases thus far examined in fact appears in the role of Messenger. With respect to Patroklos (§6), Iris (§7), and Priam (§10), each has been explicitly dispatched by someone else on an official mission (cf. *Il.* 11.608-15, 23.192-99, 24.143-59;173). Hektor (§8) himself is under no special injunction to visit Paris, though his response to Helen's offer (*Il.* 6.360-62) makes his own sense of mission quite clear. This suggests that the passages in question represent "mixed" types such as those studied by Edwards, namely the condensation of Arrival (*Ankunft*) + Visitation (*Besuch*) with Messenger (*Botschaft*) scenes. The initial sequence for Simple Arrival (Setting Out - Arrival - Encounter) + Visitation (§5:1-5) proceeds as far as the offering of hospitality, at which point the scene modulates instead into the standard pattern for *Botschaft*,[26] in which the appearance of the Messenger is followed immediately by (1) standing beside the addressee (*not* "at the threshold"), and (2) the delivery of the message, after which—with or (rarely) without the response of the addressee—(3) the

[25] On the scene between Priam and Akhilleus in *Iliad* 24, see Foley 1991:174-89.

[26] See Arend 1933:54-63, and above, note 22.

Messenger departs.

This modulation—or better, juxtaposition, given the abruptness of the shift between types—serves in each instance to focus attention on a conflict of priorities. Hospitality Declined is in every case motivated by an equally formulaic expression of Haste to Depart. The offer to sit is refused in the interest of values deemed higher than the social pleasure of allowing oneself to be entertained, and so *a fortiori* more urgent than the values that structure the relation between host and guest. Hektor's loyalty (§8) to the defense of Troy, outlined more sharply by contrast with his brother's idleness, and no less explicit in his refusal of wine from Hekabe (§9); Patroklos' mission (§6) to report the identity of the wounded soldier to Akhilleus, whose curiosity in this matter implicitly undercuts the firmness of his resolve to remain indifferent to the plight of the Greeks; the appeal of Iris to the Winds (§7) in response to Akhilleus' prayer, when the pyre of Patroklos will not burn and release him to death; the desperate dignity of Priam (§10), who will not sit with his son's killer while Hektor's corpse lies unattended and unburied, though he has only just (*Il.* 24.477-79) kissed those murderous hands—all these scenes throw critical values into high relief, revealing commitments and obligations from whose fulfillment nothing can deter or deflect the Messenger.

In three of the five cases now under review, these commitments—and the narrative pattern that embodies them—are immediately honored. Hektor turns from Helen with no less resolve than he left his mother moments earlier, and goes on his way, while Hekabe hastens to offer prayer to Athene (*Il.* 6.286-310) and Paris shakes off his erotic sloth and returns to the field (503-19). Iris speaks briefly and departs, and the Winds leap up from their seats to do her bidding (*Il.* 23.212-16). In Priam's case, the higher values of reconciliation and forgiveness—more urgent than hatred, much harder to learn—require that he finally yield to Akhilleus' offer, and sit with him. Despite his initial refusal, the demands of hospitality prevail.[27]

With Patroklos, however, the situation is different. On the one hand, his refusal to accept hospitality—specifically, his decline of the offer to sit—is ostensibly honored by Nestor. In the absence of indications to the contrary, we must imagine that he remains standing throughout the conversation that ensues. On the other hand, the alleged urgency of his need to be on his way (*Il.* 11.649-52) is ignored. Rather than being allowed to turn quickly and leave—as are Hektor (§§8-9) and Iris (§7)—Patroklos is

[27] See above, note 25.

detained an inordinate length of time from returning to Akhilleus by what amounts to Nestor's most extensive monologue (655-803) in the poems, namely his tale of the cattle-raid against the Eleians, and his visit (along with Odysseus) to the house of Peleus, followed by his famous advice to Patroklos concerning Akhilleus' armor. The specific content of that speech[28] is less important here than its crucial role in advancing the story of the *Iliad*. As a result of his staying to hear Nestor's lengthy reminiscence and the advice that follows it—which at the level of type-scenes amounts to a breach of the pattern Hospitality Declined + Haste to Depart—Patroklos is deflected from his original aim and set on a narrative path that leads ineluctably to his own demise. It is worth noting that when Patroklos finally does return to Akhilleus (after a "hiatus" of four books), it is not to report the information he was initially sent out to discover—namely, the identity of the wounded soldier glimpsed by Akhilleus—but instead to entreat him to lend his armor and allow Patroklos to fight in his stead.[29] Apart from the change of pronouns and the variation of a single line (11.799/16.40), this entreaty precisely echoes Nestor's earlier counsel (11.799-803 = 16.36-45). Of course, this deflection of aim signals the priority of the story of the *Iliad* over the events at the surface of the narrative. However plausibly Akhilleus' request for information is motivated in the text—for example, as a sign that he is not at all indifferent to the suffering of the Greeks—from the viewpoint of the story, Patroklos' mission is a bogus one.[30] Its true function is to supply the pretext for his encounter with Nestor. Like all intercessory figures, as I have argued

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[28] For an analysis of the content of this speech, see Cantieni 1942, Vester 1956:54- 74, Pedrick 1983.

[29] *En route* back to Akhilleus' tent, Patroklos allows himself to be deflected from his course once again, this time to minister to the wounded Eurypylos (*Il.* 11.806-48, 15.390-404). This scene—essentially single, though dispersed over two widely separated places in the narrative—is interesting in light of the pattern of Hospitality Declined + Haste to Depart examined above, and in fact suggests that this pattern might itself be a species of a more generic pattern structuring responses to invitations of any type.

[30] In this it resembles, for example, the encounter of Odysseus with the shade of Elpenor in *Odyssey* 11 and his request for proper burial, whose actual function in the logic of the story is to motivate Odysseus' return to Aiaia for specific instructions on how to get home. For a discussion of Elpenor, along with cogent presentation of the distinction between the "function" and the "motivation" of narratives, and full bibliographical references, see Peradotto 1980.

elsewhere,[31] the old man is ultimately in the employ of the (abstract) story; his role here, at this critical juncture in the tale, is to motivate the Sacrifice of Patroklos and the consequent Return of Akhilleus.

Despite its greater preoccupation with comings and goings, comprising frequent Arrival, Messenger, and Visitation scenes and scenes structured by a character's eagerness to leave, the *Odyssey* shows no instances of the precise combination of the patterns Hospitality Declined + Haste to Depart that we have examined so far. Where Haste to Depart does occur, it is always after Hospitality has already been accepted and enjoyed, and the visitor (sooner or later) expresses a desire to be on his way again. This is clearly often the case with Odysseus, in his dealings with Aiolos (*Od.* 10.17-18)—where his request for permission to depart represents the motif in the "zero degree"—Kirke (10.467-89), Kalypso (5.81-84;160- 224), and the Phaiakians (7.146-52;331-33, 8.465-66, 13.28-35).[32] It also features prominently in the visits of Telemakhos to Sparta (4.594-99, 15.64-74) and Pylos (15.195-214), where the pattern raises issues that have direct bearing on the present argument.

After his arrival, entertainment, and conversation with Menelaos, Telemakhos responds to his host's insistence—ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐμοῖσιν [But come now, stay in my house]—that he remain in Sparta "eleven or twelve more days" (*Od.* 4.587-92) by elegantly declining that offer (594-99):

§11 Ἀτρεΐδη, μή δή με πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἔρυκε.
καὶ γὰρ κ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἐγὼ παρὰ σοί γ' ἀνεχοίμην
ἥμενος, οὐδέ με οἶκου ἕλοι πόθος οὐδὲ τοκήων·
αἰνῶς γὰρ μύθοισιν ἔπεσσί τε σοῖσιν ἀκούων
τέρπομαι. ἀλλ' ἤδη μοι ἀνιάζουσιν ἑταῖροι
ἐν Πύλῳ ἠγαθέῃ· σὺ δέ με χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἐρύκεις.

Son of Atreus, don't keep me here any longer.
Indeed I'd stay sitting beside you all year,

[31] See Dickson 1990. With reference to the central role played by Nestor in advancing the story of the *Iliad*, Vester 1956:55 remarks: "Alle diese Szenen [in which Nestor figures] . . . stellen die Kardinalstellen der Ilias dar; an diesen wird die Handlung auf weite Stecken festgelegt und auch in neue Bahnen gelenkt. Sie sind der Nerv der Handlung. An diesem Nerv sitzt aber der alte Nestor als der Faktor, der durch sein Wort die Handlung biz zur Transposition des Zorns in den Rachezorn vorantreibt."

[32] On the significance of the motif of departure vs. detainment and unwillingness to leave in the *Odyssey*, see Taylor 1960-61 and Apthorp 1980.

> nor would longing for home or parents ever seize me:
> for listening to your tales and words remarkably
> delights me. But my men already grow restless for me
> in sacred Pylos, and you keep me here too long.

The implicit connection between fascination with speech and deferral or forgetfulness of aim has already been touched on several times above, and will receive more attention in what follows. For the moment, it is important to note the parallels between this and several other passages in the poems. The initial hemistich of Menelaos' request—#ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον [But come now, stay] (*Od.* 4.587)—is repeated twice elsewhere. On one occasion (*Il.* 6.340), it is addressed to Hektor by Paris in lines that immediately precede Hektor's refusal of hospitality in the scene that has already been examined (above, §8). Its other appearance is in the departure scene in *Odyssey* 1, where the phrasing of Telemakhos' invitation —ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον, ἐπειγόμενός περ ὁδοῖο [But come now, stay, though you are eager to travel] (309)—is echoed in the disguised Athene's refusal: μή μ' ἔτι νῦν κατέρυκε, λιλαιόμενόν περ ὁδοῖο [Do not hold me back any longer now, while I yearn to travel] (315). Significant responsions—clustering around forms of the verbs {κατ}ἐρύκειν [hold back] and {ἀπο}πέμπειν [send away] in similar cola—also link the situation of Telemakhos in Menelaos' court with that of his father on the islands of Kirke and Kalypso.[33]

The narrative of Telemakhos' departure from Sparta in *Odyssey* 4 is suspended by an abrupt shift (624-25) of scene back to Ithaka, and only resumes eleven books later. As Apthorp has argued, it is in all likelihood not merely the account of his leaving that is interrupted but also the departure itself.[34] Despite his protestation of Haste to Depart, Telemakhos apparently succumbs to the allures of Menelaos' court—prominent among which is the pleasure he takes in his host's "tales and words" (594-98)—and remains in Sparta for roughly one month. Like Odysseus on Aiaia in *Odyssey* 10, he must in fact be eventually reminded of the homecoming he

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[33] For a citation of passages, see Delebecque 1958:26, Apthorp 1980:19-20, and Rose 1971:511-13.

[34] See Heubeck-West-Hainsworth 1988:51-66, 229 (on 594ff.) and 231-32 (on 621-24) on the problems associated with this shift. Apthorp 1980—relying principally on Delebecque 1958 and Taylor 1960-61—argues that narrative chronology "keeps moving" despite this "suspension," i.e., that the actual departure of Telemakhos from Sparta in Book 15 occurs roughly one month after the scene in Book 4.

seems to have forgotten (cf. *Od.* 10.472-74 and 15.3; 10-42).[35]

In the final exchange with Menelaos in *Odyssey* 15, some of the issues raised by his earlier leave-taking receive fuller treatment. The young man's request for permission to return home (64-66) now wins assent—in language that repeats the colon πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἐρυκ—# (cf. *Od.* 4.594;599)—and also prompts from Menelaos a reflection on the obligations of the host (68-74):

§12 Τηλέμαχ', οὔ τί σ' ἐγώ γε πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἐρύξω
ἱέμενον νόστοιο· νεμεσσῶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ
ἀνδρὶ ξεινοδόκῳ, ὅς κ' ἔξοχα μὲν φιλέῃσιν,
ἔξοχα δ' ἐχθαίρῃσιν· ἀμείνω δ' αἴσιμα πάντα.
ἶσόν τοι κακόν ἐσθ', ὅς τ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα νέεσθαι
ξεῖνον ἐποτρύνει καὶ ὃς ἐσσύμενον κατερύκει.
χρὴ ξεῖνον παρεόντα φιλεῖν, ἐθέλοντα δὲ πέμπειν.

Telemakhos, I surely won't keep you here any longer
if you yearn for home. I'd feel shame for myself and any
other host as much for being overly friendly
as overly unsociable. Propriety is best in everything.
It's just as wrong for someone to urge an unwilling guest
to leave, as to detain him if he's eager to depart.
Entertain a guest at hand but speed him when he wants to go.

If this lecture amounts to an implicitly ironic commentary on the ease with which Telemakhos himself had forgotten his home—cf. οὐδέ με οἴκου ἔλοι πόθος οὐδὲ τοκήων# [nor would longing for home or parents ever seize me] (*Od.* 4.596)—it is also proleptic of an irony touching the scene (*Od.* 15.193-214) that immediately follows his departure from Sparta. As they draw within sight of Pylos, Telemakhos abruptly asks his companion Peisistratos to avoid Nestor's palace altogether and to drop him off at the ship instead (200-1), "lest the old man hold me back against my will in his house | desiring to entertain" (μή μ' ὁ γέρων ἀέκοντα κατάσχῃ ᾧ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ | ἱέμενος φιλέειν).[36] This is despite the fact that

[35] See Apthorp 1980:5-6, 12-13.

[36] Apthorp (1980:20) remarks: "After his difficulty in escaping from Menelaos' hospitality it is hardly surprising that Telemachus should appear almost paranoid in his fear lest Nestor should hold him back (κατέσχῃ) against his will." See also Rose 1971:511- 13, who draws attention to the parallels between Telemakhos in Sparta and Pylos and Odys-

his decision to steer clear of Nestor makes him break his earlier promise (155-56) to convey Menelaos' regards to the old man. Telemakhos' Haste to Depart and fear of detention are so great that he acts to forestall the anticipated offer of hospitality. The line expressing his fear is unique in the poems, though κατέσχετο is used once elsewhere to describe Menelaos held back by the storm off Point Sunion ἐπειγόμενός περ ὁδοῖο# [though eager to travel] (*Od.* 3.284; cf. 1.309;315). The disguised Athene speculates (*Od.* 1.196-99) that Odysseus in all probability is detained (κατερύκεται; cf. 1.14) somewhere on the wide sea, where savages hold him captive (ἔχουσιν) and detain him against his will (ἐρυκανόωσ' ἀέκοντα#). Further, both Alkinoos—ἀέκοντα δέ σ' οὔ τις ἐρύξει [no one will hold you back against your will] (*Od.* 7.315) and Kirke—μηκέτι νῦν ἀέκοντες ἐμῷ ἐνὶ μίμνετε οἴκῳ [do not stay in my house any longer if it goes against your will] (*Od.* 10.489)—insist they will not keep Odysseus longer than he desires to stay.

The response of Peisistratos confirms Telemakhos' worst fear that it would be nearly impossible for him to escape should he once fall into Nestor's clutches (211-14):

§13 εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε οἶδε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν·
οἷος κείνου θυμὸς ὑπέρβιος, οὔ σε μεθήσει
ἀλλ' αὐτὸς καλέων δεῦρ' εἴσεται, οὐδέ ἑ φημι
ἄψ ἰέναι κενεόν· μάλα γὰρ κεχολώσεται ἔμπης.

For I know this for certain, deep down in my heart:
He has an overbearing spirit, and he won't let you go,
but he'll come here himself to summon you, and I don't think
he'll return without you; as it is, he'll be terribly angry.

Strong words from a dutiful son. The line describing Nestor's character as violent or "overbearing" (ὑπέρβιος) in fact appears elsewhere only once, closely echoing Poulydamas' description of berserk Akhilleus in *Iliad* 18—οἷος κείνου θυμὸς ὑπέρβιος, οὐκ ἐθελήσει | μίμνειν ἐν πεδίῳ [He has an overbearing spirit, and he will not be willing | to stay here on the plain] (262-63)—from whom he wisely counsels a swift retreat behind the safety of Troy's walls. The adjective on all other occasions is reserved for the fury of Dardanian Euphorbos (*Il.* 17.19)—surpassing leopard, lion, and boar in savagery (20-23)—the outrageous behavior of the suitors (*Od.* 1.368 = 4.321, 14.92 = 16.315, 14.95), and the rashness of Odysseus' crew

seus among the Phaiakians. Clarke 1967:39 refers to "Nestor's oppressive hospitality."

(*Od.* 12.379). Baneful anger (χόλος) is of course the Akhillean attribute *par excellence*. The closing hemistich (*Od.* 15.214) μάλα γὰρ κεχολώσεται ἔμπης# appears once elsewhere (*Od.* 19.324), in the allomorph μάλα περ κεχολωμένος αἰνῶς# [even though he is dreadfully angry], to describe the violent frustration of a suitor spurned and forever denied permission to court Penelope.

Except as parody—not only of Akhilleus descending amok on hapless Trojans, but possibly even also of Odysseus' escape by ship from the clutches of the Kyklops—this characterization is at first sight hard to reconcile with the image of the honeyed, fluent speaker of *Iliad* 1. These two pictures are not unrelated, however. The old man's imperious obstinacy, which leads him to violate the precepts Menelaos has only just pronounced (§12), is in a sense a natural reflex of his speech. Its sweetness and allure combine here with its tenacity to pose the genuine threat of detaining Telemakhos, deflecting him from his destination and thus depriving him of νόστος [homecoming]. This danger of detention and loss of aim also figures implicitly in other passages in which Nestor is involved. In *Odyssey* 3, the old man's logorrhea protracts the sacrifice to Poseidon that is underway when Telemakhos and Mentor-Athene land at Pylos. The sun sets and dusk comes on as he recounts his homecoming from Troy—Ὣς ἔφατ', ἠέλιος δ' ἄρ' ἔδυ καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἦλθε [As he spoke, the sun sank and gloom came on the land] (*Od.* 3.329)—though his guests first arrived on the beach at dawn (1-5).[37] Athene must gently remind him that it is getting dark (335-36) and the rites begun have yet to be finished: Ὦ γέρον, ἦ τοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν κατέλεξας· | ἀλλ' ἄγε . . . [Old man, these things you have said are indeed right and fitting. | But come now, . . .] (330-31). And in view of the narrative motif of Hospitality Declined, the pattern of the ensuing scene is perhaps worth noting. As the sacrificial fire is extinguished and the visitors turn away to go back to their ship (342-44), Nestor restrains (κατέρυκε) them—Νέστωρ δ' αὖ κατέρυκε καθαπτόμενος ἐπέεσσι [But Nestor in turn put his hand out and held them back, with the words . . .] (345)—to insist that both sleep in the palace. Athene politely but firmly declines (356-70)

[37] The line appears elsewhere only at *Od.* 5.225, on the evening before the building of the raft on which Odysseus leaves Ogygia. It coincides with the end of Odysseus' speech rejecting Kalypso's offer of immortality and reasserting his desire to return to Penelope, and thus reinforces the closure of his statement. In the case of Nestor in *Odyssey* 3, the line on the contrary draws attention to a lack of closure, namely to the business Nestor's monologue has suspended.

on the ground that she has business to attend to among the Kaukonians, leaving Telemakhos to experience (and endure) the old man's hospitality.

As in the case of Patroklos in *Iliad* 11, it can be argued with some justification that Telemakhos' hasty departure in *Odyssey* 15 is motivated by Homer's desire to avoid what would be an awkward and otiose repetition of a Hospitality scene. It is of course true that Telemakhos has already been entertained by Nestor—though some twelve books earlier (*Od.* 3.386-94)—and has gleaned from him what little information the old man has about the whereabouts of Odysseus. By the same token, however, it should be noted that the guest-host relation between them has not been cemented by the customary (almost obligatory) presentation of a gift.[38] This by itself could support a claim that Homer "had every reason" to bring Telemakhos and Nestor together one last time. Once again, however, the narrative function of the pattern of Hospitality Declined carries far greater weight than merely intentionalist arguments. The convention of the γέρας [gift-exchange] is superseded (and the promise to Menelaos broken) by the more urgent motif of Haste to Depart in the face of the risk of detention and loss of homecoming—especially since Telemakhos has already once before succumbed to the attraction of tantalizing speech, in his protracted stay at Sparta. More important than the fact that he leaves Pylos empty-handed is that he escapes falling into Nestor's hands a second time and so manages to leave at all.

III

Speech like song, like that of the Muse or Bard, but also like that of the Sirens; sweet interminable words born of memory but causing forgetfulness; a lucid voice flowing smoothly like honey, wine, lamentation, sleep, and the mists of death to draw and deflect its listener from his journey home—the connotative range of traits assigned to Nestor intersects at the point of this motif with the issues raised by the type-scene of Hospitality Denied + Haste to Depart in which he is involved. The motif is of course much larger than the figure of Nestor himself. Deeper than the level of the surface narrative, it belongs to the dynamics of the story that

[38] By way of contrast, note the prominence with which the issue of gifts figures in his dealings with Menelaos (*Od.* 4.589-619, 15.75-132). On the convention of gift-exchange, see, e.g., Coldstream 1983 and Finley 1979:73ff.

controls the presentation of his *ethos*; and deeper still, it ultimately derives from an implicit psychology of pleasure.[39] Telemakhos' admission to Menelaos (§11) that the delight (αἰνῶς . . . τέρπομαι) of listening to his host's tales could easily keep him there yearlong only underscores the connection between sweetness and oblivion already noted above (§§2-3) in the form of the "sweeter than X (honey/homecoming)" pattern that responds with the description of Nestor's honeyed voice (§1). Sweet is whatever allures and soothes, but what allures also poses the threat of loss of and deflection from true aim; and chief among the sweet things that detain and defer—in fact, "sweeter even than honey" (*Il.* 1.249)—is the exquisite pleasure of narrative.[40]

The temptation represented by the sweet speech of Nestor embodies a danger that for Telemakhos in Book 15 (as for Patroklos in the *Iliad*) is perhaps as great—always allowing for parody—as the threat posed to Odysseus by the Sirens. We have already noted the associations between Nestorian and poetic speech in general, in terms of such attributes as sweetness, clarity, and allure. The Sirens too enjoy these traits. Kirke (*Od.* 12.38-54) warns Odysseus of the threat they pose to his homecoming in words that give special emphasis to the quality of the sound (φθογγή) of their voice—four of eleven instances of this noun in the poems refer to the Sirens (*Od.* 12.41;159;198, 23.326)—and their seductive song (ἀοιδή). The other term (ὄψ) frequently used for their voice shows a similar distribution, with fully half (14 of 24X) of its occurrences reserved for the Sirens (4X) and divine voice in general (10X), and the remainder given over to human voices in marked and emotionally charged situations—in expressions of grief (*Od.* 11.421, 20.92) and pitiless rage (*Il.* 11.137, 18. 222, 21.98)—and in situations that advert to its exceptional beauty, as in the case of the Trojan Elders, who speak as cicadas drone (*Il.* 3.152), and of Odysseus himself (*Il.* 3.221), whose words fall like flurries of snow. In all these instances, the immediate effect of the voice is to command its listener's awe and full attention, to turn him aside from his course, to stun

[39] For an introduction to views of poetry and pleasure represented in Homer, see, e.g., Walsh 1984:3-21 and Pucci 1987:193-96, 201-4.

[40] The pleasure of narrative is an abiding motif in the poems, and especially in the *Odyssey*. In addition to the passages discussed above, see e.g. *Od.* 4.239, 8.367-69; 487-91, 9.3-4, 13.1-2, 17.513-21; and Apthorp 1980:16-19, who notes the power of narrative to charm (θέλγειν) in the case of Muses and stroytellers no less than of the Sirens themselves.

and absorb or even paralyze him;[41] and the Sirens clearly represent this effect in the highest (and most lethal) degree. Whoever gives them ear will never come home to see wife and children (*Od.* 12.41-43), since he will be bewitched by their "lucid song"—Σειρῆνες λιγυρῇ θέλγουσιν ἀοιδῇ [the Sirens charm with their clear singing] (44; and cf. 40)—into remaining with them until the flesh rots from his bones (45-46).[42]

The parallels between Nestor and the Sirens at the level of the narrative motif of detention are worth considering more closely. As Odysseus' ship draws near their grassy island, the wind suddenly drops and their honeyed voices call out to him (*Od.* 12.184-91):

§14 Δεῦρ' ἄγ' ἰών, πολύαιν' Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν,
νῆα κατάστησον, ἵνα νωϊτέρην ὄπ' ἀκούσῃς.
οὐ γάρ πώ τις τῇδε παρήλασε νηΐ μελαίνῃ,
πρίν γ' ἡμέων μελίγηρυν ἀπὸ στόματος ὄπ' ἀκοῦσαι,
ἀλλ' ὅ γε τερψάμενος νεῖται καὶ πλείονα εἰδώς.
ἴδμεν γάρ τοι πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ
Ἀργεῖοι Τρῶές τε θεῶν ἰότητι μόγησαν·
ἴδμεν δ' ὅσσα γένηται ἐπὶ χθονὶ πολυβοτείρῃ.

Come closer, famed Odysseus, great glory of Akhaians,
stay your ship, so you can listen to our voice.
For no one ever sails by this place in his black ship
until he hears the honeyed voice from our mouths,
takes his pleasure and sails off knowing even more.
For we indeed know everything that in wide Troy
the Argives and Trojans suffered by the will of the gods,
and we know everything that happens on the fertile earth.

The degree to which this passage adverts to the intimately related issues of

[41] Sirens: *Od.* 12.160;185;187;192; Muses: *Il.* 1.604, *Od.* 24.60; Kalypso: *Od.* 5.61; Kirke: *Od.* 10.221; various gods: *Il.* 7.53, 2.182, 10.512, 14.150, 20.380; *Od.* 24.535. The loud cry of Poseidon (*Il.* 14.150) turns the Akhaians from thoughts of retreat and inspires them with courage, while Akhilleus' voice (*Il.* 18.222) strikes paralyzing fear into the Trojans; and fear is also the immediate response of Hektor to Apollo's voice (*Il.* 20.380). On the role of the voice in inducing the fascination associated with binding-spells, see Marsh 1979:ch. 1. On the Hesiodic view that poetry acts as a remedy for present anxieties by deflecting the listener's attention from immediate (particular) cares to monuments of universal order—hence through an evocation of memory that simultaneously induces forgetfulness—see Walsh 1984:22-36 and Pucci 1977:espec. 22-27.

[42] On the relation between magic, rhetoric, and sexual seduction in Greek thought, see Marsh 1979:ch. 3.

poetic utterance (189-91), sweetness of voice (187), pleasure from song (188)—through which the Sirens are assimilated to the Muses themselves—and the risk of detention (185) is obvious, and has been dealt with extensively elsewhere.[43] What deserves further treatment here, especially in relation to the figure of Nestor, is how the Sirens characterize themselves and, specifically, the content of the song they promise to the wayfarer.

To begin with, it has often been noted that the Sirens' claim to knowledge equals what is attributed to the Muses by Homer in the celebrated invocation at the beginning of the *Catalogue of Ships*—with the anaphora of #ἴδμεν . . . (189, 191) compare ἴστε τε πάντα# [you know everything] (*Il.* 2.485). Its range corresponds, though of course (given their divine status) disproportionately, to the broader temporal scope of the knowledge traditionally assigned in the poems to the type of the Elder. The aged Halitherses (*Od.* 2.188), Ekheneos (*Od.* 7.157), and Nestor himself (*Od.* 24.51) are in fact all qualified by the closing B1 hemistich παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς# [knowing many ancient things]. Despite the fact that this formula is modelled on the ubiquitous adonean colon /- u u εἰδώς#/, its attribution is unique to these three figures. The same association of greater knowledge with greater age is expressed by the endline formula ἐπεὶ πρότερος γενόμην καὶ πλείονα οἶδα# [since I am older than you and know more] (Il. 19.291, 21.440)—a fact that Nestor makes much of in his lecture to Agamemnon and Akhilleus in the opening of the *Iliad* (1.259), as well as in his qualified praise of Diomedes several books later (*Il.* 9.56- 59).[44]

The kind of knowledge to which advanced age gives special access is that of the past. Without discounting the fact that Elders may also command a strictly practical wisdom that is oriented to the range of possibilities in the present—Nestor himself is after all one of the outstanding proponents of μῆτις [practical intelligence] in the *Iliad* (cf. *Il.*

[43] For discussion and bibliography, see Pucci 1979, 1980, 1987:209-13.

[44] To this list could be added the A2 formula for circumspection—ὁ γὰρ οἷος ὅρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω# [who alone looked both ahead and behind] (*Il.* 18.250, *Od.* 24.452; cf. *Il.* 1.343, 3.108-10; *Od.* 2.158-59)—commonly predicated of old men, or else of young ones (such as Poulydamas) known for wisdom beyond their years. See Dickson 1990 for a discussion of the range of this and related formulas; and Vester 1956:14-15.

7.323-24 = 9.92-93, 10.18-19, 14.106-8, 23.313-18)[45]—their minds turn chiefly towards the past, from which they "know many ancient things" (παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς#). This is of course what grants them their role of keepers of tradition, whether at the level of specific moral conventions—issuing in their greater sense of propriety and of what is "right and fitting" (κατὰ μοῖραν, κατὰ κόσμον, κατ' αἶσαν) in any given situation[46]—or else, more generally, at the level of the ethnic and cultural memory of the group to which they belong. Nestor himself in fact once figures quite literally as the encyclopedic memory of his race, the custodian of the genealogical inventory of *all* the Greeks at Troy, which he enumerates for Peleus prior to the marshalling of the troops for the expedition (*Il.* 7.128): πάντων Ἀργείων ἐρέων γενεήν τε τόκον τε [recounting the generation and birth of all the Argives]. Elders thus typically embody the link between their present community and the ancient narrative blood-lines that define it and shape its moral horizons.

The character of these narratives is the second and final point worth noting. It has often been remarked that what the Sirens offer to tell Odysseus is precisely the tale of the *Iliad* itself:[47] πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ Ἀργεῖοι Τρῶές τε θεῶν ἰότητι μόγησαν [everything that in wide Troy the Argives and Trojans suffered by the will of the gods] (*Il.* 12.189-90). This is of course the same song that the Muses inspire Homer to tell—unless what these creatures promise to sing is in fact even more comprehensive, since the *Iliad* itself is clearly just one fragment of a far

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[45] See Vester 1956:18-23, and more recently Detienne-Vernant 1974:11-26.

[46] For a preliminary survey of the associative range of the phrases κατὰ μοῖραν, κατὰ κόσμον, and κατ' αἶσαν in Homer, see Dickson 1990. Of note in the present con-text is the fact that over 60% of the uses of the colon κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπ-# [spoke right and fittingly] in the poems occur in situations in which the generational gap between speakers is explicitly an issue. Propriety is more often than not the special province of the aged.

[47] See Pucci 1987:209-13. With a reference to Buschor 1944, he remarks (212): "The Sirens, Muses of Hades, have the same power of *thelgein* [enchantment] as the Iliadic, epic Muses. . . . Even their poetic themes become contiguous: because the Sirens are Muses of Hades, their promise to sing of all that happens in Troy sounds like a polemic intimation by the *Odyssey* that the epic cycle of the Trojan War is obsessionally involved with what today we would call the 'beautiful death' of the heroes." The latter part of this statement of course goes beyond the range of the present essay, and engages (though from a different perspective) the issues of narrative pleasure and grief raised earlier. The "strictly Iliadic diction" of the Sirens' song is the subject of Pucci 1979.

broader narrative tradition.[48] Nestor's speeches likewise have a similar range and resonance. His tales of war against the hill-beasts (*Il.* 1.262-72), of battle between Pylians and Arkadians beside "swirling Keladon" (*Il.* 7.132-156), of cattle-raids on Elis (*Il.* 11.670-762), of the funeral games of Epeian Amaryngkeus (*Il.* 23.629-43)—are identical at least in tenor and substance with the Homeric narratives in which they are embedded. They open out on the extensive antiquity of pre-Iliadic κλέα ἀνδρῶν [sung glories of men], such as Akhilleus himself is singing as the Greek embassy approaches his compound (*Il.* 9.189). In this respect, his tales in fact serve as metonyms of that vast and unrecorded narrative tradition from which poems like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* themselves emerge, and from which they derive their support and orientation. Nestorian speech is thus virtually the same as the speech of Siren, Muse, and Poet himself, and in some sense—given its implicit invocation of the lost narrative whole—is the paradigm of their speech.[49] This is certainly true of the role it plays within the Akhaian society depicted in the poems. Like Homer, who mediates the Mycenaean past for an Archaic audience, Nestor provides the link between the community of Greeks at Troy and the prior narratives that embody its heritage. This analogy confirms the metaphorical associations examined earlier, which linked his speech to poetic utterance and in some respects assimilated Nestor to the figure of the Bard. What chiefly distinguishes his speech from that of Homer, of course, is the fact that the old man always speaks in the first person.[50] We saw that this is what makes him an

[48] Pucci (1987:211) also implicitly recognizes this possibility, though with reference chiefly to the second claim made by the Sirens, on which he notes that "the nature of the Sirens' promised song contributes to the sublimity of the scene. It is infinite in scope: the Sirens tell Odysseus that he will learn not only all that happened in Troy but also all that happens in the world." Despite his acknowledgment (17-18) that the process of evolution of both poems follows the dynamics of oral composition, much of his language ("text," "writing," "reader") at times seems to imply—perhaps even despite his best inten-tions—the status of the *Iliad* as a relatively fixed *text* against which the text of the *Odyssey* launches its "polemic." This language is of course encouraged by his claim (26-27) that written and oral semiosis are identical. See also Dickson 1992.

[49] See Foley 1991:39-60.

[50] Formally, and to borrow Plato's distinction (*Rep.* 392C-395), Nestor's recollections amount to *mimesis* that is also *diegetic*, namely to an *oratio recta* with narrative content. Plato himself does not consider the possibility of this kind of mirroring, namely the combination of direct speech and narrative, and no convenient term seems to exist for

autaoidos or "self-singer," bound through his peculiar grief to interminable autocitation, rather than a singer whose identity (except in invocation of the Muses and occasional apostrophes) always remains concealed. As we suggested above, Nestor's role as "self-singer" is in turn a reflex of the special sorrow born of his remarkable longevity, and which echoes sadly in the words (*Il.* 11.763; cf. 23.643) with which his reminiscences sometimes close: #ὥς ἔον, εἴ ποτ' ἔον γε, μετ' ἀνδράσιν . . . [Such was I among men, if ever this was . . .].

Muse, Poet, Siren, and Elder thus all sing epic narrative—a song of the irretrievable past, a song of the glory of men in war—in much the same honeyed, flowing voice, and with much the same irresistable allure. Their virtual identity in terms of the substance of what they sing raises the question whether what they each sing serves a similar or even an identical function. This is not the place to address this question with reference to the Muses and thus to Homeric narrative itself.[51] However, on the basis not only of the metaphorical associations examined in the first section of this paper, but also of the narrative pattern of Hospitality Declined + Haste to Depart considered more recently, it would seem that a functional analogy indeed obtains in the case of Nestor and the Sirens. What differences in function lie between them are possibly just ones of degree. Much like the Sirens, Nestor often exhibits the features of a sweet (and potentially deadly) detainer. His narrative of adventures two or three generations prior to Troy at one and the same time pleases and teaches—and also threatens to trap his listeners, to deflect them from their aim and deprive them of νόστος.[52] In the course of an apparently innocent errand—in quest of the name of a

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the trope. In a pinch, something like "secondary" or "mimetic" *diegesis* might do. Whatever name it is given, the important point is that Nestor most characteristically does precisely what Homer himself does, namely narrates the κλέα ἀνδρῶν. For a modern discussion of Plato's distinction between *diegesis* and *mimesis*, see Genette 1980:162-66.

[51] See Pucci 1987 for the most extensive work to date on this question. He remarks (231) that "for the *Odyssey*, the Muses—like the Sirens—are personifications of literary practices, of the epic tradition, rather than divine objective inspirers."

[52] Frame 1978:81-115 relies heavily on Indo-European linguistics and comparative mythology to argue that the figure of Nestor in the Homeric poems is the literary avatar of a god "Who-Brings-Home" (**nes-tôr*). Whatever the status of his linguistic evidence and his implicit view of the nature of myths—in which Max Müller (unacknowledged) looms large —a typology of the scenes from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in which Nestor plays a part often seems to suggest that he serves precisely the opposite function.

wounded man—Patroklos stops to listen to him; and though he does leave Nestor's tent eventually, it is along a path that leads anywhere but home again. Telemakhos, perhaps wiser for having once succumbed to the charm of stories in the court of Menelaos, avoids meeting him altogether—and gets home as a result.

Would that the same could be said of this study. It has perhaps already tarried at the old man's side too long, without ever reaching the end of his story. As always in the analysis of oral traditions, we are left with a sense of the interminability of the task. The relation between the extant texts and the totality of the unrecorded narratives out of which they arise and from which they derive their orientation is always a metonymic one,[53] the relation of part to implicit and unrecoverable whole. Issues raised but insufficiently addressed in the course of the present essay—the complete metaphorical range of "sweetness" and "fluidity," the psychology of narrative reception, the unsettling dynamics of memory and forgetfulness, the ritual transmutation of grief into narratives—must remain for the time being mere prolepses, rough directions for analysis that is better postponed for now. After all, a sense of timeliness is best in everything.

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[53] See Foley 1991. My thanks once again to John Foley for patient and thoughtful advice, and for supplying me with advance copies of sections of his work.

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Theocritus and Oral Tradition

James B. Pearce

Certain aspects of the life of the Greek poet Theocritus are fairly well agreed upon. We know, for instance, that he flourished in the third century B.C. He was most likely born in Sicily and migrated at a later time to the Greek island of Cos and from there to Alexandria in Egypt, or he was Coan by birth and came to be associated with Sicily only later in his life. At any rate, he appeared in Alexandria at a time in history when this great city was the cultural center of the Eastern Mediterranean. He became part of the Alexandrian school, which, coming as it did upon the heels of the golden age of Greek literature, did what it could to avoid slavish imitation of its predecessors:

> All the Alexandrians had in common one characteristic, showing itself in a variety of forms, namely avoidance of the trite and commonplace. Hence all alike sought restlessly for subjects either new or capable of being treated from some new angle; and all used language which, while retaining the flavour of antiquity, showed at every turn some novelty of formation, shade of meaning, or collocation (Rose 1948:317).

In particular they developed new genres such as the epyllion, or little epic, and epigram, miniature forms instead of the large-scale epic and drama. They also had a keen regard for form in both language and meter, and developed a taste for erudition as witnessed in their didactic poems and mythological allusions. In particular, they avoided large works and strove to expand upon previously treated material in ways that emphasized individuals' emotions or peculiarities.

Theocritus' greatest contribution to the movement was a group of poems referred to today as the *Idylls*, which feature several pastoral poems, the first ever to appear in literary form, and which earned Theocritus the title of Father of Pastoral Poetry. We see here the beginnings of a genre that numbers among its followers such names as Bion and Moschus among

the Greeks, the Romans Virgil, Calpurnius, and Nemesianus, the Italians Boccaccio and Petrarch, and such English poets as Spenser, Milton, Shelley, and Arnold.

This genre, however, seems to have appeared full-blown with Theocritus out of a literary vacuum, the source used for his pastorals being shrouded in mystery. A few Theocritean scholars simply dismiss the issue as unresolvable due to scant evidence. There is, however, general consensus that the genre was most likely based somewhat upon a preexisting folk culture of Sicily and the Peloponnesus, more particularly upon the actual songs of the shepherds of these regions. They especially single out the tradition of singing contests among the country folk, the remnants of which are perhaps still to be found today in Greece, Sicily, and parts of mainland Italy.

Steven Walker (1980) recounts a tradition according to which Syracuse in Sicily was afflicted by a plague or civil strife that the goddess Artemis was responsible for bringing to an end. Consequently, in her honor a festival was instituted, featuring the custom of herdsmen coming to the theater at Syracuse to perform their singing contests for the public. Walker goes on to say that perhaps these were witnessed by a young Theocritus (16): "It is certainly tempting to imagine Theocritus witnessing such spectacles as a child, and later looking back on his childhood and saying like Wordsworth in *The Prelude*: 'Shepherds were the men that pleased me first.'" According to A. S. F. Gow (1972: xiv), however, "the gap between the ritual singing adduced as the origin of Bucolic and the real songs of peasants on the one hand, and on the other the songs of the bucolic poets, is profound, nor does our information suffice to bridge it." In fact most Theocritean scholars of today would agree that the extent to which Theocritus borrows from some earlier tradition and what is original in his poems is quite unclear.

This paper addresses some aspects of this supposed "borrowing," in particular the possibility of Theocritus' being influenced by the motifs of an oral tradition existing among the shepherds of some Doric-speaking Greek area.

First of all it should become obvious to the reader of Theocritus that the poet wanted his songs at least to *appear* to be directly from the mouths of his shepherd characters. In fact, most of his *Idylls* are presented in dramatic form and the narrated portions employ similar language. Yet there can be little doubt that what one encounters in the *Idylls* is not simply a mimicking of real country songs; on the contrary, most of the contents are a reflection of Theocritus' own literary genius. His poems are highly

literary, even artificially so. They are neither formulaic nor lacking a high incidence of necessary enjambement. And it may be noted, as has Richard Janko (1982:31), that Theocritus was aware of epic enjambement tendencies: "The mock-heroic *Idyll* 22 of Theocritus is indistinguishable from real epic in terms of enjambement." Janko goes on to support this claim with pertinent statistics. In short, what we have in Theocritus is a highly literate poet fully steeped in a highly literate tradition. Yet Theocritus is attempting to compose songs that come forth from the mouths of his shepherd characters, who are thoroughly steeped in rusticity. Moreover, Theocritus would only naturally have wanted to give his shepherds' words a semblance of authenticity. I contend that he would surely have wanted to, and indeed did, lend verisimilitude to his rustic scenes by borrowing some aspects of real shepherd life as well as certain aspects from real shepherd songs.

Let us also bear in mind that the Alexandrians, as one of their characteristics, tended to write for a well-educated reader, one familiar with a wide variety of literary works and well versed in various literary traditions. This practice is, of course, in extreme contrast to the oral style of song that would appeal to the non-literate shepherds as they composed their ditties.

As one reads Theocritus' *Idylls*, it is not too difficult to determine what of real country life is reflected there. What remains to be proved is whether it is logical to assume that to *further* the verisimilitude there were borrowings from actual contest songs, that is, topics and motifs, if not actual wording. The issue then is, which, if any, motifs found in Theocritus have their roots in an oral tradition and which are original with the poet or perhaps to what extent he borrowed from the wording or phraseology of real shepherd songs. I shall elaborate on both these issues later, but first it will prove beneficial to digress a bit to consider a few mechanical aspects of the poems.

Theocritus, being from Sicily or Cos, spoke the Doric dialect of Greek as his native language. Yet the choice of dialect for a work of literature in Greek antiquity was based on other considerations: "In the course of literary development . . . dialects came to be characteristic of certain classes of literature, and, their role once established, the choice of one or the other usually depended upon this factor rather than upon the native dialect of the author" (Buck 1928:14). As a matter of fact, Theocritus himself writes in a number of different dialects within the *Idylls*. Those which are pastoral in nature, however, are invariably Doric. Theocritus of course stands at the beginning of the pastoral genre, that is,

there exists no literary precedent concerning choice of dialect. It seems only natural then that he would use the very dialect of the shepherds about whom he writes, that is to say, those of Sicily, south Italy, and the area around Arcadia. The dialect of all these regions is Doric. Yet Doric was considered by the Alexandrians to be in many respects a non-literary dialect. Perhaps it was for this very reason that Theocritus felt it to be especially appropriate for his non-literate shepherds. In his non-pastoral *Idyll* 15, two Syracusan women who now lived in Alexandria are criticized for their characteristic broadening of vowels by an unnamed man in the crowd:

> MAN: Will you two wretched turtle doves put a stop to your endless chatter? [To the crowd] They'll wear us out with all their drawling.
> PRAXINOA: Heavens, where is this fellow from? And what is it to you if we chatter? Go buy some slaves and order them about. You're giving orders to Syracusans now, and I'll have you know that we are Corinthians by descent as was Bellerophon. We are speaking a Peloponnesian dialect, and it is permitted, I presume, for Dorians to speak Doric.

Yet Theocritus' Doric is a fuller or "salon-Doric." Perhaps more of his artificiality is revealed by this hyper-Doric form.

Furthermore, according to R. J. Cholmeley (1913:36), "Theocritus introduces—even in the mouths of his roughest countrymen—long obsolete Homeric forms. His language is the Homeric which prevails in the epic and lyric poetry of Greece. Even in the bucolic idylls there is not only an admixture of Homeric forms, but a not infrequent reminiscence of Homeric phrase." Let us keep this in mind as we attempt to tie the *Idylls* to an oral tradition and in particular as we consider the fact that Theocritus chose the dactylic hexameter for his pastorals, the very metrical form of the Homeric epic.

Once again, there are strict conventions among the Greeks concerning their choice of poetic meter just as we have seen with their choice of dialect. It is fair to say that when a Greek poet considered composing within a given genre, his choice of meter was predetermined by tradition, and he would seldom question the issue. His reader would have considered the wrong choice of meter as in poor taste. Yet once again we must realize that Theocritus stood at the beginning of a genre. His choice therefore

could be based on something other than a literary tradition.[1] It is tempting to think that his choice of the epic hexameter was influenced in some way by shepherd songs. Of course the meter of shepherd songs is unknown, but a few conclusions may be inferred from available data. First of all, we can safely assume that shepherds may have been familiar with the language of rhapsodes. Their performances are known to have continued as late as the time of Sulla, 138-78 B.C., long after the time of Theocritus. One particular rhapsode, Cynaethus, is said to have recited Homer at Syracuse as early as 504 B.C.[2] Furthermore, an acquaintance on the part of shepherds with Homeric recitations or perhaps even with oral compositional techniques, could possibly have led them to make a general association between oral, spontaneous composition and the hexameter verse form. Again it is tempting to think that if shepherds chose the hexameter for their verse form as appropriate because of the extemporaneous nature of their contest songs, it would not be unlikely that Theocritus used the same verse form either in imitation of the shepherd songs or, more likely, to indicate extemporaneity in the songs of his *Idylls*.

Let us also consider Theocritus' use of contest songs, examining especially those of *Idyll* 5. Although this may not be one of the best of Theocritus' works, it does serve as his most typical example of the amoebaean singing exchange. Here we have in literary form an approximation of the form of actual contest songs, similar in many ways even to those still sung in contest among country people of that part of the world today. The amoebaean exchange has many characteristics that can be found reflected in practically all of Theocritus' successors in the field of the pastoral. It is the one format that perhaps most typically represents how shepherds actually sang for their own amusement in the fields of ancient Greece. David Halperin refers to "the convention of 'amoebaean song' which was destined to become the hallmark of the bucolic poetry of Theocritus and his imitators" (1983:178). The term amoebaean implies an exchange in which there are two singers singing in opposition. The one presents a "lead-off" song on a topic of his own choosing, and therefore it may or may not be extemporaneous. The "second" singer then would be expected to respond to the lead-off song in some way; he might give an

[1] Cf. Rosenmeyer 1969:14: "The gross fact remains that pastoral lyric was at first composed in the same verse form as epic, and remained faithful to the pattern for over 1700 years."

[2] According to T. W. Allen (1924:66), this performance occurred as early as soon after the founding of Syracuse, i.e., before 700 B.C.

opposing view, produce a song on a similar theme, or simply add information. His real task of course would be to outdo his opponent in some fashion. The lead-off singer would then begin the second round of the contest with a theme of his own choosing and the entire process would be repeated. It is felt by some, however, that if the lead-off singer were in some manner to build his song upon the previous response, he would "score more points," so to speak, with the judge. One sure thing about this technique is that it required spontaneity at least on the part of the second singer.

For example: Comatas, the lead-off singer in *Idyll* 5, begins the contest in line 80 with a claim of love from the Muses, the divine inspirers of song, and devotion to them on his part. Lacon, the second singer, responds with a claim of love from Apollo, another divine inspirer of song, and devotion to Apollo on his part. In the second set of songs (84-87), Comatas boasts of the fertility of his flock and of the amorous advances of one; Lacon responds with a boast of the productivity of his flock and of his amorous adventures with a loved one of his own. These exchanges continue on topics such as their respective admiration for wild plants and/or their fruits, gifts proffered to their respective loved ones, warnings addressed to their respective flocks, and so on for some fourteen amoebic exchanges, through line 137, all following the basic pattern in which the response songs are in some way built upon the lead-off songs.

We might also consider Theocritus' use of the refrain. Once again by using a stylistic feature, Theocritus establishes it as one of the conventional characteristics of the genre to be repeated by many of his successors. Yet this particular characteristic, the refrain, might be considered either related somehow to the oral pastoral songs preceding Theocritus or at least constituting an attempt on his part to lend his pastorals an oral flavor. Certainly the refrain can be used for a variety of other stylistic purposes, but in addition to these, whether an actual part of the oral tradition or not, the refrain could lend to the reader of a written tradition a feeling for the oral as if the refrain were being used as a compositional device whereby the extemporaneous oral singer paused somewhat to organize his thoughts before proceeding with the next several lines or stanzas.

So much for mechanical aspects, each of which, incidentally, can be thought of as a reflection of a preexisting oral form; let us return to our examination of other ways in which real pastoral life is reflected in Theocritus' *Idylls*. First of all, let us consider the caste system among the various herdsmen found in the *Idylls*. According to tradition the herdsmen occupied distinct social positions depending on the type of animals they

herded. The most elite were the neatherds (or cowherds) followed in turn by the shepherds, then the goatherds, and finally the swineherds. By far the majority of characters found throughout the pastoral genre are shepherds and goatherds. The herdsman's ideal, however, found in the character of a certain Daphnis, is quite naturally supposed to be a neatherd. The swineherds, on the other hand, are not even found in Theocritus, and they appear in later pastoralists only on rare occasions and never have speaking roles. Furthermore, a distinction is clearly made between the goatherd and other herdsmen above him in the caste system.[3] Also, the rustics of the pastoral genre are frequently depicted as being involved in some all-too-realistic rustic chore, for example milking animals of the flock, making cheese from the milk thus extracted, herding the flocks to water or shade, protecting them from disease or predators, and so on.

Quite frequently in the *Idylls* we read of shepherds meeting in the fields as by coincidence they drive their respective flocks to the same place, perhaps in search of shade or water. The tradition is that when real shepherds met on just such real occasions, in order to while away their spare time as the flocks drank, rested, or browsed and cropped the grass, they would recline in some shady precinct and play their rustic musical instruments and/or sing. This practice in time gave rise to the singing contest in order to make such encounters more interesting and competitive. If the records of such contests in the *Idylls* are accurate, the entire process involved an exchange of compliments or insults upon their meeting, which would then precipitate the challenge to a match, a debate over the suitableness of the environment for singing (choosing a lovely spot appropriate for their songs), selecting a judge to determine the victor in the contest, staking of wagers to be won by the victor (frequently involving the use of various animals from their respective flocks, hand-carved vessels, or musical pipes), and of course the judge's decision along with the elation of the victor and the depression of the loser.[4]

It seems only natural then that Theocritus, in wanting to lend verisimilitude to his *Idylls*, would reflect in them not only various aspects of real shepherds' lives but, since his readers could be expected to be sensitive to them, various aspects of their real songs. This activity might have involved the borrowing of specific words, topics, or motifs but, since there are practically no indications to the contrary, not necessarily

[3] See *Idylls* 1.56, 1.86, 5.51-52, 6.6-7, and 7.13-14.

[4] For examples, see *Idyll* 5.1-79 and 138-50.

phraseology of greater length than single words or short phrases. This study limits itself to Theocritus' borrowing of motifs; but in order to seek specific indications of this borrowing, it will first be necessary to establish the methodology employed for determining what comprises a sufficient basis for inclusion in the study. The assumption here is that if a motif occurs often enough in Theocritus' pastorals, it more than likely was thought by the poet to be one that typified the genre and therefore was more than likely an actual part of an oral shepherd song tradition existing in Theocritus' day.

I have treated here a total of seven poems: *Idylls* 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11.[5] This list coincides with Steven Walker's list and does not differ radically from that of other Theocritean scholars (cf. Walker 1980:34). These seven poems yield a total of 703 lines, that is, an average of ca. 100 lines per poem. This study limits itself to five specific motifs, illustrated here selectively because of the frequency of their occurrences. Each of these motifs occurs from ten to twenty-three times for an average of sixteen times each in the collection of seven poems. Each of the seven poems contains an average of between eleven and twelve instances of these motifs alone.

Rustic Gifts

Let us consider these more commonly encountered motifs as they appear in the *Idylls*. First of all it may be noted that Theocritus makes frequent allusion to various rustic gifts that are usually being bestowed upon or offered to a loved one. The herdsman of pastoral literature would attempt this bestowal with the only gifts he had to offer, and these are sometimes even amusing in their crudeness. Often such rustic gifts consisted of animals or flowers. Note the following:

> αἴ κα ταὶ Μοῖσαι τὰν οἴιδα δῶρον ἄγωνται,
> ἄρνα τὺ σακίταν λαψῇ γέρας· αἰ δέ κ' ἀρέσκῃ

[5] *Idylls* 2 and 10 have not been considered since they are not essentially pastoral in nature, and *Idylls* 8 and 9 are generally considered spurious. Of the other poems in the corpus, only *Idylls* 20 and 27 are considered pastoral; *Idyll* 20, however, does not have a pastoral setting, merely a rustic character bemoaning his treatment at the hands of a "city girl," and *Idyll* 27 is spurious. Lawall's argument for linking *Idyll* 2 with *Idyll* 1 is made on stylistic grounds, rather than any pastoral nature of *Idyll* 2 (1967:14-33).

τήναις ἄρνα λαβεῖν, τὺ δὲ τὰν ὄιν ὕστερον ἀξῇ.
(*Id*. 1.9-11)

[If the Muses take the ewe as their gift, you would take the stall-fed lamb as your prize; and if it should please them to take the lamb, then you would lead off the ewe in turn.]

αἶγά τέ τοι δωσῶ διδυματόκον ἐς τρὶς ἀμέλξαι,
ἃ δύ' ἔχοισ' ἐρίφως ποταμέλγεται ἐς δύο πέλλας,
καὶ βαθὺ κισσύβιον κεκλυσμένον ἁδέι κηρῷ,
ἀμφῶες, νεοτευχές, ἔτι γλυφάνοιο ποτόσδον.
(*Id*. 1.25-28)

[I shall give to you a she-goat to milk three times, one that has delivered twins and which, although she has two kids, gives two pails of milk in addition; and I shall give you a deep two-handled, ivy-wood cup coated with sweet wax, one newly fashioned and still fragrant from the chisel.]

ἔνθ', ὦναξ, καὶ τάνδε φέρευ πακτοῖο μελίπνουν
ἐκ κηρῶ σύριγγα καλὸν περὶ χεῖλος ἑλικτάν.
(*Id*. 1.128-29)

[Come, lord, and take this beautiful honey-breathing panpipe wreathed with tightly-packed wax around its lip.]

ἠνίδε τοι δέκα μᾶλα φέρω· τηνῶθε καθεῖλον
ὥ μ' ἐκέλευ καθελεῖν τύ· καὶ αὔριον ἄλλα τοι οἰσῶ.
(*Id*. 3.10-11)

[Look, I bring you ten apples; I plucked them there where you bade me pluck them; and tomorrow I shall bring you more.]

ἦ μάν τοι λευκὰν διδυματόκον αἶγα φυλάσσω,
τάν με καὶ ἁ Μέρμνωνος ἐριθακὶς ἁ μελανόχρως
αἰτεῖ· καὶ δωσῶ οἱ, ἐπεὶ τύ μοι ἐνδιαθρύπτῃ.
(*Id*. 3.34-36)

[I am saving a white she-goat for you, one that has borne twins, the one that Mermnon's dark-skinned working girl asks me for; and I shall give it to her since you trifle with me.]

ΒΑΤΤΟΣ
χἀ σῦριγξ εὐρῶτι παλύνεται, ἄν ποκ᾽ ἐπάξα.

ΚΟΡΥΔΩΝ
οὐ τήνα γ᾽, οὐ Νύμφας, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ Πῖσαν ἀφέρπων
δῶρον ἐμοί νιν ἔλειπεν· ἐγὼ δέ τις εἰμὶ μελικτάς.
(*Id*. 4.28-30)

[BATTOS: Aegon's panpipe is sprinkled with mold ever since he hung it up.
CORYDON: No, by the Nymphs, not that one, since he left it for me as a gift when he went off to Pisa; I myself am something of a flute player.]

τηνεὶ καὶ τὸν ταῦρον ἀπ᾽ ὤρεος ἆγε πιάξας
τᾶς ὁπλᾶς κἄδωκ᾽ ᾽Αμαρυλλίδι.
(*Id*. 4.35-36)

[Grabbing the bull by the hooves, he brought it from the mountain and gave it to Amaryllis.]

ΚΟΜΑΤΑΣ
τὰν ποίαν σύριγγα; τὺ γάρ ποκα, δῶλε Σιβύρτα,
ἐκτάσω σύριγγα; τί δ᾽ οὐκέτι σὺν Κορύδωνι
ἀρκεῖ τοι καλάμας αὐλὸν ποππύσδεν ἔχοντι;

ΛΑΚΩΝ
τάν μοι ἔδωκε Λύκων . . .
(*Id*. 5.5-8)

[COMATAS: What panpipe are you talking about? Have you, the slave of Sibyrtas, ever owned a panpipe? Why is it no longer enough for you to hiss upon that reed flute of yours along with Corydon?
LACON: Lycon gave that panpipe to me . . .]

ΚΟΜΑΤΑΣ
κἦγὼ μὲν δωσῶ τᾷ παρθένῳ αὐτίκα φάσσαν,
ἐκ τᾶς ἀρκεύθω καθελών· τηνεὶ γὰρ ἐφίσδει.

ΛΑΚΩΝ
ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐς χλαῖναν μαλακὸν πόκον, ὀππόκα πέξω

τὰν οἶν τὰν πέλλαν, Κρατίδᾳ δωρήσομαι αὐτός.
(*Id.* 5.96-99)

[COMATAS: I shall give a wood pigeon to the maiden soon, snatching it down from the juniper, for it roosts there.
LACON: But I, whenever I shear the dark ewe, shall myself give its soft fleece to Crathis for a cloak.]

ΚΟΜΑΤΑΣ
ἔστι δέ μοι γαυλὸς κυπαρίσσινος, ἔστι δὲ κρατήρ,
ἔργον Πραξιτέλευς· τᾷ παιδὶ δὲ ταῦτα φυλάσσω.

ΛΑΚΩΝ
χἀμοῖν ἐστι κύων φιλοποίμνιος ὃς λύκος ἄγχει,
ὃν τῷ παιδὶ δίδωμι τὰ θηρία πάντα διώκειν.
(*Id.* 5.104-7)

[COMATAS: I have a milk pail of cypress wood, and I have a bowl, the work of Praxiteles, but I am saving these for my girl.
LACON: And I have a dog who loves the flock and kills the wolves, which I give to my boy to chase off all the wild beasts.]

ΚΟΜΑΤΑΣ
οὐκ ἔραμ' Ἀλκίππας, ὅτι με πρᾶν οὐκ ἐφίλησε
τῶν ὤτων καφελοῖσ', ὅκα οἱ τὰν φάσσαν ἔδωκα.

ΛΑΚΩΝ
ἀλλ' ἐγὼ Εὐμήδευς ἔραμαι μέγα· καὶ γὰρ ὅκ' αὐτῷ
τὰν σύριγγ' ὤρεξα, καλόν τί με καρτ' ἐφίλησεν.
(*Id.* 5.132-35)

[COMATAS: I do not love Alcippe because recently, when I gave her the wood pigeon, she did not take me by the ears and kiss me.
LACON: But I do love Eumedeus greatly; for when I offered the panpipe to him, he kissed me very well indeed.]

τόσσ' εἰπὼν τὸν Δάφνιν ὁ Δαμοίτας ἐφίλησε·
χὠ μὲν τῷ σύριγγ', ὁ δὲ τῷ καλὸν αὐλὸν ἔδωκεν.
(*Id.* 6.42-43)

[When he had thus spoken, Damoetas kissed Daphnis; the latter then bestowed a panpipe upon the former, and the former a beautiful lute upon the latter.]

"τάν τοι," ἔφα, "κορύναν δωρύττομαι, οὕνεκεν ἐσσί
πᾶν ἐπ' ἀλαθείᾳ πεπλασμένον ἐκ Διὸς ἔρνος."
(*Id.* 7.43-44)

["This shepherd's staff," he said, "I present to you because you are truly a child of Zeus, fashioned after the truth."]

. . . ὃ δέ μοι τὸ λαγωβόλον, ἁδὺ γελάσσας
ὡς πάρος, ἐκ Μοισᾶν ξεινήιον ὤπασεν ἦμεν.
(*Id.* 7.128-29)

[Laughing sweetly as before, he gave to me a shepherd's crook as a friendly parting gift from the Muses.]

ἤρατο δ' οὐ μάλοις οὐδὲ ῥόδῳ οὐδὲ κικίννοις,
ἀλλ' ὀρθαῖς μανίαις, ἄγεῖτο δὲ πάντα πάρεργα.
(*Id.* 11.10-11)

[He (Polyphemus) did not conduct his love with apples, nor roses, nor ringlets of hair, but with downright madness, and he considered all else as trivia.]

. . . τράφω δέ τοι ἔνδεκα νεβρώς,
πάσας μαννοφόρως, καὶ σκύμνως τέσσαρας ἄρκτων.
(*Id.* 11.40-41)

[I am nursing eleven fawns for you, all of which have collars, and four bear cubs.]

. . . ἔφερον δέ τοι ἢ κρίνα λευκά
ἢ μάκων' ἁπαλὰν ἐρυθρὰ πλαταγώνι' ἔχοισαν.
(*Id.* 11.56-57)

[. . . and I would bring you either a white lily or a soft red poppy with its broad petals.]

It can be noted additionally that in five of these instances (1.128-29, 4.28-30, 5.5-8, 5.132-35, and 6.42-43) the gift is specifically the panpipe (σῦριγξ), which becomes one of the most typical symbols of shepherd

music specifically and of the pastoral genre in general.

Nymphs

As might be expected, allusions to various denizens of the woods abound in Theocritus' *Idylls*. The Nymphs, representing the divine essence of various things in nature, e.g., mountains, bodies of water, trees, or regions, are particularly singled out for reference in song. Sometimes they are addressed by the poet or a character speaking directly to them:

> πᾷ ποκ' ἄρ' ἦσθ', ὅκα Δάφνις ἐτάκετο, πᾷ ποκα, Νύμφαι;
> (*Id.* 1.66)

> [Where were you then when Daphnis was wasting away, where then, O Nymphs?]

> . . . χαῖρ', 'Αρέθοισα,
> καὶ ποταμοὶ τοὶ χεῖτε καλὸν κατὰ Θύβριδος ὕδωρ.
> (*Id.* 1.117-18)

> [Farewell, Arethusa and you rivers which pour your sweet water down Thybris.]

> Νύμφαι Κασταλίδες Παρνάσιον αἶπος ἔχοισαι,
> ἆρά γέ πᾳ τοιόνδε Φόλω κατὰ λάινον ἄντρον
> κρατῆρ' 'Ηρακλῆι γέρων ἐστάσατο Χίρων;
> (*Id.* 7.148-50)

> [Castalian Nymphs, you who hold the height of Parnassus, did the elderly Chiron serve Heracles such a cup as this in the rocky cave of Pholus?]

On still other occasions the allusion is to sacrifices or offerings made to the Nymphs:

> τὸ Κροκύλος μοι ἔδωκε, τὸ ποικίλον, ἁνίκ' ἔθυσε
> ταῖς Νύμφαις τὰν αἶγα.
> (*Id.* 5.11-12)

> [Crocylus gave the spotted (goatskin) to me when he sacrificed the goat to the Nymphs.]

στασῶ δὲ κρατῆρα μέγαν λευκοῖο γάλακτος
ταῖς Νύμφαις, στασῶ δὲ καὶ ἁδέος ἄλλον ἐλαίω.
(*Id*. 5.53-54)

[I shall place a great bowl of white milk for the Nymphs, and also I shall place another of sweet olive oil.]

. . . τὶν δέ, Κομᾶτα,
δωρεῖται Μόρσων τὰν ἀμνίδα· καὶ τὺ δὲ θύσας
ταῖς Νύμφαις Μόρσωνι καλὸν κρέας αὐτίκα πέμψον.
(*Id*. 5.138-40)

[Morson awards the lamb to you, Comatas, but when you sacrifice it to the Nymphs, see that you immediately send a good piece of its flesh to Morson.]

οὗτος ὁ λευκίτας ὁ κορυπτίλος, εἴ τιν' ὀχευσεῖς
τᾶν αἰγῶν, φλασσῶ τυ, πρὶν ἢ ἐμὲ καλλιερῆσαι
ταῖς Νύμφαις τάν ἀμνόν.
(*Id*. 5.147-49)

[You there, Whitey, you who butt with your horns, if you mount any of the she-goats before I have properly sacrificed this lamb to the Nymphs, I shall beat you.]

And using the term "Nymph" in the form of an oath is common enough:

λῆς ποτὶ τᾶν Νυμφᾶν, λῆς, αἰπόλε, τεῖδε καθίξας,
ὡς τὸ κάταντες τοῦτο γεώλοφον αἵ τε μυρῖκαι,
συρίσδεν;
(*Id*. 1.12-14)

[By the Nymphs, goatherd, will you sit down here where this sloping hill is and these tamarisks, and play your pipe?]

οὐ τήνα γ', οὐ Νύμφας, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ Πῖσαν ἀφέρπων
δῶρον ἐμοί νιν ἔλειπεν.
(*Id*. 4.29-30)

[No, by the Nymphs, not that (panpipe), since (Aegon) left it for

me as a gift when he went off to Pisa.]

οὐ μάν, οὐ ταύτας τὰς λιμνάδας, ὠγαθέ, Νύμφας,
αἵτε μοι ἵλαοί τε καὶ εὐμενέες τελέθοιεν,
οὔ τευ τὰν σύριγγα λαθὼν ἔκλεψε Κομάτας.
(*Id.* 5.17-19)

[No, my good fellow, no, by these marsh Nymphs, and may they prove to be gracious and kind to me, Comatas did not secretly steal your panpipe from you.]

ναί, ποτὶ τᾶν Νυμφᾶν, Μόρσων φίλε, μήτε Κομάτᾳ
τὸ πλέον ἰθύνῃς, μήτ᾽ ὤν τύγα τῷδε χαρίζῃ.
(*Id.* 5.70-71)

[Yes, friend Morson, do not, by the Nymphs, be partial to Comatas nor show favor to this fellow.]

Consider also a variety of other instances:

. . . ἔκλυσε δίνα
τὸν Μοίσαις φίλον ἄνδρα, τὸν οὐ Νύμφαισιν ἀπεχθῆ.
(*Id.* 1.140-41)

[The whirling water swept away the man who was dear to the Muses and who was not disliked by the Nymphs.]

χἀλκυόνες στορεσεῦντι τὰ κύματα τάν τε θάλασσαν
τόν τε νότον τόν τ᾽ εὖρον, ὃς ἔσχατα φυκία κινεῖ,
ἁλκυόνες, γλαυκαῖς Νηρηίσι ταί τε μάλιστα
ὀρνίχων ἐφίληθεν, ὅσοις τέ περ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἄγρα.
(*Id.* 7.57-60)

[Halcyons will calm the waves and the sea and the winds from south and east, which stir up the most remote seaweed, halcyons, which are the most beloved of birds to the pale-green Nereids and for whom there is booty from the sea.]

. . . πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα
Νύμφαι κηὐδίδαξαν ἀν᾽ ὥρεα βουκολέοντα
ἐσθλά, τά που καὶ Ζηνὸς ἐπὶ θρόνον ἄγαγε φάμα.
(*Id.* 7.91-93)

[The Nymphs taught me many other fine things while I was tending my flocks upon the mountains, which report has carried perhaps to the very throne of Zeus.]

. . . τὸ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἱερὸν ὕδωρ
Νυμφᾶν ἐξ ἄντροιο κατειβόμενον κελάρυζε.
(*Id.* 7.136-37)

[And from nearby, the sacred water babbled as it trickled down from the cave of the Nymphs.]

ἆρά γέ πᾳ τῆνον τὸν ποιμένα τὸν ποτ' Ἀνάπῳ,
τὸν κρατερὸν Πολύφαμον, ὃς ὤρεσι νᾶας ἔβαλλε,
τοῖον νέκταρ ἔπεισε κατ' αὔλια ποσσὶ χορεῦσαι,
οἷον δὴ τόκα πῶμα διεκρανάσατε, Νύμφαι,
βωμῷ πὰρ Δάματρος ἁλωίδος;
(*Id.* 7.151-55)

[Was it such nectar that persuaded that shepherd alongside the River Anapus, the mighty Polyphemus, who hurled mountains at ships, to dance upon his feet about his cave, as that potion that you Nymphs then poured forth at the altar of Demeter Arealis?]

Pan

When shepherds sang of denizens of the woods, however, in addition to the Nymphs, the god Pan in particular might be mentioned, not merely because of his association with woodland areas, but because he was considered their patron god, the tutelary deity of herdsmen and of their flocks. As such he even had some of the physical attributes of a goat, such as budding horns, goat-like legs, and a nature to match. On occasion he is alluded to or even called upon by a devotee:

στασῶ δ' ὀκτὼ μὲν γαυλὼς τῷ Πανὶ γάλακτος,
ὀκτὼ δὲ σκαφίδας μέλιτος πλέα κηρί' ἐχοίσας.
(*Id.* 5.58-59)

[I shall offer eight pails of milk to Pan and eight bowls of honey including teeming honeycombs.]

τόν μοι, Πάν, ῾Ομόλας ἐρατὸν πέδον ὅστε λέλογχας,
ἄκλητον τήνοιο φίλας ἐς χεῖρας ἐρείσαις,
εἴτ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἆρα Φιλῖνος ὁ μαλθακὸς εἴτε τις ἄλλος.
κεἰ μὲν ταῦτ᾽ ἔρδοις, ὦ Πὰν φίλε, μήτι τυ παῖδες
᾽Αρκαδικοὶ σκίλλαισιν ὑπὸ πλευράς τε καὶ ὤμως
τανίκα μαστίζοιεν, ὅτε κρέα τυτθὰ παρείη·
εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλως νεύσαις, κατὰ μὲν χρόα πάντ᾽ ὀνύχεσσι
δακνόμενος κνάσαιο καὶ ἐν κνίδαισι καθεύδοις·
εἴης δ᾽ ᾽Ηδωνῶν μὲν ἐν ὤρεσι χείματι μέσσῳ
῞Εβρον πὰρ ποταμὸν τετραμμένος ἐγγύθεν ῞Αρκτω,
ἐν δὲ θέρει πυμάτοισι παρ᾽ Αἰθιόπεσσι νομεύοις
πέτρᾳ ὕπο Βλεμύων, ὅθεν οὐκέτι Νεῖλος ὁρατός.
(*Id*. 7.103-14)

[O Pan, you to whose lot fell the beloved plain of Homole, may you place that lad unbidden into the loving hands of my (friend), whether it is the delicate Philinus or someone else. And if you should do this, dear Pan, may the Arcadian boys not flog you on the ribs and shoulders with squills whenever their portions of meat are shy; but if you should will it otherwise, may you bite and scratch yourself all over your body with your nails, and may you sleep upon nettles; and may you dwell upon the mountains of the Edoni in mid-winter wandering along the banks of the Hebrus toward the North Pole, and in summer may you pasture among the far-off Ethiopians beneath the rock of the Blemyes beyond where the Nile can no longer be seen.

Some of the allusions in this passage are quite obscure and beyond the scope of this paper. Several of the problems are addressed by Gow in his commentary (1952b:157-60). In line with the topic of this paper, I submit that the obscurities here are as logically ascribed to our lack of knowledge of the shepherd culture of Theocritus' day as they are to the erudition of Alexandrian literature.

Pan is also mentioned in the *Idylls* because of his association with piping. He was considered to be an accomplished musician himself and even the inventor of the syrinx or panpipe, which he first fashioned from the reeds into which his beloved Syrinx had been transformed in order to avoid his amorous advances. He was quite naturally then treated as the patron of the shepherds' music and is depicted as a piper himself. In *Idyll* 1.1-3 his skill is seen as superior:

῾Αδύ τι τὸ ψιθύρισμα καὶ ἁ πίτυς, αἰπόλε, τήνα,
ἁ ποτὶ ταῖς παγαῖσι, μελίσδεται, ἁδὺ δὲ καὶ τύ

συρίσδες· μετὰ Πᾶνα τὸ δεύτερον ἆθλον ἀποισῇ.

[Something sweet, goatherd, is the murmuring of that pine tree, which makes its music there by the spring, and sweet too is your piping. You will carry off the second prize after Pan.]

In lines 123-30 he is seen as evidently the appropriate heir of a musician's flute:

ὦ Πὰν Πάν, εἴτ' ἐσσὶ κατ' ὤρεα μακρὰ Λυκαίω,
εἴτε τύγ' ἀμφιπολεῖς μέγα Μαίναλον, ἔνθ' ἐπὶ νᾶσον
τὰν Σικελάν, Ἑλίκας δὲ λίπε ῥίον αἰπύ τε σᾶμα
τᾶνο Λυκαονίδαο, τὸ καὶ μακάρεσσιν ἀγητόν.
. . .
ἔνθ', ὦναξ, καὶ τάνδε φέρευ πακτοῖο μελίπνουν
ἐκ κηρῶ σύριγγα καλὸν περὶ χεῖλος ἑλικτάν·
ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑπ' Ἔρωτος ἐς Ἄιδαν ἔλκομαι ἤδη.

[Pan, Pan, whether you are on the lofty mountains of Lycaeus or you are tending mighty Mount Maenalus, come to the island of Sicily and leave Helice's peak and the lofty tomb of Arcas, which is revered even by the blessed gods. . . . Come, O king, and receive this handsome, honey-scented panpipe, wreathed about its lip with compact wax, for I am already being drawn by Love into Hades.]

In lines 15-18 the allusion is to a harsher side of Pan's nature as the goatherd responds to a request for him to play upon his pipes:

οὐ θέμις, ὦ ποιμήν, τὸ μεσαμβρινὸν οὐ θέμις ἄμμιν
συρίσδεν. τὸν Πᾶνα δεδοίκαμες· ἦ γὰρ ἀπ' ἄγρας
τανίκα κεκμακὼς ἀμπαύεται· ἔστι δὲ πικρός,
καί οἱ ἀεὶ δριμεῖα χολὰ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται.

[It is not permitted, shepherd, not permitted for us to pipe at midday. We fear Pan; for at that time he rests, being wearied from the hunt. He is bitter, and there is always a pungent wrath sitting upon his nostrils.]

In some instances Pan is viewed as the virtual equivalent of the Satyrs and even referred to in plural form:

εὖ γ', ὤνθρωπε φιλοῖφα. τό τοι γένος ἢ Σατυρίσκοις
ἐγγύθεν ἢ Πάνεσσι κακοκνάμοισιν ἐρίσδει.
(*Id.* 4.62-63)

[Good job, you lecher. Your kind is a close rival of the Satyrs or

the shaggy-legged Pans.]

Frequently the name of Pan is used in an oath, viz., ναὶ τὸν Πᾶνα, "by Pan" (*Id*. 4.47, 5.141, and 6.21), and its negative form, οὐ τὸν Πᾶνα, "no, by Pan" (*Id*. 5.14).

Music of Nature

It can also be observed that musical sounds and musical performances have a key function in Theocritus' *Idylls*. In fact, there are few sounds that are thought by his rustics to be less than melodious, and these same rustics seem especially fond of the sounds produced by the countryside itself. Such allusions to the music of nature abound, and most can easily be divided into three categories: (1) those dealing with insects, (2) those with birds, and (3) those with inanimate objects such as trees or water. One must bear in mind, however, that what seems harsh-sounding in nature to one of urban tastes may gladden the ears of the Theocritean rustic. Let us first consider the sounds of insects:

αἱ δὲ καλὸν βομβεῦντι ποτὶ σμάνεσσι μέλισσαι.
(*Id*. 1.107)

and

ὧδε καλὸν βομβεῦντι ποτὶ σμάνεσσι μέλισσαι.
(*Id*. 5.46)

[and (here) the bees buzz pleasantly around the hives.]

. . . τέττιγος ἐπεὶ τύγα φέρτερον ᾄδεις.
(*Id*. 1.148)

[(May you be rewarded) since you sing better than the cicada.]

. . . αἴθε γενοίμαν
ἁ βομβεῦσα μέλισσα καὶ ἐς τεὸν ἄντρον ἱκοίμαν.
(*Id*. 3.12-13)

[If only I might become a buzzing bee and come into your cave.]

ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ τουτεὶ καταλείβεται· ὧδε πεφύκει
ποία, χἀ στιβὰς ἅδε, καὶ ἀκρίδες ὧδε λαλεῦντι.
(*Id.* 5.33-34)

[In this place the cool water drips down; here there is grass growing and this soft bed, and here the grasshoppers chatter.]

There is room, however, for the intrusion of an unpleasant sound alongside a pleasant one.

ὅστις νικασεῖν τὸν πλατίον ὡς τὺ πεποίθεις,
σφὰξ βομβέων τέττιγος ἐναντίον.
(*Id.* 5.28-29)

[How confident you are that you will defeat your neighbor (in singing)—a wasp buzzing against a cicada!]

. . . βάτραχος δὲ ποτ' ἀκρίδας ὥς τις ἐρίσδω.
(*Id.* 7.41)

[In contest I am as a frog striving against grasshoppers.]

Less commonly encountered is the music of birds:

κἠξ ὀρέων τοὶ σκῶπες ἀηδόσι γαρύσαιντο.
(*Id.* 1.136)

[From the mountains may the owls sing to the nightingales.]

οὐ θεμιτόν, Λάκων, ποτ' ἀηδόνα κίσσας ἐρίσδειν,
οὐδ' ἔποπας κύκνοισι.
(*Id.* 5.136-37)

[It is not right, Lacon, for jays to strive against nightingales nor hoopoes with swans.]

καὶ Μοισᾶν ὄρνιχες ὅσοι ποτὶ Χῖον ἀοιδόν
ἀντία κοκκύζοντες ἐτώσια μοχθίζοντι.
(*Id.* 7.47-48)

[. . . and the cocks of the Muses, who toil in vain, crowing against

the Chian bard.]

There are also trees:

ʿΑδύ τι τὸ ψιθύρισμα καὶ ἁ πίτυς, αἰπόλε, τήνα.
(*Id.* 1.1)

[Something sweet, goatherd, is the murmuring of that pine tree.]

. . . καὶ ὡς δρύες αὐτὸν ἐθρήνευν.
(*Id.* 7.74)

[. . . and the oaks sang a dirge for him.]

And streams:

ἄδιον, ὦ ποιμήν, τὸ τεὸν μέλος ἢ τὸ καταχές
τᾶν᾽ ἀπὸ τᾶς πέτρας καταλείβεται ὑψόθεν ὕδωρ.
(*Id.* 1.7-8)

[Your song, shepherd, flows down sweeter than this babbling water from the rocks above.]

But perhaps the most representative passage, one that incorporates all of the techniques above is to be found in *Idyll* 7.135-42:

πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἄμμιν ὕπερθε κατὰ κρατὸς δονέοντο
αἴγειροι πτελέαι τε· τὸ δ᾽ ἐγγύθεν ἱερὸν ὕδωρ
Νυμφᾶν ἐξ ἄντροιο κατειβόμενον κελάρυζε.
τοὶ δὲ ποτὶ σκιαραῖς ὀροδαμνίσιν αἰθαλίωνες
τέττιγες λαλαγεῦντες ἔχον πόνον· ἁ δ᾽ ὀλολυγών
τηλόθεν ἐν πυκιναῖσι βάτων τρύζεσκεν ἀκάνθαις·
ἄειδον κόρυδοι καὶ ἀκανθίδες, ἔστενε τρυγών,
πωτῶντο ξουθαὶ περὶ πίδακας ἀμφὶ μέλισσαι.

[We had many poplars and elms that stirred mightily overhead, and nearby the sacred water babbled as it poured down from the cave of the Nymphs. And the swarthy cicadas went about their toil chattering upon the shady branches; and the tree frog murmured from afar in the thick thornbushes and brambles; and larks and finches sang while the turtle dove moaned, and the yellow bees flitted about the springs.]

Shepherd as Musician: Piper

It is the characters themselves, however, in Theocritus' poetry, with their avid preoccupation with music, who most dramatically reflect the impact of music upon the pastoral. No herdsman truly has a place in the genre unless he is also a musician of some accomplishment or, if not a participant, at least avidly interested in country song. Participation generally assumes the form of singing or playing the flute or panpipe. Let us first consider the shepherd as piper:

ᾯδύ τι τὸ ψιθύρισμα καὶ ἁ πίτυς, αἰπόλε, τήνα,
ἁ ποτὶ ταῖς παγαῖσι, μελίσδεται, ἁδὺ δὲ καὶ τύ
συρίσδες· μετὰ Πᾶνα τὸ δεύτερον ἆθλον ἀποισῇ.
(*Id.* 1.1-3)

[Something sweet, goatherd, is the murmuring of that pine tree, which makes its music there by the spring, and sweet too is your piping. You will carry off the second prize after Pan.]

ΘΥΡΣΙΣ
λῆς ποτὶ τᾶν Νυμφᾶν, λῆς, αἰπόλε, τεῖδε καθίξας,
ὡς τὸ κάταντες τοῦτο γεώλοφον αἵ τε μυρῖκαι,
συρίσδεν; τὰς δ' αἶγας ἐγὼν ἐν τῷδε νομευσῶ.

ΑΙΠΟΛΟΣ
οὐ θέμις, ὦ ποιμήν, τὸ μεσαμβρινὸν οὐ θέμις ἄμμιν
συρίσδεν.
(*Id.* 1.12-16)

[THYRSIS: By the Nymphs, goatherd, will you sit down here where this sloping hill is and these tamarisks, and play your pipes? I myself shall tend your goats here.
GOATHERD: It is not permitted, shepherd, not permitted for us to pipe at midday.]

. . . ἐγὼ δέ τις εἰμὶ μελικτάς,
κεὖ μὲν τὰ Γλαύκας ἀγκρούομαι, εὖ δὲ τὰ Πύρρω.
(*Id.* 4.30-31)

[I myself am something of a flute player, and I strike up the songs of Glauce quite well, and quite well those of Pyrrhus.]

καὶ τύ νιν οὐ ποθόρησθα, τάλαν τάλαν, ἀλλὰ κάθησαι
ἁδέα συρίσδων.

(*Id.* 6.8-9)

[Poor, poor wretch, you do not even see (the girl), but you sit sweetly playing your pipe.]

αὔλει Δαμοίτας, σύρισδε δὲ Δάφνις ὁ βούτας·
ὠρχεῦντ' ἐν μαλακᾷ ταὶ πόρτιες αὐτίκα ποίᾳ.

(*Id.* 6.44-45)

[Damoetas played his flute, and Daphnis the neatherd played his panpipe, and the heifers at once began to dance upon the soft grass.]

. . . Λυκίδα φίλε, φαντί τυ πάντες
ἦμεν συρικτὰν μέγ' ὑπείροχον ἔν τε νομεῦσιν
ἔν τ' ἀματήρεσσι.

(*Id.* 7.27-29)

[Friend Lycidas, everyone says that you are the most eminent piper, both among the herdsmen and among the reapers.]

αὐλησεῦντι δέ μοι δύο ποιμένες, εἷς μὲν Ἀχαρνεύς,
εἷς δὲ Λυκωπίτας.

(*Id.* 7.71-72)

[Two shepherds will play their pipes for me—one a man of Acharnae, the other of Lycope.]

συρίσδεν δ' ὡς οὔτις ἐπίσταμαι ὧδε Κυκλώπων.

(*Id.* 11.38)

[I know how to play the pipe as none of the Cyclopes here (can).]

Shepherd as Musician: Singer

Finally let us consider the shepherd as a singer. Frequently the *Idylls* are presented in dramatic form, and singing, when it occurs (as it often does), comes forth from the mouths of Theocritus' herdsmen themselves; but these instances need not be enumerated here. It is also frequently the case, and should be noted, that herdsmen are alluded to in the poems as being singers, or that the act of singing on the part of some rustic character is specifically pointed out:

> ἅδιον, ὦ ποιμήν, τὸ τεὸν μέλος ἢ τὸ καταχές
> τῆν' ἀπὸ τᾶς πέτρας καταλείβεται ὑψόθεν ὕδωρ.
> (*Id.* 1.7-8)

[Your song, shepherd, flows down sweeter than this babbling water from the rocks above.]

> ἀλλὰ τὺ γὰρ δή, Θύρσι, τὰ Δάφνιδος ἄλγε' ἀείδες
> καὶ τᾶς βουκολικᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἵκεο μοίσας.
> (*Id.* 1.19-20)

[But you, Thyrsis, sing of Daphnis and his woes, and in bucolic song you have come far.]

> . . . αἰ δέ κ' ἀείσῃς
> ὡς ὅκα τὸν Λιβύαθε ποτὶ Χρόμιν ᾆσας ἐρίσδων
> (*Id.* 1.23-24)

[. . . if you would just sing as you once sang in contest against Chromis of Libya]

> Θύρσις ὅδ' ὡξ Αἴτνας, καὶ Θύρσιδος ἁδέα φωνά.
> (*Id.* 1.65)

[This is Thyrsis of Etna, and the voice of Thyrsis is sweet.]

> . . . ᾄσεῦμαι ποτὶ τὰν πίτυν ὧδ' ἀποκλινθείς,
> καί κέ μ' ἴσως ποτίδοι, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀδαμαντίνα ἐστίν.
> (*Id.* 3.38-39)

[I shall turn aside by the pine tree here and sing, and perhaps she will look out at me since she is not made of stone.]

ἑσδόμενοι θέρεος μέσῳ ἅματι τοιάδ' ἄειδον.
(*Id.* 6.4)

[Sitting down at noon on a summer day, they sang such songs as these.]

τῷ δ' ἐπὶ Δαμοίτας ἀνεβάλλετο καὶ τάδ' ἄειδεν.
(*Id.* 6.20)

[And after this Damoetas lifted up his voice and sang these words.]

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ Μοισᾶν καπυρὸν στόμα, κἠμὲ λέγοντι
πάντες ἀοιδὸν ἄριστον.
(*Id.* 7.37-38)

[For I am also a distinct voice of the Muses, and everyone says that I am an outstanding bard.]

ἀλλ' ἄγε βουκολικᾶς ταχέως ἀρξώμεθ' ἀοιδᾶς.
(*Id.* 7.49)

[Come, let us quickly begin our bucolic songs.]

. . . ὁ δὲ Τίτυρος ἐγγύθεν ᾀσεῖ
ὥς ποκα τᾶς Ξενέας ἠράσσατο Δάφνις ὁ βούτας.
(*Id.* 7.72-73)

[From nearby, Titryus will sing how once Daphnis the neatherd longed after Xenea.]

ᾀσεῖ δ' ὥς ποκ' ἔδεκτο τὸν αἰπόλον εὐρέα λάρναξ
ζωὸν ἐόντα κακαῖσιν ἀτασθαλίαισιν ἄνακτος.
(*Id.* 7.78-79)

[He will sing how once, due to the evil recklessness of the king, a wide coffer received the goatherd, still alive.]

φωνᾶς εἰσαΐων, τὺ δ' ὑπὸ δρυσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ πεύκαις

ἀδὺ μελισδόμενος κατεκέκλισο, θεῖε Κομᾶτα.
(*Id.* 7.88-89)

[I listened to your voice, godlike Comatas, while you lay beneath the oaks or beneath the fir trees and made sweet music.]

ἀλλὰ τὸ φάρμακον εὗρε, καθεζόμενος δ' ἐπὶ πέτρας
ὑψηλᾶς ἐς πόντον ὁρῶν ἄειδε τοιαῦτα.
(*Id.* 11.17-18)

[He found a cure; for sitting upon a lofty crag and looking toward the sea, he sang such words as these.]

τίν, τὸ φίλον γλυκύμαλον, ἁμᾶ κἠμαυτὸν ἀείδων
πολλάκι νυκτὸς ἀωρί.
(*Id.* 11.39-40)

[It is of you, my dear sweet-apple, and at the same time of myself that I sing frequently at untimely hours of the night.]

οὕτω τοι Πολύφαμος ἐποίμαινεν τὸν ἔρωτα
μουσίσδων, ῥᾴον δὲ διᾶγ' ἢ εἰ χρυσὸν ἔδωκεν.
(*Id.* 11.80-81)

[So Polyphemus shepherded his love by singing, and he spent his time better thus than if he spent gold.]

Three further examples are worthy of mention, but because of one detail or another do not fit happily in the preceding list. *Idyll* 3 opens with these words from a goatherd:

κωμάσδω ποτὶ τὰν 'Αμαρυλλίδα.

[I am going to Amaryllis' to serenade her.]

This verb kwmavsdw means to celebrate the kw'mo" that may or may not involve actual singing outside a loved one's home. *Idyll* 4 seems to have the speaker actually break into song at line 32:

αἰνέω τάν τε Κρότωνα — "Καλὰ πόλις ἅ τε Ζάκυνθος . . . ." —

[I sing the praises of Croton —"Zacynthus is a lovely city . . . ."—]

The term αἰνέω literally means to praise and does not in itself imply singing. The interpretation of these lines is problematic in other respects also. Finally, in *Idyll* 7.100-1 the allusion is to the historical character Aristis, who is not a shepherd, but the use of ἀείδειν is similar to those above. Notice also that the instrument is not the typical pastoral flute:

> ἐσθλὸς ἀνήρ, μέγ' ἄριστος, ὃν οὐδέ κεν αὐτὸς ἀείδειν
> Φοῖβος σὺν φόρμιγγι παρὰ τριπόδεσσι μεγαίροι.
>
> [(Aristis is) a fine man and very noble, whom Apollo himself would not begrudge to sing with a lyre alongside his tripods.]

Many other motifs could be included in this study that deal with particularly rustic allusions or that occur less frequently. The use of these five and the compilation of the above data are merely in an effort to make the essential point that such an influence upon Theocritus did actually exist. It is difficult to make convincing arguments for specifics beyond this point due to a lack of information about Theocritus' sources in general. In summary, we may say that if we can accept the premise that a tradition of oral shepherd songs existed in third-century Greece, at least some of them being amoebaean contest songs, that were in part orally composed as indicated by the general extemporaneousness of such songs, and if Theocritus borrowed other aspects of real shepherds' lives in order to lend verisimilitude to his poems, such as their dialect, their caste system, their method of meeting in the fields and having singing matches, and so on, then it follows that he most likely also borrowed for the same reason from their oral songs, if not actual phraseology, at least some of the aspects that best typified the tradition; and it would also follow that, although the *Idylls* of Theocritus are in many ways typically Alexandrian, for example in being the product of a highly literate school and founded in large part upon the written poetry of previous generations, there is indeed a significant impact upon his poetry by a previously existing oral tradition.

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Homer and the *Roland*: The Shared Formular Technique, Part I

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I. Introduction

The argument of the following article, though necessarily long and demanding, can be summarized briefly. Homer employs his noun-formulae consistently, so that the principles of their employment can be stated mathematically in the form of equations and graphs. So too does the poet of the *Chanson de Roland*. Moreover, each displays virtually the same equations as the other: in the employment of formulae, the techniques of the two are almost identical. The similarity is particularly arresting when we observe that it results from the pervasive use of infrequent formulae, formulae that occur very often, but only a few times each. A great many of these infrequent formulae are either combinations of nouns with standardized adjectives or verbs (called "generic words"), or are flexible formulae, phrases that can be separated, inverted, inflected, or moved about in the line. Such adjectives and such formulae are equipment intended to meet poetic needs that arise very commonly as a type, but individually very rarely; and it is very hard to avoid the inference that these are needs that arise in the course of composing poetry during an oral performance. Even from Homer alone, or from the *Roland* poet alone, we could infer a technique of oral composition. We then ask why their mathematically analyzable compositional principles should be so very similar, noticing meanwhile that these principles are also shared by the *Cantar de Mio Cid* and the twentieth-century Yugoslavian oral poet Avdo Međedović, but not by Apollonius of Rhodes, Virgil, or Quintus of Smyrna, though the latter especially is a highly formulaic poet. If a technique almost certainly designed to meet the exigencies of oral composition in performance is shared by four poets believed on other grounds (or, in the case of Avdo,

known) to be an oral poet, and is eschewed by three imitators of Homer known to have written, we are approaching scientific demonstration that Homer and these medieval poets composed orally. Many readers of *Oral Tradition* may feel that we knew this already from the work of Milman Parry, Albert Lord, Joseph Duggan, and others. But among classicists, at any rate, Parry's position has recently become somewhat beleaguered; it is important to see how close we are to proving the truth of Lord's opinion, that Homer did what Avdo did and dictated a text to a scribe—or at least did something very much like it.

Since the following comparison of the styles of the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Chanson de Roland* is based upon statistics, it may be appropriate to say a word or two at the beginning on how statistics has previously been applied to the three poems. All three are long, and all three are repetitious, and these two facts combine to put a useful scholarly tool into our hands: we can count the number of occurrences of phenomena important to the style and arrive at numbers that are statistically significant, numbers large enough to enable meaningful comparisons. Milman Parry counted the number of occurrences of formulae in order to show, for instance, how large a number of different formulae belong to a given system (that is, possess the same meter and syntax; Parry 1971:17). He counted occurrences of nouns with and without an epithet, in order to compare the behavior of nouns that had different metrical shapes, and to compare nouns in Homer with nouns in Virgil (34-36). Denys Page counted words and phrases that occur frequently in the *Odyssey* but are absent or very rare in the *Iliad* (and vice versa) in an effort to show that the poems were composed in different geographical places (1955:149-55). Eugene O'Neill counted and compared the number of times metrical word-types occur in various locations in the hexameter line (1942). O'Neill went beyond merely counting and comparing by stating the percentage of times a word-type appeared in a given position, revealing thereby the commonest—the favored—positions. Albert Lord made calculations of formulaic density (the percentage of lines or half-lines in a given sample that are formulaic) for Yugoslavian, Homeric, Old English, and other poetry (1960). Joseph Duggan took a further step by calculating the formulaic density of entire poems: the *Chanson de Roland*, the *Cantar de Mio Cid*, and other *chansons de geste* (1973, 1975:74-83). He showed that certain poems, including the *Roland* and the Cid, have a much higher formulaic density than others, a fact that allowed him to argue that high formulaic density must be due to the fact that the poems were orally composed. Margalit Finkelberg counted and compared occurrences of verb-formulae to determine their formularity, the percentage of their

formulaic occurrences out of all their occurrences (1989:179-87). I myself counted numbers of occurrences of Homeric formulae for *Olympos* and *Ouranos* meaning "the divine home," in order to show that the set of *Olympos* formulae was the earlier (1984); I then counted place-phrases in the *Iliad* and calculated the percentage of their formulaic occurrences out of all their occurrences (their **formularity**) in order to expose a remarkable deficiency in formulae meaning "in Troy" and "from Troy" (1987); and I counted the number of occurrences of all nominative proper-noun formulae in order to show that the Trojans lacked regular formulae (formulae exactly repeated 6 times or more) (1989).

In the 1987 article, with the very considerable help of Professor Dee Clayman of CUNY, I used a statistical test to prove the significance of the deficiency in the Trojan place-phrases; and in the 1989 piece I employed the same test to evaluate the uniformity of the formularity of the nouns I was studying. In this last article I also developed an *equation* to plot the relationship between localization (the percentage of times a word occurs in that place in the hexameter line in which it occurs most often) and regularity (the percentage of occurrences of regular formulae out of all formulaic occurrences). Meanwhile, Richard Janko had used statistical tests to show the significance of linguistic changes for evaluating the relative time of composition of the Homeric and Hesiodic poems and the Homeric Hymns (1982): the greater the extent of change, the later the poem was likely to be.

The current article uses simple percentages and equations to compare the formularity of nouns in Homer and the *Roland*. But then it deepens the scope of the statistical study of epic verse by using equations and graphs to get at more subtle aspects of formulaic composition: the number of different formulae a noun displays relative to the total number of its occurrences, and the difference in behavior between a poem's frequently- and infrequently-occurring formulae. The *equations* are linear, but more complex than any I have constructed hitherto, since they entail as many as four variables. The *graph*, however, is no longer linear, but hyperbolic—a further complexity, but not one that steps up the demands upon our mathematical experience, since it is not the equation that interests us in this article, but the graph itself. The technical sophistication required by these ideas therefore falls well within the scope of basic algebra and the simple statistics of fitting a linear curve to plottable data (and indeed we use a computer program to determine the best fit!). The real difficulty offered by what follows is not mathematical; it comes not from the curves, but from their explanation. Four variables acting together in a linear equation

are easy enough to handle algebraically; what is harder is to picture the activity the equation symbolizes, especially since this is the activity not of the poet, but of his nouns. And the mathematics of the hyperbola is not relevant to the current study; we want to know what formulaic behavior engendered such a shape. Hence the energy of the following description is directed primarily at explaining the phenomena, such as **different formulae** and **formulaic occurrences**, to which the equations refer. (These phrases will be highlighted with bold font when when they refer to variables, that is, when the mathematical quality or behavior of their referents is being stressed.)

There are three arresting statistical correspondences between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer and the Oxford *Roland*.[1] These correspondences are almost certainly due to similarities in the compositional techniques of the three poems, but in much of the ensuing discussion it will prove easier to think of them as due to the behavior of the nouns themselves. In speaking thus metaphorically of a noun's "behavior," I do not intend to suggest animal or human behavior; but it will do no harm to think of it as analogous to the behavior of molecules, for instance. The laws of composition we shall touch on are not as precise as the laws of chemistry—they are closer instead to the rules of musical composition—but they are precise enough that the analogy between nouns and molecules is helpful. To ensure that it does not mislead, we shall be reminded at the conclusion of the article and in various places throughout that it is a poet and his technique that in fact determine how the nouns behave. Since we are interested in the nouns' *formulaic* behavior, let us begin by offering a precise definition of "noun-formulae," a definition suitable to the use of statistics: noun-verb and noun-epithet phrases that are exactly repeated, repeated with slight alterations (such as inflexion, separation, inversion, change in position, and extension), or partly repeated (the phrase contains a patronymic, or a generic word—an epithet or verb used in identical metrical circumstances with more than one different noun). Repetitions with alterations, and partial repetitions—inexact repetitions, that is—are counted as different formulae from those they inexactly repeat, so that it is possible

[1] In speaking of Homer as one author, as I shall do, I do not mean to imply anything more than that from the point of view of formulaic composition, I can detect no difference between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. To make this clear, equations will be given for the individual poems as well as for Homer generally.

(and indeed common) for a formula to occur only once.[2]

The first correspondence between Homer and the *Roland* is simple enough: the nouns in both are consistently formulaic, and the nouns in one have about the same **formularity** (the same percentage of formulaic occurrences) as the nouns in the other: 74.8% in Homer, 70.5% in the *Roland*. When I say "consistently formulaic" I mean that though the formularities of some nouns in each source can vary considerably, Homer's mostly tend to cluster around 74.8%, the *Roland*'s mostly around 70.5%. This consistency is most clearly revealed when we construct linear equations relating **formulaic occurrences** to **total occurrences** (they are given below, in Section III). With some exceptions, the bulk of Homer's nouns that occur often enough for useful statistical comparisons display a value for **formulaic occurrences** that is very close to the value we expect from the equation (the expected or "predicted" value); and exactly the same is true of the *Roland*'s nouns.

When I say "about the same **formularity**" I mean that, despite the difference between 74.8% and 70.5%, the parameters—the slope and the y-intercept—of the Homeric equation are nearly identical to the parameters of the *Roland* equation. Hence we can feed figures for **total occurrences** from the *Roland* into the Homeric equation (or vice versa) and come up with figures for **formulaic occurrences** in the *Roland* (or Homer) that are very close to the truth. In other words, we can regard the parameters of the Homeric equation as a prediction, remarkably accurate, of the parameters of the equation for the *Roland*. To this extent the poets must share the same compositional technique: in his handling of nouns, each uses a formula about as often as the other, roughly three-quarters of the time; and each appears to aim consistently at this figure.

The second correspondence arises when we construct equations relating the **total occurrences** of a noun to the number of **different formulae** it displays. A formula is different from another if it does not repeat it exactly, which is why all repetitions with slight alterations, and partial repetitions, are counted as occurring only once (unless they are

[2] A full discussion of the criteria for a statistically appropriate definition of a formula is given in Sale 1989:347-51.

themselves repeated exactly).[3] We might have expected that the more often a noun occurred, the more often each of its different formulae would be used. Instead, we find that on the whole this is not true; rather, the more often a noun occurs, the more **different formulae** it generates, while the number of its **occurrences per formula** does not grow much.[4] We can construct a linear equation relating the number of **different formulae** to **total occurrences**, from which, if we know a noun's **total occurrences**, we can make a good calculation of its **different formulae**.

We can make an even better calculation by introducing two new concepts. First, **localization**, the percentage of times a noun occurs at the point at which it occurs most often. Some nouns, especially in Homer, tend almost always to be found in just one position in the verse (called the localization-point), while others wander about, and as they wander, create different formulae in various parts of the line. There is a limit to the number of formulae that can be generated from any one position, because the poets will not create different formulae that say exactly the same thing in exactly the same meter. Hence we expect, and find, that in both poets, nouns that wander possess more **different formulae** than nouns that do not, though their **total occurrences** may be exactly the same. Second, though **occurrences per formula** does not change much with **total occurrences**, it does change a little, and we find that by introducing it as another variable into the equation we can improve the calculation. This revised Homeric equation not only fits the Homeric data elegantly, it makes extremely accurate predictions for the parameters of the corresponding equation for the *Roland*. As a result we can feed figures for **total occurrences**, **localization**, and **occurrences per formula** for the *Roland* into the Homeric equation, and come up with remarkably accurate figures for

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[3] The one exception to this is that *extensions* are not counted as different formulae, since if they were we would have to make some very bizzare statements: for instance, the formula λευκώλενος Ἥρη occurs only three times and is an infrequent formula (but θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη occurs 19 times and is a frequent, a regular formula).

[4] To make such statements as "The more often a noun occurs, the more different formulae it generates," is somewhat sloppy; it suggests that we are following the course of a given noun through a number of poems. But this language is far handier than such locutions as, "When one noun occurs more often than another, the number of its different formulae will be proportionately greater than the number of different formulae displayed by the other noun."

different formulae for the *Roland*.[5] Here again we have demonstrated a shared compositional technique: roughly stated, the more often a poet uses a noun, the more different formulae he will employ for that noun; neither poet elects simply to use the same formulae more often. Later we shall find reason to connect this technique with oral composition in performance; but even without this inference it is interesting to uncover this shared rule of epic creation.

We note the third correspondence when we construct graphs, hyperbolic in shape, that pinpoint the difference in behavior between frequently-occurring formulae (what I call "regular formulae") and infrequent formulae. The x-axis of these graphs gives the number of times a formula occurs: once only, twice, three times, and so on. (Remember that a formula that is never exactly repeated, but repeats another formula inexactly, is said to occur only once, because it counts as a different formula from the one it inexactly repeats.) The y-axis gives the number of formulae that occur at each level on the x-axis: Homer, for instance, has 673 formulae that occur once only, 490 that occur just twice, and so on. There are many fewer formulae that occur twice than once, many fewer occurring three times than twice, many fewer four times than three times, five times than four times, six times than five times. The descent is steep and almost linear. But at 6 times (on the Homer graph) a change occurs: the plunge is arrested, and we find virtually as many formulae exactly repeated 22 times as 11 times (for example). This change of behavior, once we have analyzed it, enables us to identify a small range of numbers from which to choose a *minimum number* for a formula to be counted as frequently occurring, to be called a regular formula. It turns out that the choice of 6 is a reasonable one for the *Roland* as well as Homer. It is striking that hyperbolae occur in both authors—that is, that both authors distinguish between regular and infrequent formulae; it is more than striking, it is astonishing that both hyperbolae offer a similar range of choices, such that it is reasonable to pick the same number for our minimum in both authors.

In the course of studying the difference between regular and infrequent formulae, we observe that each Homeric noun displays only a

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[5] I cannot sufficiently stress that what the Homeric equation is predicting is the parameters of the *Roland* equation, not the figures for its **different formulae**, which will of course be predicted accurately if the parameters are sufficiently close. It would be uncomfortable to speak of predicting **different formulae** with an equation that included **occurrences per formula** on its right-hand side, since we cannot know **occurrences per formula** until we know **different formulae**.

few different regular formulae, usually 1 or 2 (true for 87% of the 190 Homeric nouns studied), and almost always 4 or fewer (97%). Therefore, though a frequently-occurring noun may well have more different regular formulae than a noun occurring less often, it will obviously not have many more. This will hold down the number of different formulae a noun can display, and work against the general rule we stated above, that if a noun occurs more often, it will display more different formulae. On the other hand, a frequently-occurring noun does show proportionately more regular formulaic *occurrences*. As a result, there is a tendency (not remarkable, but genuine) for such a noun to show more occurrences *per* regular formula (this too working against the general rule). As **total occurrences** goes up, **occurrences per regular formula** tends to go up. This means that **occurrences per formula** will go up too—not much, to be sure, because there are many fewer regular formulae than infrequent formulae, and because **occurrences per *infrequent* formula** is very nearly constant with respect to **total occurrences**. But it goes up enough to explain why we need to make the slight modification suggested above to the equation relating **total occurrences** and **different formulae**.

These statements will grow clearer as we proceed; I have made them here in order to emphasize that in Homer most of a noun's formulaic behavior is absolutely regular, "statistically predictable." We have already seen that from its **total occurrences** we can determine its **formulaic occurrences** and its **different formulae**. The cap on the number of regular formulae makes it relatively easy to find out how many of these different formulae will be regular formulae and how many infrequent formulae; then, since **occurrences per infrequent formulae** is constant, we can equally easily discover how many of its **formulaic occurrences** will be regular and how many infrequent. We can do this because the overall formulaic technique is pervasive: it reaches into every corner of the poem. The same is true of the *Roland*, only here the influence of **occurrences per formula** and especially **localization** is much slighter, and we make our discoveries simply by determining **formulaic occurrences** and **different formulae** from **total occurrences**. Our ability to predict the formulaic behavior of each poet does not by any means suggest that either one was a mere mechanic. It means that each one followed a technique of composition, followed rules of procedure little different from the rules that musical composers follow. And if something is a rule of composition, it is usually obeyed throughout the piece. We find similarities in harmonic progression among most instances of the Classical sonata-allegro form, similarities that are no doubt susceptible of statistical analysis; the intellect of a Mozart utilizes the common technique even as it individualizes and

deepens it. Thanks to the preservation of a large number of *chansons de geste*, we can observe the genius of Turoldus, the *Roland* poet, in his mastery of (and over) the technique he shares with his fellow *jongleurs*. The freedom enjoyed by Homer is even greater, partly because greater freedom is built into the metrics of the hexameter line. But there is nonetheless a body of strict rules that both poets obeyed.

Mathematics uncovers certain of these rules, and shows that they are the same for both poets. Both halves of this statement are equally important to us—that each poet *had* a mathematically discoverable technique for handling formulae, and that it was pretty much the *same* technique as regards the utility of formulae. We not only isolate algebraic equations, but we stress their similarity. We are glad to discover the hyperbola for Homer, since it confirms the distinction between regular and infrequent formulae; we are even more pleased to discover a hyperbola for the *Roland*, and to note how similar it is to Homer's. In what follows we shall first set out the equations and the hyperbolae, and then shall go on to try to explain these similarities, adducing the results of similar (not yet published) investigations of the *Cantar de Mio Cid* and Avdo Međedović's *Wedding of Meho, Son of Smail*, poems that behave in the same way as the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Roland*.

In giving this explanation I shall find no other way to account for such impressive resemblances except on the theory that the technique that generated them was created to facilitate the composition of *oral* poetry in *performance*. This is not just a conclusion *faute de mieux*, or a mere assertion that orality is the only thing they have in common that can possibly explain the mathematical similarities (though it is true that the rest of what they have in common does not explain them). Rather, we shall argue that the similarities are due to the poets' meeting certain of their needs by generating infrequent formulae. Such needs arise rarely for any given noun, but are of the sort that arise constantly; the formulae to meet them are generated either out of previously existing materials—generic words and alterable formulae—or by repeating exactly a phrase used earlier in the poem. This material is kept ready to hand, and turned into new formulae so predictably and so pervasively, because the demands of composition in oral performance are immediate and unrelenting: unusual needs arise at every turn, there is no leisure to investigate a variety of possibilities, and there is no rest until the piece is over.[6]

[6] We shall discuss below (Appendix 1) how unusual needs can "arise at every turn." This process of composition is exactly what Albert Lord describes as "adjustment of phrase and creation of phrases by analogy" (1960:37). Indeed, the distinction between

It is important to stress the limitations on the above argument. Mathematical comparisons show that in three important ways the techniques of the two poets were remarkably similar; only in attempting to explain the similarity do we have recourse to the theory of oral composition. Even here we must be careful. It is at least possible that any one of our poems (except Avdo's) was composed in writing; it is only the underlying *technique* that must be oral. We may wonder why a literate poet should have wished to reproduce so thoroughly the circumstances, and the results, of composition in performance; but we cannot disprove the possibility that he did. It is also at least barely possible that any one of our poems was preserved orally for a long period of time; the underlying technique bespeaks only an *original* composition in performance. The culture of the *Roland* had the means for writing the poem down at any time during the period in which it must have been composed; but we may have to suppose a period of oral preservation for the Homeric poems.[7] This is acceptable, from the point of view of our arguments, provided that the preservation was careful and the effects of composition-in-performance were not destroyed.

The best sustained demonstration known to me that the *Roland* is an orally composed poem is to be found in Joseph Duggan's *The Song of Roland* (1973; see also the excellent assessment of the value of this work in Foley 1988:79-80 and 96-97). Duggan approaches his task from several points of view, of which statistical analysis is only one part; indeed most of his book is given over to a qualitative discussion of how formulae work (both in the *Roland* and in certain other *chansons de geste*), of how they form the basis of the narrative technique, and of how the poet of the Oxford *Roland* employs that technique in composing such magnificent poetry. But

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infrequent and regular formulae as based upon the hyperbola, as well as the equations (espec. 2A-C below) that are ultimately explained by this distinction, are little more than a mathematical formulation of the results of the process described by Lord on pp. 37-67.

[7] I must say I find Richard Janko's (1990) restatement and elaboration of Albert Lord's theory of oral dictated texts extremely plausible. I am also convinced by Janko's eighth-century date for the *Iliad*, which I have argued for on other grounds—see Sale 1987:38. But there are two outside possibilities that cannot be dismissed. First, as Gregory Nagy has pointed out (in conversation), the statistically determined linguistic differences among the various early epic poems might be due not to difference in time of composition, but to difference of place and tradition. Second, as Sarantis Symeonoglou has pointed out (also in conversation), the eighth century might have wished to write down the text of the *Iliad*, but have simply lacked a sufficient supply of material on which to write it. In that case, singers might have devised a technique of verbatim oral transmission quite different from the technique of composition in performance.

Duggan does not neglect the mathematical side: using rigorous criteria for what is to constitute a formula, he finds the poem 35.2% formulaic—that is, 35.2% of its hemistichs are themselves formulae. This makes it comparable in formularity to Old French poems known to be orally composed, and much more formulaic than a large body of medieval material known to have been composed in writing. Duggan's criteria for a formula are slightly different from mine: he does not include phrases that occur only once but share a key epithet or verb with a similar phrase of identical metrical shape and syntax. These he calls "syntactic formulas"; Lord calls them "formulaic expressions," and I call them "generic formulae" in order to direct attention to the shared key word; they are the phrases I classify as "partly repeated" above. But Duggan does count phrases that undergo modifications similar to the alterations set out and discussed by J.B. Hainsworth (1968:*passim*; my "slight alterations" above).[8] As we have already seen, I count both generic formulae and Hainsworth-alterations as formulae. On the other hand, I have occasionally refused to count certain repetitions confined entirely to lines close to one another, where there is a possibility of a refrain effect, of deliberate echoing—in other words, where the repetition may not be integral to the narrative technique.[9] Nor do I count such phrases as "Li empereres" filling

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[8] See esp. Duggan 1973:131-33. The alterations noted by Duggan include: inflection, simple stylistic variation (such as "en cest pais" for "en ceste tere"), changes obviously brought about by metrical considerations ("cinquante carre" in the first hemistich becoming "plus de cinquante care" in the second), and changes in second-hemistich formulae due to assonantal requirements.

[9] See also Sale 1989:347, where some other sorts of repetition are also ruled out as sufficient criteria for formulae. There is some inevitable subjectivity here, since the decision that a passage is a deliberate echo is an aesthetic judgment; I have deliberately erred in all cases in favor of declaring that a passage *is* formulaic, but mistakes will surely occur. However, the number of instances where the problem arises is relatively small: the most I have observed for any one noun is three, and that many only when there are a great many total occurrences; most nouns present no problems at all. Since the total number of nouns, formulaic occurrences, and different formulae is so large, this source of error cannot significantly affect the statistics. Duggan uses small capitals when he prints formulae whose occurrences are confined to a given scene. This procedure allows us to recognize the possibility of refrains, while also identifying formulae that may have limited usefulness, or may have been coined for the sake of composing a particular scene. See Duggan 1973: 42.

Another seeming source of error is worth mentioning here: when a phrase is

the first hemistich, phrases possessing neither an epithet nor a verb—phrases I call "minimal formulae." My criteria should by no means be seen as an implied criticism of Duggan's. Mine were created for Homeric analysis undertaken long before I had studied Duggan's work carefully; I continue to employ them because we are now looking for what Homer and the *Roland* have in common, and it behooves us to use the same criteria on both sets of data. In any case, what I call a formula and what Duggan calls a formula will on the whole coincide. I have given in Appendix 2 the phrases that are formulaic by my criteria for 22 of the nouns in the *Roland*.

The mathematical relationships I am exploring derive from my earlier work on Homer, and are different from those discussed by Duggan (see Sale 1984, 1987, and espec. 1989). To restate more formally what was set out earlier: the **total occurrences** of a given noun in a given grammatical case are grouped into a set, which is divided into subsets labeled **formulaic occurrences** and **non-formulaic occurrences**. The **formulaic occurrences** (algebraically, **fo**) of a noun divided by its **total occurrences** (**to**) is its **formularity**. We determine the relative formularity of the sets by constructing the linear equation **fo = *f*(to)**, **formulaic occurrences** as a function of **total occurrences**. We then count the number of **different formulae** in each noun's set, and construct the linear equation **df = *f*(to)**, **different formulae** as a function of **total occurrences**. We then calculate the **localization** (abbreviated **loc** in the equation) of each noun, and observe that **df = *f*(loc)**, that **different formulae** is a function of **localization**. This fact justifies us in using **loc** to modify the equation **df = *f*(to)**, producing **df = *f*(to, loc)**. We then calculate **occurrences per formula (tof/df)** for each noun, and construct the linear equation **df = *f*(to, fo/df)**. We go on to combine this with **df = *f*(to, loc)** to produce the further modification **df = *f*(to, loc, fo/df)**. Then we classify the different formulae for all our nouns, as to whether they occur once, twice, three times, and so on, and count how many occur once, how many twice, and so on. This gives us the distribution of number of occurrences for each level of frequency of occurrence, enabling us to construct the hyperbola and determine a minimum number for regular formulae. We are then able to divide each noun's different formulae into regular formulae and infrequent formulae, and its total formulaic occurrences into regular formulaic

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repeated just once, even though it is almost certainly not a deliberate refrain, it might be repeated by accident. Here there is no real problem provided we are consistent. All such cases are rigidly counted as formulae for all nouns in all poems, so that the validity of the *comparisons* is not affected. The worst that can happen is our forming the opinion that the poets are slightly more formulaic than they really are.

occurrences and infrequent formulaic occurrences. This distinction is shown to underlie the **df = *f*(to, loc, fo/df)** equation and to account for the shape of the hyperbola; it is our ultimate basis for arguing that the technique of the two poems was developed for the sake of composition in performance.

II. Data and Definitions

In what follows we shall be comparing three groups of data:

1. The 190 nouns in Homer that occur at least 13 times and have at least one regular formula. A noun in the *Odyssey* is counted as a different noun from the same noun in the *Iliad*. We have three reasons for counting this way: some nouns occur in only one poem, and should not therefore suffer statistically; we need to keep the two poems independent in order to observe significant statistical differences between them, if any such arise (so far I have not encountered any); and we must be alert to the possibility that the length of a given poem might influence the statistics.

2. Twenty-two nouns in the *Roland* that occur at least 13 times and possess a regular formula: the 11 personal names in the nominative that occur this often (all 11 happen to possess a regular formula), plus 11 common nouns.[10] There are a few more common nouns, not many, that meet these criteria and might have been included; but I felt that there was a statistical advantage to having the same number of both types, and constructed a similarly divided set for Homer (#3 below). With a minimum of 12 I could have included "Blancandrins" (see note 41 below), but much experimentation with nouns in Homer had already convinced me that bringing the minimum below 13 brought about misleading improvements in the statistics.

We cannot, to be sure, claim that 6 is the only possible minimum for regular formulae in the *Roland* (we might have chosen 4, 6, or 8: see below), but let us at least note that all the personal names (not counting "Deus") occurring in the nominative at least 13 times (or 12 times, for that matter) possess a formula exactly repeated at least this often; no character is

[10] It is important to keep in mind that a phrase, in order to be counted as a regular formula, must be exactly repeated (disregarding certain irrelevant spelling variations and *verb* inflections): each part must fall in the same place in the line of verse, and the noun must be in the same case and number. "Blanche barbe," e.g., is not a regular formula, though the two words are juxtaposed 10 times. Some nouns—"sire," e.g.—are best treated as epithets, though they can be used independently.

being left out. Should later investigation reveal idiosyncratic behavior on the part of some common nouns omitted because they have no formula exactly repeated 6 times, that will bring complications, not falsification.

3. A smaller selection of 70 Homeric nouns in the nominative used 15 times or more and possessing at least one regular formula: specifically, the 35 personal names that in fact meet these criteria, and 35 common nouns chosen from among those meeting these criteria.[11] This selection was constructed for two reasons:

First, I wanted something closer in size to the *Roland* set than the 190 nouns under #1 above; I wanted it exactly divided into proper and common nouns, like the *Roland* set; I wanted a minimum number of occurrences per noun that would keep the set relatively small while ensuring that some of its nouns occurred only a little more often than the *Roland* minimum; and I wanted to avoid as much sample bias as I could—that is, I wanted to minimize my own choosing of the individual nouns that were to belong to the set. The minimum of 15 occurrences per noun determined 35 personal names automatically, so that if I let the set have 70 nouns, divided half common and half proper (as the *Roland* is divided), then half the set, at least, could be unbiased. A minimum of 13 would have produced too large a set, while a set the same size as the *Roland* set would either have been subject to intolerable bias (I would have had to choose every member), or have entailed a much larger minimum number than the 13 for the *Roland*.

Second, I wanted a selection whose formulae could be broken down into those that fall in a major colon (see the definition below) and those that

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[11] The choice of common nouns was on the whole random. It resulted in a rather larger than normal number of nouns with exceptional formularities; this fact did not affect the statistics importantly. I did deliberately avoid one noun, θυμός (appearing in three forms, θυμός in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and θυμόν in the *Iliad)*, whose formulae include one that is metrically bizarre by Homeric standards: θυμὸς(ν) ἐνὶ στήθεσσι. Including all three appearances would not have compromised either the statistics or the argument, but it would have made the statements much more cumbersome: I would have been constantly interrupting an already difficult presentation to remind readers that this isolated formula, which was producing some minor ripples on the graphs, really is isolated; and I would have had to say in nearly half-a-dozen places, "except, of course, for θυμὸς(ν) ἐνὶ στήθεσσι." That this formula does not really affect the fundamental statistics is clear from its presence (three times, of course) among the 190 nouns, where its distorting effect is virtually unnoticeable. (Granted, one of the three cases, θυμός in the *Iliad*, is a distinct outlier for two of our equations: it is too formulaic and has too many different formulae. But this means that some of what I counted as infrequent formulae are probably chance repetitions, an experimental error bound to occur sometimes with nouns occurring over 100 times.) And subtracting it from the group produces very little change.

do not, in order to explain the hyperbola and to make comparisons with *Roland* formulae that fall, or fail to fall, in the first hemistich. To do such a breakdown carefully for 190 nouns is a monumental enterprise, and before engaging in it I wanted to discover whether comparisons along these lines between smaller groups of sets would prove fruitful.

The following definitions, evolved from Homer, have also been applied to the *Roland*.

Caesura = a break in the poetic line after a word-ending. The caesurae that most interested Milman Parry fell after verse-positions 5, 5.5, 7 and 8 (see below) and are called, respectively, the penthemimeral (masculine, B1), trochaic (feminine, B2), and hepthemimeral (C1) caesurae and the bucolic diaeresis (C2). The caesura in the French decasyllabic line always falls after verse-position 4 or 4.5.

Colon = a segment of the hexameter line falling between two caesurae or between a caesura and the beginning or end of the verse.

Epithet = an adjective, adjective-phrase, noun, or noun-phrase accompanying a noun in a formula.

Formula = a noun-epithet and noun-verb phrase, either

A. exactly repeated (same words, same grammatical case, same place in the line of verse), or

B. repeated with slight variations (Hainsworth-alterations), or

C. partly repeated by including a generic epithet or verb so as to constitute a generic formula, or

D. partly repeated by including a patronymic.

Formularity = formulaic occurrences ÷ total occurrences.

Generic epithet or noun = an epithet or verb used in identical metrical circumstances with at least two nouns of the same metrical shape.

Hainsworth-alteration = a formula that differs from another merely by occupying a different position in the verse, or being extended by an added word, or by being inflected, or by having its parts separated or inverted.

Hemistich = a segment of the hexameter line running from the beginning though verse-positions 5 or 5.5 (occasionally 6) or from 5.5 or 6 (occasionally 7) to the end; a segment of the French decasyllable occupying the space before, or the space after, the caesura.

Infrequent formula = a formula exactly repeated fewer than 6 times, or (if it occurs only once) containing a generic epithet or verb, or a patronymic, or consisting of a Hainsworth-alteration.

Localization-point = the place in the verse in which a word occurs most often.

Localization = the percentage of times a word occurs at the localization-point.[12]

Major cola = the cola in the hexameter line that run from the beginning to verse-positions 5 and 5.5, from 5, 5.5, 7 and 8 to the end, and from 2 or 3 through 8.[13]

Minimal formulae = single words, and noun-preposition and noun-adverb phrases, that fall repeatedly in the same place in the line.

Minor cola = all cola except major cola.

Regular formula = a formula exactly repeated 6 times or more in any one poem.

Regularity = regular formulaic occurrences as a percentage of formulaic occurrences.

Verse-position = 1) a segment of the hexameter line occupying one long syllable or two short syllables and numbered from the beginning of the line. Thus position 1 is the opening long syllable, position 1.5 (or 1 1/2) the ensuing short syllable if there is one, position 2 the second long syllable, and so on. 2) a segment of the decasyllabic line occupying one syllable and numbered from the beginning of the line. Ten syllables is normal; but after 4 and 10 we may have 4.5 and 10.5.

I have put two Appendices at the end of the article. The first is a discussion of how infrequent formulae come into being, a discussion that seemed too elaborate for the text itself. The second gives all the data for the *Roland*, along with a list of its regular formulae. Some of the data for Homer are published in Sale 1989:396-405; the rest are fairly easy to compile with the help of the concordances, or the Ibycus computer, or the Pandora program for the Macintosh, using the same format that I used for the *Roland* in Appendix 2. But I would be happy to respond to individual requests.

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[12] Though it is natural to state this as a percentage, it is desirable in constructing equations that all the variables have comparable sizes, and this desideratum has entailed stating localization as a number from 1 to 10 followed by a decimal in Equations 3A, B, and C below.

[13] A full recent account of the caesura and the colon in relation to the formula can be found in Foley 1990:73-84. It should be noted that twice as many major cola fall after the caesurae as before them; it is also true that many more formulae fall in these second-half cola than in the first-half variety. This is in keeping with the principle that Foley calls "right-justification," the tendency for greater fixity at the end of the line (see Foley 1990:56-57, and below).

III. The Formularity Curve
(Total Formulaic Occurrences/Total Occurrences)

We begin with a fundamental fact: that Homer and the *Roland* both maintain consistent formularities for most of the nouns they use. There are two mathematical ways to state this consistency. One can construct a histogram for each poet, a picture of the distribution of the **formularities**, of the quotients **formulaic occurrences÷total occurrences**, of each of his nouns. These **formularities** cluster around the *average* formularity (74.8% in Homer, 70.5% in the *Roland*) in roughly bell-shaped curves. Figure 1 is the histogram for Homer's 190 nouns. The base of each rectangle spans 3 percentage points, so that the rectangle to the left of 69% means, "All the nouns with formularities between 66 and 69%." The y-axis tells how many: in this case, 16 nouns have such formularities. Note that the longest rectangle falls between 78 and 81%, higher than the mean of 74.8%; we do not have a precisely normal distribution, but one with a slight skew to the left.

Figure 1



Alternatively, one can state the algebraic relationship between the **total occurrences** of all the nouns and their **formulaic occurrences**. We derive this relationship by a process of *linear regression*. That is, we first construct a graph with **total occurrences** on the x-axis and **formulaic occurrences** on the y-axis, and put on it a point for each noun corresponding to that noun's **total occurrences** and f**ormulaic occurrences.** We then determine (by the method of least squares, which any statistical computer program will employ) what straight line comes closest to the points, gives the best fit. Figure 2 is the graph for 190 nouns in Homer:

Figure 2



The point furthest to the right, with 256 **total occurrences** and 191 **formulaic occurrences**, is Odysseus. The reader can see that the two methods, the histogram and the graph, correspond conceptually. That is, the line on the graph, though not precisely identical with it, is roughly equivalent to the mean formularity on the histogram; the distance between the line on the graph and the various points corresponds roughly to the distance between the mean formularity and the points in each rectangle in the histogram. The correspondence is not exact because the line on the graph reflects the fact that the variations in **total occurrences** of the nouns can affect their **formulaic occurrences**; the histogram omits this fact.[14]

We shall therefore concentrate on the algebraic relationship, which we shall need in any case when we come to study the relationship between **different formulae** and **total occurrences**. First, the 190 nouns in Homer (**fo = formulaic occurrences, to = total occurrences**):

1A. fo = .676 to + 2.1; R = .97, s = 6.9.[15]

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[14] If we know the difference (call it **Δf**) between the formularity of a given noun and the mean formularity of all the nouns, .748 (stated as a decimal, not a percent), and we wish to know $\mathbf{s_1}$, the distance on the y-axis between the line and the point on the graph occupied by the noun, we use the formula $\mathbf{s_1 = to(\Delta f + .072) - 2.1}$. That is, $\mathbf{s_1}$ includes the effect of **to**, **Δf** does not.

[15] The letter **R** stands for the correlation coefficient, one measure of the probable accuracy of predictions made from the equation upon fresh data. Since **R** = 1 means that the correlation is perfect, and **R** = 0 that there is no correlation, an **R** value of .97 marks a

The equation indicates that on average, the **formulaic occurrences** (**fo**) of a noun in Homer will be a little more (2.1 occurrences more) than about two-thirds (.676) of its **total occurrences** (**to**). Next, the corresponding equation for the 70 nouns in Homer, adduced mainly in order to affirm the fact that these 70 nouns are indeed a representative sample:

1B. fo = .679 to + 2.6; R = .98, s = 7.7.[16]

The reader will note that the equation is virtually identical to Equation 1A. Finally, the equation for the 22 nouns in the *Roland*:

1C. fo = .689 to + 0.3; R = .98, s = 4.7.

This equation is very close to the other two. If a noun occurs 100 times, Equation 1C predicts that it will have 69.2 formulaic occurrences; if a Homeric noun occurs 100 times, Equation 1A predicts that it will have 69.7 formulaic occurrences. And the biggest difference in predicted formulaic occurrences between the two equations is less than two.

These equations, then, give us the ratio between formulaic occurrences and total occurrences: the more often a noun occurs, the more formulaic occurrences it will have; and the difference between one noun and another in this respect is proportional. The correlation coefficients, **R**, are very high indeed at .97, .98, .98. The root-mean-square residuals, **s**, are low or reasonably low at 6.9, 7.7, 4.7. If we take the expected values (the "predicted" values) of **formulaic occurrences** from Equation 1A, Homer's 190 nouns, and compare the actual values, we find a low median error of 2.9, a fairly low average error of 4.6, but a maximum error of 33. This

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very high correlation. The letter **s** stands for the root-mean square residual, an indicator of how far away such predictions will be from the observed or actual values. The median error that the equation in fact incurs for the Homeric data is 2.9; the median number of total formulaic occurrences displayed by our nouns is 25, so that the median error is about 11%. Given all the things that can affect a noun's formularity—its metrical properties, its meaning, the variety of contexts in which it may be used—a median error of 2.9 is satisfactory. (For the relationships among meter, meaning, and formularity, see Sale 1989:357-61.)

[16] The equations for the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:

Iliad: **tfo = .650 to + 2.9, r = .96, s = 7.7**
Odyssey: **tfo = .726 to + .65, r = .98, s = 5.3**

means that most of the time the equation gives a highly satisfactory picture of the relation between **total occurrences** and **formulaic occurrences** in Homer, but that some nouns are really quite deviant. The *Roland* shows a comparable figure for the median error (2.7) but a lower average (3.4) and maximum (12).

As we saw above, the average formularity for Homer is 74.8%, for the *Roland* 70.5%, which means that if we apply the Homeric equation, Equation 1A, to the data in the *Roland*—that is, if we calculate **formulaic occurrences** for the 22 nouns in the *Roland* by feeding their **total occurrences** into the *Homeric* equation—we expect the calculation to be a little high; and so it is, by an average of 1.2. Despite this fact, it is still very close: the median error in its predictions is 2.8, the average 3.6, the maximum 11.[17] These results are almost the same as what we obtain from Equation 1C, the *Roland* equation, itself: a median error in *its* predictions of 2.7 (an improvement of just .1), average 3.4 (an improvement of .2), maximum 12 (not as good, by 1). Above all, Equation 1A has given a highly accurate prediction of the *parameters* of 1C: the slopes (.676 and .689) are very close, differing by only .01, while the y-intercepts (2.1, .3) are off by only 1.8 (that is, a difference of 2 formulaic occurrences). This means that the nouns in both sources are displaying the same *consistency*, are clustering near the mean formularity, or deviating from it, about as frequently and to about the same extent. Each shows a roughly normal distribution around the mean; Homer's standard deviation is 12.9, the *Roland*'s 11.4. The difference in average formularity of 4.3% between Homer and the *Roland* does not obscure the fact that both poets are using the same technique with regard to the formularity of their nouns.

IV. The Number of Different Formulae

The precision of the formularity relationship—the proportionality with which **formulaic occurrences** rises and falls with **total occurrences** both in Homer and in *Roland*—leads to a further conclusion. If a particular noun has more **total occurrences**—and therefore more **formulaic occurrences**—than another, it must *either* have more **different formulae**

[17] The calculated value and the amount off: Charles, 92(5), Roland, 83(11), Guenes, 39(3), Oliver, 29(2), Naimes, 17(4), Marsilie, 33(2), L'arcevesque, 24(7), Baligant, 13(3), Franceis, 41(7), Franc(s), 29(4), Paiens, 40(2), cheval 26(1), escut 14(1), hanste 12(4), osberc 18(3), reis 53(1), mot 19(0), cors 47(10), rei 31(3), cumpainz 12(1), bataille 22(1), oilz 15(2).

than the other, *or* its formulae must on average occur more often—it must display more **occurrences per formula**—or *both*. Earlier we stated the general rule, that the number of **different formulae** rises and falls with **total occurrences**, and stressed that this result is not trivial, that we can easily imagine a technique in which it was the other way around. Indeed it probably would have been if all we had were **regular formulae**, since **occurrences per regular formulae** does go up and down with **total occurrences**, and over the years I have noted a number of statements by scholars that seemed to imply a belief, perhaps half-conscious, that as the number of **total occurrences** rose, **occurrences per formula** rose with it. The fact is that **occurrences per formula** is close to being constant.[18]

If it were absolutely constant, we could deduce the relationship between **different formulae** and **total occurrences** from the formularity equation. **Occurrences per formula**, remember, is **formulaic occurrences** divided by **different formulae**, algebraically **fo/df**. If this were constant, we could write **fo/df = K**; multiplying through by **df**, we get **fo = dfK.** Substituting **dfK** for **fo** in Equation 1A we get **dfK = .676to + 2.1**; dividing through by **K** we could then write:

P. df = .676to÷K + 2.1÷K.

(I call this equation "P" to indicate that it is a derived equation, not directly based on linear regression as 1A is.) Equation P states that if **occurrences per formula** is constant, a change in **total occurrences** is accompanied by a change in **different formulae** precisely proportionate to the change in **formulaic occurrences** stated by Equation 1A.

Since **occurrences per formula** is not quite constant, we shall proceed a little differently. Because **fo = df(fo/df)**, we write Equation 1A as:

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[18] Not quite, because as we just saw, **occurrences per regular formula** changes when **total occurrences** changes, and so therefore does **occurrences per formula**, at least slightly. It would not have to, if **occurrences per infrequent formula** (occurrences per infrequently employed formula) went down when **occurrences per regular formula** went up, but **occurrences per infrequent formula** does not; there is literally zero correlation between these two variables, and **occurrences per infrequent formula** is essentially constant. On the other hand, the correlation between **occurrences per regular formula** and **occurrences per formula** is quite good (.65 correlation coefficient); when one rises with total occurrences, the other does. When they do, **different formulae** is somewhat lower than it would have been had **occurrences per formula** been absolutely stationary, and we shall work this fact into Equation 4A.

Q. df = .676(to÷[fo/df]) + 2.1÷fo/df.

Since **df** can be canceled out—**df** could be anything without affecting **to** or **fo**—we cannot use Equation Q to determine the relationship between **total occurrences** and **different formulae**. But since **occurrences per formula** is *nearly* constant, we could guess the relationship between **total occurrences** and **different formulae** by entering the *average* value of **occurrences per formula** (3.898) into Equation Q. If we do this, we get

R. df = .173to + .54.

This is not far off the equation we get when we simply apply linear regression, the method we used to construct Equation 1A, to the data (see Equation 2A below); Equation R produces predicted values for **different formulae** that are virtually as close to the actual values as those predicted by Equation 2A. Equation Q therefore tells us that since **occurrences per formula** is *nearly* constant, a change in **total occurrences** is accompanied by a change in **different formulae** *roughly* proportionate to the change in **formulaic occurrences** stated by Equation 1A.

It also says that the slight changes that do take place in **occurrences per formula** could affect the relationship between **different formulae** and **total occurrences** *inversely*. If, say, **occurrences per formula** is higher when **total occurrences** is higher, **different formulae** will be not as high as it might otherwise have been. We were ready for this. We began Section IV by noticing that as **formulaic occurrences** changes, either **different formulae** or **occurrences per formula** or both must change, and change inversely: the greater the change in one, the slighter the change (or the greater the inverse change) in the other. This is logically necessary: it follows from the meaning of the concept **formulaic occurrences**. To this logical observation we add the empirical observation that when **total occurrences** changes, there is a corresponding change in **formulaic occurrences** (Equation 1A). It follows that as **total occurrences** changes (and **formulaic occurrences** along with it), either **different formulae** or **occurrences per formula** or both must change, and change inversely to each other: the greater the change in one, the slighter the change (or the greater the inverse change) in the other.[19]

[19] Note that the fact that we can cancel out **df** from Equation P does not make the equation a tautology, as it would be if the independent variable were **fo÷fo/df**. It is a restatement of 1A and says as much as 1A says. *If* we know a noun's **occurrences per formula** and **total occurrences**, we can determine first its **formulaic occurrences** and then

Let us set Equation Q aside for a moment, and turn to the equation relating **different formulae** (algrebraically **df**) and **total occurrences** as determined by linear regression from the data for the 190 Homeric nouns:

2A. df = .150to + 2.48, R = .83, s = 4.1.

That is, if the number of total occurrences of a noun is higher than another's, it will probably display more different formulae in the ratio indicated by the equation. Similarly for the 70 Homeric nouns:

2B. df = .120to + 3.78, R = .76, s = 5.2

And for the *Roland*:

2C. df = .236to - 0.06, R = .97, s = 2.0

The correlation coefficient for Equation 2C is very high; but the fit of the Homeric equations to the data, though all right, is not impressive, nor do the Homeric equations resemble the *Roland* equation as closely as we should like. Moreover, if we feed data from the *Roland* into 2A, we are off by an average of 2.3 and a maximum of 12.6, which is quite high.[20]

The *Roland* equation is so much more successful, indeed, that from it alone we might (begging the question for a moment!) suspect that something is missing from the Homeric equation, that it needs to be modified. We saw above why **different formulae** moves in inverse proportion to **localization**: if a noun is more highly localized, it will show a tendency to display fewer different formulae, because whenever it occurs at the localization point, it will very often use a formula it has already used

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its **different formulae**, if and only if it has the formularity that Equation 1A says it should—which is to say, if and only if the parameters of Equation P are correct. Or we could know **total occurrences** and **different formulae**; we still do not know **occurrences per formula** unless we know **formulaic occurrences**, and we cannot figure that out from **total occurrences**—unless the parameters of Equation P are correct. If the parameters of P are correct, then a change in **total occurrences** will necessarily be accompanied by a change in either **occurrences per formula** or **different formulae** (or both), but we cannot know which one *a priori*.

[20] High, because the range of values for **different formulae** is much smaller than for **formulaic occurrences** in Equation 1A above; **different formulae** in Homer goes from 2 to 38, while **formulaic occurrences** goes from 8 to 191.

before.[21] The reason for this is the principle of economy: Homer has almost no formulae with the same referent and the same meter, unless the sense is genuinely different. There is obviously a limited number of formulae that can put the name at the localization point and still differ from one another. Hence a noun that is highly localized eventually faces the choice of repeating a formula already used, or of violating economy, and it rarely prefers the latter. The equation expressing the relationship between **different formulae** and **localization** has therefore a negative correlation coefficient, expressing the inverse proportion. The value is -0.50, not high; but for such a large sample size (190) the correlation is certain. Hence it is logical to combine **localization** (algebraically **loc**) with **total occurrences** in a new variable **to÷loc** (we put **loc** into the denominator since it moves inversely with **different formulae**) and perform the linear regression for **df** and **to÷loc**:

3A. df = .752(to÷loc) + 2.9, R = .93, s = 2.7

In order to indicate the extent of the improvement of 3A over 2A, I give graphs for the two:



[21] Ὀδυσσεύς (with double sigma) in the *Odyssey*, for instance, occurs more often (256 times) than any other noun, but his figure of 20 different formulae is equalled or bettered by no fewer than 20 other nouns, some of which are found far less frequently. Ζεύς in the *Odyssey* occurs just 87 times, a third as often, yet has 32 different formulae, more than half again as many. Ζεύς, as a monosyllable, has low localization and wanders all over the verse; Ὀδυσσεύς is highly localized.

The equation for the 70 nouns, affirming that this sample is typical:

3B. df = .702(to÷loc) + 3.3, R = .95, s = 2.6

These improved equations are matched by a comparable equation for the *Roland*:

3C. df = .950(to÷loc) + 1.8, R = .95, s = 2.5

The parameters of 3A and 3C are a little different, and the maximum error calculated by 3A for the *Roland*'s **different formulae** is 8, higher than we could wish. Still, the mean error is only 2, and the median still lower at 1.4. These equations, taken together with 2C for the *Roland*, are perfectly satisfactory evidence that the *Roland* and Homer are alike in this aspect of their techniques, that in both poets the more often a noun occurs, the more different formulae it generates.

I am, however, convinced from our examination of Equations P and Q that it is appropriate to add the complex variable **formulaic occurrences** divided by **occurrences per formula**, **to÷fo/df**, to 3A. It not only brings in the fact that earlier, by constructing this variable, we came close to deducing the **different formulae/total occurrences** relationship from 1A, but it also recognizes what we saw at that point: that since slight changes in **occurrences per formula** must have an effect upon the relationship between **different formulae** and **formulaic occurrences**, they also have an effect upon the relationship between **different formulae** and **total occurrences**. The result:

4A. df = .363 (to÷loc + to÷[fo/df]) + 1.4, R = .98, s = 1.6[22]

Localization and **occurrences per formula** are both in the denominators because both are in inverse proportion to **different formulae** (see above on **occurrences per formula**, and on **localization**).

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[22] This equation should replace the one I gave in footnote 45 of Sale 1989:394; and we should modify somewhat the final statement in that footnote, which reads, "as TO rises and falls, the number of different formulae is affected precisely, but the occurrences per formula not at all." Occurrences per formula *is* affected by rises and falls in the total occurrences, though only very slightly. And the trouble with the equation I gave is that, though it has a very high correlation coefficient, it depends in part upon a correlation between infrequent formulaic occurrences and the number of different formulae, and this is a separate phenomenon with a separate explanation.

Equation 4A obviously gives us an extremely good fit. We must stress, though, that a full analysis and justification of it is still needed, that we do not have an entirely satisfactory mathematical statement of the relationship between Equation 1A and 4A, and of the precise role of the effect in 4A of the slight variations in **occurrences per formula** on **different formulae**. We have an equation which works *empirically*, and whose empirical logic we understand intuitively. The correlation co-efficient, **R**, is higher than it is in 3A, and **s**, the mean residual, lower; if we apply Equation 4A to Homer's nouns, the average error is only 1.1. And when we compare the graphs of Equation 3A and 4A, the improvement can be seen even more dramatically:



I give the corresponding formula for the 70 nouns, again in order to validate the typical nature of the sample:

4B. df = .354 (to/loc + to÷[fo/df]) + 1.6, R = .98, s = 1.4[23]

Equation 4A gives an excellent prediction of the parameters of the corresponding *Roland* equation:

4C. df = .391 (to/loc + to÷[fo/df]) + .9, R = .98, s = 1.7

The parameters of, and the **R** and **s** values for, Equations 4A and 4C are much closer to each other than the parameters and values of 2A and 2C. And if now we feed *Roland* data into Homeric equation 4A, the mean error is 1.2 and the maximum only 4.5, a striking improvement over the results of applying 2A. The two variables **localization** and **occurrences per**

[23] The equations for the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:
Iliad: **df = .350 (to/loc + to÷tfo/df) + 1.6, r = .98, s = 1.7**
Odyssey: **df = .381 (to/loc + to÷tfo/df) + 1.1, r = .97, s = 1.4**

formula are obviously very meaningful for Homer. They are not so much so for the *Roland*, probably because the correlation between the two variables **different formulae** and **total occurrences** is already very high (coefficient .97). Nevertheless, 4A and 4C are very close to one another; and 4A, whatever its theoretical deficiencies, is an equation derived from Homer that gives an exceedingly accurate picture of the relationship between **different formulae** and **total occurrences** in the *Chanson de Roland*.

The compositional techniques are therefore in some respects the same. In both poets, nouns that occur more often have proportionately more different formulae than those occurring less often. The number of different formulae per noun is about the same in both poets: each poet's nouns display a minimum of 2; Charles has 35, Zeus in the *Iliad* also has 35, and **νῆας** in the *Iliad* has 38. Hence we can say: not just proportionately more different formulae, but significantly more. In both poets, there is a cap on the number of regular formulae, so that these significant and predictable differences in the number of different formulae are mostly differences in the number of infrequent formulae.

We cannot sufficiently stress the role played by the distinction between regular and infrequent formulae in creating these equations, and in marking the great similarities and slight differences between the techniques. In both poets, when a noun's **total occurrences** is high, its regular formulae show more **occurrences per regular formula**, while its infrequent formulae show more **different infrequent formulae**. If one or both poets had used a technique whereby **different formulae** was the same for nouns with low **total occurrences** and nouns with high, but **occurrences per formula** was very different, then the nouns in that poet's works could not have displayed very many infrequent formulae. Most formulae would have been regular formulae; but as it is Homer has five times as many infrequent formulae as regular formulae, the *Roland* seven! In both poets, the ratio **occurrences per formula** is nearly constant with **total occurrences**; in Homer this is clearly because **occurrences per *infrequent* formula** is constant (the cause is less certain in the *Roland*.) **Localization** in both poets moves inversely with **different formulae**, because when a noun has low **localization** and wanders about in the line, it is infrequent formulae that are generated in the unusual positions.

But although the distinction between infrequent formulae and regular formulae is highly significant, we know it so far only as a quantitative distinction. The step we are to take next will eventually reveal differences in quality.

V. The Formulae-Occurrences Curve in Homer

The distinction between regular and infrequent formulae is vital in Homeric studies for two reasons: first, for the reason we have just seen, that the equations that predict variations in the number of **different formulae** are largely based on variations in the number of **different infrequent formulae**; and second, because Parry's assertions about formulaic systems in Homer hold good for regular formulae and break down for infrequent formulae. I have discussed the second reason in earlier work, in which I also develop criteria for applying the term "regular formula" to the proper nouns in the nominative case in Homer, and defend the choice of 6 as a minimum number of occurrences while calling attention to the fact that 8 and 10 are also defensible minima (1989:362-95). I made the choice of 6 not because it was any more logical than the other two, but because I wanted to make it as low as I could while preserving the overall integrity of the regular formulae group. When I later extended the term "regular formula" to the other nouns in Homer, I decided to keep the same minimum number, although some of the criteria I elected for choosing 6 as a minimum for the nominative proper nouns (such as always being noun-epithetic) were no longer valid for frequent formulae displayed by nouns in oblique cases.

Since the criteria I originally used for choosing the minimum number were qualitative, it was possible to feel, as long as I was speaking of proper nouns, that the distinction between regular formulae and infrequent formulae was qualitative as well as quantitative; but with the extension of the number to common nouns and the ensuing questionability of some of the criteria (not to mention the fact that none of the criteria had actually been used in determining the minimum number for the common nouns), I seemed to be forced to rely upon intuition to support the distinction for all except the proper nouns. Moreover, some of the mathematical equations about regular formulae that worked splendidly for the proper nouns worked less well for the rest. It was amidst such uncertainty that I encountered the hyperbola depicted on Graph F-O1.

The x-axis reads "one-occurrence-only, two-occurrences-only," and so on. (Let me remind the reader that a formula that is never repeated exactly, only inexactly, is counted as occurring only once.) The y-axis tells us how many instances correspond to each x-point—how many formulae occur that many times. Thus the point (x = 1, y = 673) represents the fact that 673 different formulae occur just once; the point (2, 490) the fact that

490 formulae occur exactly twice; and so on. The curve describes a smooth hyperbola with a very sharp angle, though there is an interesting flattening at 6-7, then a resumption of the curve. To supplement the graph, I adduce on Table F-O1 the figures for the first 25 points on the x-axis beginning at x = 1.

Graph F-O1: Formulae-occurrences curve, Homer 190 nouns



Table F-O1: Formulae-occurrences, Homer

x:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
y:	673	490	194	98	74	62	60	35	28	20	14	12	10	8	7	2	4	3	7	3	5	9	2	1	2

As the eye moves from left to right on the table and graph, we can follow the sharp downward movement to x = 6, the flattening from x = 6 to 7, another sharp drop from x = 7 to 8, a shallower drop from x = 8 to 11, and then a very gradual drop from x = 11 to 25, with much sporadic up-and-down movement along the way—so sporadic that there are more formulae at x = 22 than at x = 14. The equation for this curve is **y = 736/x – 31.7, R = .97, s = 32.1**.[24] We shall, however, concentrate on the curve

[24] The root-mean-square residual seems very large, but it must be remembered that the y-axis is also very large, reaching y = 673. Despite appearances, the value at x = 2 is the most deviant.

rather than the equation, since it gives a clearer picture of the phenomenon.[25]

It is obvious to the reader that the beginning of the bend in the curve at x = 6 corresponds to the previously selected minimum for regular formulae. Moreover, there is a sharp drop from x = 7 to x = 8, and a very much shallower drop thereafter; 8 was another, almost equally valid choice for a minimum number. The reader may feel that the true leveling-off begins at x = 11; we might also make this our minimum. The graph seems to say that the choice is somewhat arbitrary: the minimum cannot be on the sharply vertical left-hand tail running from x = 1 to x = 5, which must correspond to infrequent formulae, nor on the very gradual right-hand tail, which must correspond to regular formulae; it must lie somewhere on the bend in between, running from x = 6 to x = 11. We might indeed have three classes—infrequent formulae, regular formulae, and transition- formulae—but the gain in precision would probably not be worth the encumbrance to our calculations. Let us be satisfied with the fact that the hyperbola, if we can explain it, endorses our previously chosen minimum of 6 for regular formulae, while indicating that either of the alternatives then available, 8 or 10, would have been acceptable.

If we had plotted Graph F-O1 and had come up with a steadily declining straight line, we could still have made a distinction between regular formulae and infrequent formulae, but it would have remained a quantitative distinction. The existence of the hyperbola suggests that there may well be a qualitative distinction—provided that we can explain the curve's shape. Now not every possible explanation will help us. Consider, indeed, the explanation that seems at first sight the most obvious, that our hyperbola simply follows the pattern of another (conjectural) hyperbola, one that traces the number of times each noun occurs. That is: suppose that we should find that a great many nouns occur exactly 13 times (the number of occurrences per noun that we have chosen for a minimum), a considerably smaller number 14 times, and so on, with a steep descent down to 19 or twenty times, and then a flattening out, so that around 20 to 25 times we have only three or four nouns occurring that often, around 30 to 35 only one or two. This distribution would give us a curve of the same shape as the Graph-F-O1 hyperbola, with number of occurrences per noun on the x-axis, and number of different nouns on the y-axis. We would have

[25] The curves for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are identical to the curve for Homer's 190 nouns, and therefore not worth reproducing. The equations for the individual poems have different parameters from the equation for the 190 nouns, of course, since the numbers on their y-axes are not nearly as large.

a relatively large number of nouns capable of generating formulae that occur once, which would explain why we have a large number of such formulae. We would have a relatively small number of nouns capable of generating formulae that occur more than 14 or 15 times, explaining why their number is so small. We would have a bend in the curve at around 20 times, to explain the sharp change in the slope of our hyperbola at around 6 times on the x-axis. With this as the explanation, we could hardly argue that the bend in our hyperbola is due to a qualitative distinction between regular formulae and infrequent formulae.

Fortunately for our hopes for such a distinction, there is no such number-of-nouns/occurrences-per-noun hyperbola; the conjecture falls apart the moment we look at the figures. They are worth looking at; not only do we rebut an unwelcome hypothesis, but we garner some useful information along the way. We construct a table: one row will read "exactly 13 occurrences, exactly 14 occurrences," and so on, and the other row will tell how many nouns occur that many times. The statistics for the first 25 levels may be found on Table N-O1.

Table N-O1: Nouns-occurrences, Homer

occ/n	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37
nouns	9	7	3	6	5	7	5	3	3	7	7	3	5	2	2	2	5	3	4	5	2	5	1	2	6

Nine nouns occur exactly 13 times, 7 nouns occur 14 times, and so on. We observe at once that there are *not* a great many nouns that occur 13 times: there are only 9. It is not true that only three or four nouns occur between 20 and 25 times: there are as many nouns that occur 23 and 24 times as occur 14 times. It is not true that only one or two nouns occur as often as 30 to 35 times: there are 6 that occur 37 times, and 6 that occur 16 times. It is not true that only a small number of nouns are capable of generating a formula that occurs 15 times: a noun that occurs only 23 times (δάκρυ in the *Iliad*) is capable of it, and 135 out of our 190 nouns occur 23 times or more, 54 of them appearing in the above table. If we were to plot the graph for the numbers on Table N-O1, we would get a scattering of points that is, if anything, linear and not hyperbolic. There would be a down- ward movement from level 13 to level 37, but a very gentle one. The graph would certainly bear no resemblance to our hyperbola as a whole— though it would not be dissimilar to its long right-hand tail. And the reader can see this by contrasting the figures on Table N-O1 with the figures on Table F-O1 above: the left side of Table F-O1 has nothing in common with Table N-O1, but the right side matches it very closely.

This very fact may help us in our search for a qualitative distinction between regular formulae and infrequent formulae. If we can show that the shape of the right-hand tail of the hyperbola is indeed caused largely by the frequency of occurrence of the nouns themselves, then the shape of the left-hand tail must have a different cause; or perhaps there are facts about the regular formulae that *enable* them to occur as a function of the occurrences of their nouns, facts that the infrequent formulae lack. Either way, we get a quality or qualities responsible, at least in part, for the distinction. Let us begin by actually plotting on Graph N-O1 the number of nouns vs. occurrences-per-noun, this time including all 190 nouns. We note the dissimilarity between Graph N-O1 and Graph F-O1; if anything, the relationship on Graph N-O1 is linear. If we do give it a linear analysis, we get an equation with a very low slope, minus 0.02, and a root-mean-square residual of 1.6. That is, the number of nouns per level is nearly constant, but there is a slight downward movement as we go from left to right. Naturally enough, since we expect a narrative poem to display fewer nouns that occur 100-150 times than occur 15-20 times.

Graph N-O1: Number of nouns/occurrences per noun, 13-256 occurrences



On the other hand, the resemblance between Graph N-O1 and the hyperbola's right-hand half from x = 11 or 12 on out along the x-axis to x = 79 is striking. After x = 11 on Table F-O1, the numbers go up and down, with a very gradual overall downward movement, a movement often arrested, so that we see, for example, 8 formulae occurring 14 times, and 9 formulae occurring 22 times. This is exactly what is happening on Graph N-O1 and Table N-O1: the numbers go up and down, but there is a gradual and often arrested downhill movement. If we go out far enough on the graphs, and if we extend Table N-O1 to include all the instances on Graph N-O1, we come to a point where for each x value, y = 1. This helps us to understand the gradual decline, as such, in the right-hand tail; it must reflect the equally gradual diminution in the number of nouns that occur often

enough to provide a formula that can occur that often.[26] Most nouns occur too seldom to generate a formula exactly repeated 66 or 79 times.[27]

But it does not explain the *sporadic movement* in the right-hand half, the fact that a regular formula is just as likely to occur 22 times as 14 times. Nor does it fully explain why the decline is so gradual, in contrast to the steady, sharp decline on the left, the fact that an infrequent formula is less likely to occur twice than once, three times than twice. A regular formula on the right seems to be enabled to occur as often as the number of overall occurrences of its noun permits; an infrequent formula on the left is obviously prevented from doing the same.

Now the most obvious reason for the difference between the tails is that there are so many more infrequent formulae than regular formulae, 1529 vs 307. The infrequent formulae must be answering poetic needs, each one of which arises rarely, but which as a type arise very commonly. Only once in the *Iliad* does the poet need, or elect, to say in the genitive

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[26] Naturally we ask whether there is a linear relationship between the number of total occurrences of our 190 nouns and the number of formulae that occur at each level of occurrence (i.e., between Graph N-O1 and the right-hand tail of the hyperbola), and indeed there is. But the correlation coefficient is only moderate high (.51) because there are various factors that work to decrease correlation. See further below.

[27] There is another idea that looms temporarily as a way of explaining the formulae-occurrences hyperbola. It happens that a large number of nouns have formulae that occur once, a significantly smaller number have formulae occurring twice, and so on until we reach 17-22 times, after which the numbers level off and a noun is as apt to have a formula occurring 40 times as occurring 20. Plotting a graph, with x = "possessing a formula occurring x times," and y = the number of nouns that have a formula occurring that often, we get another hyperbola, one also possessing a sharp break, but in a place further out on the x-axis, around x = 18. Moreover, there is a high correlation (coefficient of .94) between the y-values for this hyperbola and the y-values for the formulae-occurrences hyperbola, and an even better one (coefficient of .99) between their logarithms. (That is, the relationship between the y-values is not quite linear, but follows a gentle curve.) It is no doubt true that these two phenomena are closely related; but have we explained anything? This line of argument seems only to postpone the difficulty: *why* do a much larger number of nouns have formulae occurring once than have formulae that occur 18 times? And why such a sharp break around x = 18? Is not the answer going to be, because there is a much larger number of different formulae that occur once than occur 6 times, and there is a sharp break at x = 6? In other words, a great many nouns have formulae occurring once because a great many formulae occur once. The high correlation between the two phenomena means only that each noun tends to have the same *proportion* of formulae occurring once, twice and so on as every other noun. This is an interesting fact, but it does not explain the formulae-occurrences hyperbola.

before position 9 that Achilles was "great of soul," but he says 9 times in this place and case that *someone* was. Just once does Odysseus "rise up," ἀνίστατο in position 6-8, but the verb occurs in this position 7 times in the *Iliad* and twice in the *Odyssey*. The astonishing number of different infrequent formulae, and the fact that there are only 5 places on the x-axis of Graph F-O1 where infrequent formulae can fall, means that even before we constructed the graph, we knew that whatever the left-hand side of the graph might turn out to look like, it could not have been a linear extension of the right-hand tail backwards to the y-axis. It might have been a scattering of points, or a horizontal line, or an S-curve, but whatever shape it took, it had to be much higher on the y-axis than the right-hand tail. But this does not account for the shape that the left-hand tail does in fact take, for its steep and regular decline as opposed to the gradual sporadic decline on the right. It is as if some force were at work upon the infrequent formulae to produce the sharp decline. This force is constrained on the right-hand tail by some counter-force that allows the regular formulae to occur freely. The constraint starts to gain control at x = 6 and is fully in command at x = 11. Indeed we shall see that it begins to exert itself even earlier, and slows down the sharp left-hand decline.

We shall encounter several reasons for the shape of the left-hand tail before we are done, but it is useful to begin with a generality. Entropy is the natural tendency of any system towards maximum randomness. If we recognize formularity—as we have defined it—as a state of order, then with respect to formularity the state of maximum randomness is a non-formulaic occurrence, and entropy is the force at work upon the infrequent formulae. The set of 70 nouns, for example, shows 1204 non-formulaic occurrences. If we subtract from this set those formulaic occurrences, and only those, that are enabled to occur freely by the (as yet unspecified) constraint upon randomness just mentioned, there remain just 747 formulaic occurrences. Without the constraint, there would be many more non-formulaic than formulaic occurrences. Without it, the formularity of our 70 nouns would be 38% instead of the 74% it actually is. Without it, a non-formulaic occurrence has a greater chance to occur than a formula.

The first stage of order is a once-only formula, a partial repetition, which is likelier to occur than a total repetition (if entropy is allowed to play freely). For μεγάθυμος ’Αχιλλεύς to count as a once-only formula, μεγάθυμος need not occur again with ’Αχιλλεύς, but need only be found with some other noun in the same position; or the two could occur together, but in a variety of different positions. For it to have counted as a twice-only formula, every part of it would have had to be exactly repeated.

Hence—since at this point on the graph entropy is more powerful that the constraint upon it—there are twice as many once-only as twice-only formulae, and a formula is twice as likely to occur once than twice.[28] For a formula to occur three times, the circumstances permitting its occurrence must be present three times, and this is less probable than their presence just twice. (Three of a kind is less common in poker than a pair.) And so on, until we reach the place on the x-axis of Graph F-O1 where the constraint upon randomness is largely in place, somewhere between x = 6 and x = 11.

The best candidate for this constraint has two aspects: the structure imposed by the poets upon the hexameter line to facilitate the use of formulae, viz., the caesurae and the cola, especially the major cola; and the nature of the formulae that are especially devised to fill the major cola. The epic tradition has broken the hexameter line into four segments separated by caesurae. These caesurae can fall in six possible places: after verse-positions 2, 3, 5, 5.5, 7, and 8.[29] Caesurae are determined by cola, and the cola that chiefly operate to restrain randomness are the major cola. Most formulae in the right-hand tail occur in major cola; most infrequent formulae (57%) do not; and the more often a noun-formula occurs, the likelier it is to fall in a major colon: 31% of once-only formulae fall in a major colon, 44% of twice-only formulae, and so on.[30] This growing percentage of occurrences in a major colon slows the steep decline of the left-hand tail, begins to arrest it at x = 6 on Graph F-O1, where most formulae are falling in a major colon, and has brought it to a halt by x = 11, where almost all are.

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[28] It is twice as easy provided that the poet has the means—largely Hainsworth-alteration and generic epithets and verbs—to create once-only formulae. If he did not, or if they were severely curtailed, the hyperbola proper would start at twice-only. For that reason we might speak of these means as another kind of constraint upon randomness. See further below.

[29] I am accepting the formulation of Geoffrey Kirk, Berkley Peabody, John Foley, and others: see Foley 1990:73-84.

[30] In any discussion of the major cola, we must use the figures for the 70 nouns in Homer, since the calculation for the 190 nouns is not yet complete. Complete figures for these 70 will be found below; figures for nominative noun-epithet formulae for the 38 characters who occur more than 20 times may be found in Sale 1989:387-88. On the basis of these samples, and of non-statistical examination of all 190 sets, we can say that the statements in the text are certainly true for all proper nouns in the nominative and for a representative sample of all common nouns; they are *almost* certainly true for all nouns in all grammatical cases.

To fill these major cola, the tradition devised the formula-systems, many of which are so elegantly isolated and analyzed by Milman Parry. We have regular verb-formulae that put the verb in the identical position each time, admit of relatively few variations in the words accompanying the verb, say only a few things ("spoke, perceived, rejoiced, obeyed, smiled, departed" cover almost all of their semantic range), and usually occupy just four positions (up to the trochaic caesura, up to the hephthemimeral caesura, up to the bucolic diaeresis, and 1-2...9-12). Matching these verb formulae is a much larger number of regular noun-epithet formulae filling out the remainder of the line. When one of these complementary pairs can be used, randomness (from the point of view of meter and formula) is virtually eliminated. And even when a regular noun-epithet formula must be employed without a matching verb-formula, it inevitably reduces the number of syntactic, metrical and semantic possibilities available to the rest of the line, and thereby imposes a certain amount of order upon it. The common-noun regular formulae also display a few noun-verb formulae that operate in a similar fashion.

Twice as many major cola fall in the second half of the line as fall in the first. The principle of major cola as a constraint on randomness thus dovetails with what John Foley calls "right-justification," the overall tendency for the hexameter line to display greater phraseological and metrical fixity in its second half (Foley 1990:56-57, following Roman Jakobson, Gregory Nagy and others). At first sight, the regular verb-formulae we have been discussing seem to challenge this tendency, since they display fixity, in that they are exactly repeated, and they fall at the beginning of the line. But there are not very many such different regular verb-formulae (I count just 11 that reach the trochaic or hephthemimeral caesura), while the number of different regular noun-epithet formulae that can be used to match them is very large. Or used, indeed, for other purposes: among our 190 nouns there are 37 proper nouns in the nominative case, with 1178 regular formulae-occurrences, and only 330 of these occurrences, by a preliminary count, match verbal regular formulae that open the line. As a result, noun-epithet regular formulae falling in second-half major cola are often found matched with line-openings that are not regular formulae, or not formulaic at all by the definition of "formula" that I am using, and hence more free, less constraining of randomness. Thus the primary source of constraint comes from the noun-epithetic major cola, and these mostly fall in the right-hand portion of the verse.

Constraint can therefore be seen as arising from the colonic system as such, with its ubiquitous major cola, and from noun-epithetic regular

formulae, often supplemented by verbal regular formulae. The colonic system has created a ubiquitous need, the need to fill a major colon. The noun-epithetic regular formulae come into existence to help meet this need. They often require a matching verbal regular formula, but when they do not, they still demand to be complemented syntactically and semantically, and this in itself serves as a constraint—less particular, to be sure, but not negligible. In short, the colonic system constrains the line of verse to accommodate the regular formulae; if a regular formula is appropriate, that regular formula meets the need to fill the major colon, and thereby imposes its own demands upon the rest of the line and indeed the context generally. When this demand is for a verbal regular formula, the whole line is mostly determined; when it is not, randomness is increased, but within limits.[31]

How does the constraint help determine the shape of the right-hand tail? Clearly—since not every major colon contains a regular formula—the major cola are not so much causative as enabling; they obviate the effect of randomness, but do not determine exactly how often a regular formula will appear. The frequency of occurrence of a regular formula is actually caused by five other factors: the number of times the noun itself occurs, the localization of the noun, the syntax and meaning of the regular formula, the ability of the regular formula to extend itself into other cola, and the existence of other regular formula for the noun. The phrase δῖος ᾽Οδυσσεύς in the *Odyssey* occurs 79 times, the largest number for any noun-formula. It owes this frequency in part to the fact that ᾽Οδυσσεύς occurs more often than any other noun, 256 times.[32] It owes it to the fact that the word is highly localized, almost always occurring in final position; it does not stray into other parts of the line, where the regular formula is unusable and infrequent formulae must be employed. It owes it to being noun-epithetic, and to the epithet's being context-free: the formula can be

[31] Two qualifications: it goes without saying that the semantic and aesthetic needs of Homer are far too various to be satisfiable inevitably by a regular formula; but the need to fill a major colon with something remains nearly perpetually. And verbal regular formulae are not fully determined; they include metrically identical alternatives, and some include participles that can be replaced as the context requires.

[32] It is important to stress that these and comparable totals include no alternate names or spellings (such as ᾽Οδυσεύς) and no other grammatical cases.

used anywhere in the poem.[33] It owes it to the fact that the formula is commonly extended backwards to the trochaic caesura with the additional context-free epithet πολύτλας. And it owes it to the fact that there is only one other regular formula for the noun, πολύμητις ᾽Οδυσσεύς.

If the first of these factors were the only one, we would expect close correlation between sporadic movement of the right-hand tail of Graph F-O1 and the similar movement on Graph N-O1—that is, between the numbers on the right of Table F-O1 and the numbers in Table N-O1. Now there *is* a correlation, but the coefficient is only moderately high (.51). Correlation has been reduced by the play of the other four factors we have just enumerated. It has been reduced by the tendency for a noun with a lower localization to display a lower percentage of regular-formula-occurrences.[34] Indeed, when we examine the 100 nouns that generate regular formulae occurring just 6 or 7 times, we find that many of these occur very frequently, and that many (70%) also have low localization; thus it will often be low localization, not a low total of the noun's occurrences, that is responsible for the existence of the infrequently occurring regular formulae. Correlation has been reduced by the presence of noun-verb regular formulae, which can only be used when the action that they refer to happens; no noun-verb formula occurs more than 13 times. It has been reduced by the presence of formulae that cannot easily extend themselves backwards, a frequent phenomenon with common nouns, which (unlike proper nouns) are almost never extended by adding one adjective to another; they extend, if they do, with verbs instead, which are less free of context and therefore cannot be used nearly as often. And it has been reduced by the presence of other regular formulae for the noun, developed in part because of limitations on extension, and in part because nouns with low localization sometimes form regular formulae while occupying an unusual position (νῆας in the *Iliad* forms regular formulae in four different

[33] Most regular-formula-epithets are context-free: Diomedes' war-cry is always splendid, whether he is shouting or not; Achilles' feet are swift even when he is asleep; and so on. So if the poet needs to say "Diomedes," Diomedes' regular formulae will almost never say the wrong thing, and by epic convention will therefore almost always say the right thing. See further the discussion in Sale 1989:389-90.

[34] See Sale 1989:372-77, 410. The correlation between localization and percentage of regular-formula-occurrences for the 22 frequently occurring characters discussed there has a very high coefficient, .92. The coefficient is lower, .71, when we add the rest of the proper nouns and all the grammatical cases, and still lower, .58, when we include common nouns; but even the last figure points to a genuine relationship.

positions, and consequently displays 7 different regular formulae).

To sum up this portion of the argument, the major cola permit the free occurrence of formulae of a certain kind and shape, and this explains the low *slope* of the hyperbola's right-hand tail: it imitates the slope of the nouns-occurrences graph N-O1. Meanwhile, the irregular movement on graph N-O1, together with the other four factors just discussed, explain the sporadic up-and-down movement on the hyperbola, why there should be more regular formulae occurring 22 times than 14. The other four factors tend to lower the number of times a regular formula will appear—or rather, to raise the number of less-frequently-occurring regular formulae. The first factor, in contrast, will tend to spread the regular formulae out along the x-axis: there are 6 nouns, for instance, that occur 37 times and 6 that occur 16 times. Eventually, of course, the supply runs out, and only one occurs 197 times, one 256 times, and none in between and none after that.

We have therefore explained the very uneven and equally gradual decline of the right-hand tail, and can return to the left. We have already said earlier that it exists in part because there are so many infrequent formulae, five times the number of regular formulae, and that these infrequent formulae must exist to meet needs that rarely arise for any given noun, but are of a sort that arise frequently. We have also argued that its shape is due in part to the struggle against entropy, to the fact that without the presence—or rather with the considerably diminished presence—of the constraint that supports the free occurrence of the regular formulae, it is more difficult to have a formula than a non-formulaic occurrence, more difficult for a formula to occur twice than once, three times than twice, and so on. Just as it is the ubiquity of the constraint that causes the very low slope of the right-hand tail, so its reduced presence causes the steep slope on the left.

We have partly explained the left-hand tail, but we are faced with some bewildering questions. Why are the constraints not always in place? Why do we have this vast horde of infrequent formulae? Why do the regular formulae not do the job? If the constraints were always in place, would we get a linear curve on Graph F-O1? And why are there relatively few different regular formulae? It would be interesting to attempt an answer to each of these questions, but to save time here I suggest that we look at the job that the infrequent formulae do in fact do, and see whether this might not explain, at least intuitively, why they exist, and in such large number. (I shall do this in detail in Appendix 1; here let us summarize.) We have already identified one of their tasks: infrequent formulae answer to rare metrical needs by filling in minor cola. Though it is true that almost

all lines of hexameter verse include a major colon, a good many lines also include rarer ones, cola that a given noun is not likely to occupy more than a few times in the course of the poem. If a noun in this position is embodied in a formula that fills the rare colon, that formula will usually be an infrequent formula. True, it will happen that some nouns do occupy a rare colon more than a few times; there are some regular formulae that fall in minor cola, but not many. Based upon our sample of 70 Homeric nouns, while 57.5% of the infrequent formulae do not occupy major cola, only 8% of the regular formulae do not, and none of these 8% occurs more than 10 times. The existence of these rarer cola obviously adds variety to the line of verse; such variety is built into the Homeric technique, which is much more flexible in this respect than the technique of the *Chanson de Roland*.

Graph F-O2: Minor-colon formulae, Homer Graph F-O3: Major-colon formulae, Homer



Table F-O2: Minor-colon formulae, Homer

x:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11etc
y:	216	106	38	14	6	9	3	4	0	1	0
%:	70	56	50	30	20	43	19	22	0	8	0

Table F-O3: Major-colon formulae, Homer

x:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
y:	94	84	38	32	24	12	13	14	8	11	6
%:	30	44	50	70	80	57	81	78	100	92	100

If we separate all the formulae that fall in major cola from those that do not, and plot formulae-occurrences graphs, we get the picture given in Graphs F-O2 and F-O3 and Tables F-O2 and F-O3. Keep in mind that these figures are for 70 nouns only (35 proper nouns in the nominative plus 35 common nouns), since the study of the major cola for the 190 nouns is not yet complete. The graphs were made unequal in size in order to maintain the same scale and bring out the fact that the decline in numbers is considerably steeper for the formulae that do not occupy major cola.

Note that the percentage of occurrences in major cola rises steadily from 31% until it reaches 100% when y = 0 and x = 9.[35] Of course both shapes bear a resemblance to the shape of the Graph-F-O1 hyperbola: a sharply decreasing left-hand tail, and a long flat right-hand tail. The right-hand tail of Graph F-O2 corresponds to the fact that almost all regular formulae fall in major cola: after x = 9, y almost always = 0.[36] The right-hand tail of Graph F-O3 has the familiar low slope and irregular descent. The left-hand tails continue to indicate that there is a huge number of infrequent formulae, and that the number declines rapidly as the number of occurrences per formula goes up. But the difference between the left-hand tails of the two graphs means that whatever is causing the decline on the left may not be working at all on the right.

This cause, of course, is entropy; and since we have seen from discussing the right-hand tail of our original hyperbola on Graph F-O1 that the major cola effectively constrain entropy, we must conclude that entropy

[35] The percentage of occurrences in major cola reaches 100 at x = 9, then dips at x = 10 to accomodate just one formula, ’Αντίνοος προσ(μετ)έφη Εὐπείθεος υἱός. I cite it in its extended form, with the verb; the alternation προσ/μετ is a function of whether the addressee (referred to at the beginning of the line) is singular or plural, and it could be argued that even in the full form we have 10 examples of the same formula. This tempts us to try to argue that the formula fills the major colon from 3 to 8. But it cannot, and does not, exist without the final word, and therefore it is simply too long for the colon. I cite it to show how close we are to being able to say that for these 70 nouns all formulae occurring more than 8 times fill a major colon.

[36] If we had all 190 nouns, we would get a few more non-major-colon formulae, but only a few; three of them are discussed in note 11.

is indeed not at work on Graph F-O3. And yet it still has a left-hand tail! Let us continue to examine the tasks that infrequent formulae perform, to see why we continue to have so many infrequent formulae even after those falling in minor cola have been subtracted.

One task is to be a *noun-verb* formula. Most noun-verb formulae are infrequent formulae: out of 382 major-colon formulae (regular formulae and infrequent formulae) for the 70 selected nouns, 164 are noun-verbal, and 151 of these, 92%, are infrequent formulae. If we were to plot a formulae-occurrences graph for major-colon noun-verbs, the shape would be similar to Graph F-O3, only still less steep, and also less regular, since there are more major-colon noun-verb formulae occurring 4 times than 3. Why, then, are noun-verb formulae mostly infrequent formulae, so that we continue to see a left-hand tail?

There are at least four reasons, the first a negative metrical consideration. In order to repeat a major-colon noun-epithet formula with a context-free epithet, virtually the only thing necessary is that the person or thing referred to by the noun occur twice in the text. The interplay between noun-epithets and the major cola created by the regular formulae is such that it is extremely easy for the poet to create a line with a major colon for a noun-epithet formula to fill; the model for the rest of the sentence is already there. A noun-verb formula, on the other hand, must be fitted into a sentence that is less easily made ready for it, so that an alternative way to say what is wanted may be chosen the second time the idea is expressed.

Second, a noun-verb formula has a complex referent. The fact that so many noun-epithetic formulae contain context-free epithets means that, practically speaking, the referent of the noun is *the* referent; the epithet has no limiting role. There is almost no such thing as a context-free verb in the epic vocabulary; to use a noun-verb formula the poet must want to mention not only a particular person or thing, but also a particular action or state of affairs. No character referred to in the nominative, not just among our 70 nouns but in all of Homer, possesses a noun-verb regular formula, apart from the extension of ροδοδάκτυλος Ἠως by means of φάνη. Even the common nouns among our 70 display only 13 such regular formulae, as opposed to 151 infrequent formulae. Hands are frequently raised (in the *Iliad*), or laid upon food (in the *Odyssey*), ships frequently arrived at (in the *Iliad*), κῦδος given and won (in the *Iliad*), but most things happen more seldom. And in fact a good many actions are performed just once, though they may belong to a *class* of actions that occur more often. The phrase Αἴας δὲ κορύσσετο, for instance, which occurs once, is a formula because the verb is generic, the same verb-form being used also in the same position

of Patroclus and Achilles. We can imagine the phrase's having occurred twice; but it is unthinkable that it should be a regular formula (the verb is used only once even for Achilles, who is mentioned much more often than Ajax). The act of arming occurs relatively often; but Ajax simply does not, and in any remotely similar poem will not, arm himself more than once or twice. Thus a basic task of major-colon noun-verb infrequent formulae is to say things that rarely need to be said.[37]

The third cause applies as well to major-colon noun-epithets. Some major cola are much more rarely occupied by noun-formulae than others. For the selection of nominative proper names that he singled out for special study, Parry identified 4 major cola: 1-5 (up to the penthemimeral caesura), 6-12 (after the trochaic caesura), 8-12 (after the hephthemimeral), and 9-12 (after the bucolic diaeresis). For oblique cases and common nouns he added 1-5.5 (up to the trochaic caesura) and 5.5-12 (after the penthemimeral caesura); he recognized that certain nouns with a rarer but normal metrical shape fell in rarer cola. I in turn have added 2-8 and 3-8, moved by exactly the same considerations: certain nouns, especially certain proper nouns in the nominative that Parry did not single out, put their frequent formulae in these cola; and indeed certain complimentary verb formulae are shaped to fit around them, at 1-1.5 (or 1-2) plus 9-12 (τὴν δ' αὖ. . .ἀντίον ηὔδα, for instance). But there are 3 cola that noun-formulae occupy far more commonly than the others: 5.5-12, 8-12, and 9-12.[38] Hence when we observe 18 once-only major-colon noun-verb formulae falling in the rarer major cola, and only one of them occupying the colon where its regular formula falls, we conclude that at least the other 17 owe the scarcity of their occurrences to the rarity (relative to the meter of their nouns) of the cola they occupy. Only 2 of these 17 put the noun at its

[37] It might be objected that just because a verb occurs rarely, the idea need not occur rarely. But I have not noticed any instances where two different verbs used with a given noun in the *same major colon* say the same thing. If it does happen, it happens very seldom; always, or almost always, the need is as infrequent as the infrequent formula that meets it. Of course some needs are similar to each other. There are two noun-verbal infrequent formulae, for instance, that occupy the same major colon as χείρας ἀνάσχων (a regular formula in the *Iliad*) and mean something akin: χείρας ὀρεγνύς, and χείρας ἴαλλον (an infrequent formula in the *Iliad*). But ἀνάσχων is an action appropriately directed towards gods alone; towards mortals we use ὀρεγνύς, a different action, while for food we use the formula χείρας ἴαλλον .

[38] That 1-5 is much less common—one-tenth as frequent—as each of the others is clear from Parry's own figures (1971:39, Table 1).

localization-point, making it all the more reasonable that the remaining 15 should occur only once. In sum, another basic task of noun-verb infrequent formulae is to occupy cola that their nouns, and indeed most nouns, rarely occupy, and therefore to provide formulae for these nouns when they are wandering away from their localization-points.

There is a fourth cause, and that is accident. I have noted 5 major-colon noun-verb formulae that could have been regular formulae; three of them are, in fact, regular formulae in the other poem. Note that these formulae are still meeting rare needs; there is no reason why a need cannot be accidentally rare. A poet can easily happen to mention a person, an object, or an action less frequently in one poem than he might have in another. What is astonishing is that as few as 5 noun-verb formulae are infrequent for this reason.

We can now subtract the 164 major-colon noun-verb formulae from the 382 major-colon total formulae, and construct a formulae-occurrences graph for the remaining 218 noun-epithets. It too has a left-hand tail, but much shallower. There is a difference of only 2 between the 39 that occur once and the 37 that occur twice; then comes a steeper falling off, and then the graph grows level and begins the right-hand tail, the very gradual descent, at x = 4, y = 12. There are 121 infrequent formulae and 97 regular formulae. Again we ask what job it is that the infrequent formulae, this time noun-epithetic infrequent formulae, perform such that they are infrequent formulae and the graph continues to possess a left-hand tail. The answer becomes more complex, and we shall look at it in greater detail in Appendix 1; let us merely sketch it here.

Of the 121 major-colon noun-epithetic infrequent formulae, a total of 35 meet rare *metrical* needs. Some 23 of these occupy the rarer major cola: again the *sort* of need is common, but the rarity of the need for the individual formulae is underscored by the fact that each of the 23 occurs only once or twice. There are 12 more that offer rarely needed metrical alternatives to other formulae, usually regular formulae, falling in the common major cola (the infrequent formulae can begin with a double consonant, for instance).

We also have rare needs of a *semantic* or *aesthetic* nature: 28 of the major-colon noun-epithetic formulae are specific to the context in which they appear, and 12 seem to be used for special effect. The phrase Θέτις κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα is a good example of the former, since it can only be used if Thetis is weeping. The phrase μεγάθυμος ᾽Αχιλλεύς is an instance of the latter; the poet wanted to avoid πόδας ὠκὺς ᾽Αχιλλεύς,

which would have ineptly anticipated πόδας in the next line.[39] Obviously these special-effect formulae are not likely to occur more than once or twice; only one out of 12 occurs more often. There are thus 40 formulae that meet, or probably meet, semantically or aesthetically determined rare needs.

There are 3 formulae whose is existence is something of a puzzle. They not only overlap other formulae metrically, but they appear to be genuine violations of the principle of economy in that they are hard to defend as semantic or aesthetic alternatives to the formulae they overlap (see Appendix 1).

That leaves 43 major-colon noun-epithetic formulae that appear to be infrequent formulae by accident—formulae that could be regular formulae, or indeed are regular formulae when used in the other poem. They fall either into the commonest cola—into cola that are frequently occupied by nouns with their meters—or into cola where they put the noun in a frequently occupied position; they have context-free epithets; they are not aimed at a particular metrical, semantic, or syntactic effect; and they do not perform the same job as an already existing regular formulae. We have also already noted 5 noun-verb infrequent formulae that have this appearance; only 5, since we have seen that the bulk of such formulae could never be used more than a few times. There are thus 48 formulae that might well have been regular formulae under different circumstances—if, for instance, the poet had been using these nouns more often, or if certain metrical circumstances had happened to arise more often. Let us combine them with the 110 major-colon formulae that actually are regular formulae, and plot their formulae-occurrences curve on Graph F-O4.

Graph F-O4: Major-colon **rf** and accidental **if** vs. occurrences-per-formula



[39] I owe this example to Hainsworth 1968:9, n. 2.

At last the left-hand tail has vanished. Though it is theoretically possible to interpret Graph F-O4 as a hyperbola, the fact that the left-hand side is a scatter, not a tail, makes such an interpretation exceedingly unattractive. It makes much better sense to treat the whole as roughly linear with a gently declining slope. Indeed it resembles Graph N-O1, which relates the number of nouns to occurrences-per-noun, very closely indeed. The resemblance is so marked that we are fully justified in attributing the gentle decline on Graph FO4 to the growing lack (as we proceed outward along the x-axis) of nouns that occur often enough to produce formulae that occur that often.

What we have done, therefore, is to subtract from the total number of infrequent formulae all those formulae that clearly answer to rare needs. These needs have proved to be: for formulae in minor cola, for noun-verb formulae, for formulae filling rare major cola, for rarely-needed metrical alternatives, for expressing a meaning specific to a context, and for creating an unusual special effect. By subtracting these infrequent formulae, we have subtracted the left-hand tail from the hyperbola. We have left behind a sporadically descending, roughly linear curve describing the behavior of a group of formulae that have the same characteristics whether they occur once or 79 times.[40] The difference between these characteristics and the rare needs just enumerated gives us the qualitative differences we were seeking between regular formulae and infrequent formulae.

These qualitative differences account, therefore, for both tails of the hyperbola on Graph F-O1. In between the tails is the transitional area, the bend from x = 6 to x = 11, to remind us that there is no real minimum

[40] The graph omits 18 non-major-cola regular formulae and any non-major-cola infrequent formulae that have the characteristics of regular formulae. Since such regular formulae are exceptional, the task of determining what infrequent formulae resemble these exceptions enough to be called "accidental infrequent formulae" is a difficult one. Indeed many of the 18 regular formulae look very much like regular formulae by accident: μέσον σάκος and μένος μέγα, for instance. Remember too that we chose the lowest possible minimum for regular formulae; if we had chosen a slightly higher one, 8, only 6 would remain. On the other hand, there is every reason to expect regular formulae by accident; in the course of a long poem, certain phrases that might be expected to occur rarely will naturally occur a little more often. I might have produced a graph virtually identical with Graph F-O4 simply by removing examples such as these. Rather than winnow both the regular formulae and the infrequent formulae with insufficient confidence in the objectivity of the procedure, I preferred to set the problem aside by basing the graph on the characteristics of the vast majority (86%) of the regular formulae. If one simply includes the other 18 regular formulae, what results is a graph very similar to Graph F-O4 with a greater bulge in the left-center.

number for regular formulae, only a minimum range of numbers. Between 6 and 11 some formulae are in principle regular formulae, others are infrequent formulae that happen to have occurred a little more often, and others are no doubt indeterminate. It may well be that mathematical sophistication will one day enable us to dispense with a minimum number, but for now the interests of statistical simplicity demand that we make a choice, and the hyperbola certainly permits, nay encourages, the choice of 6 (introducing the first flattening), 8 (after the last large drop), or even 11 (introducing the second flattening). In choosing 6 we are electing, for better or worse, to make the regular formula group as large as possible, and therefore, when possession of a regular formula is a criterion for including a noun in a group, making that group as large as possible.

The qualitative differences, then, account for the hyperbola, and the hyperbola, in turn, gives a quantitative picture of the formulaic behavior of Homer's nouns: a small number of frequently employed formulae are used to meet common needs, while a large number of formulae, each one of which is infrequently employed, meet rare needs of a sort that commonly arise. Now that we have given this thorough empirical explanation, it is proper to add that the hyperbola was pretty well predictable on theoretical grounds. The formularity equation, Equation 1A, guarantees that most noun-occurrences are formulaic, and that when **total occurrences** is high, **formulaic occurrences** is high, so that either the number of **different formulae**, or **occurrences per formula**, will be high as well. Equation 2A asserts that when **total occurrences** and **formulaic occurrences** go up, it is primarily not **occurrences per formula** but **different formulae** that goes up with them. Now if **different formulae** were stationary with **total occurrences**, and **occurrences per formula** went up and down, we would probably not have a hyperbola. We would expect each of the formulae of a frequently occurring noun to occur more often, so that such a noun would have few, or no, infrequent formulae, and the left-hand side of the graph would be not much bigger than the right. Given that the reality is the opposite to this scenario, that **occurrences per formula** is nearly stationary with **total occurrences** while **different formulae** goes up and down, we are assured the existence of a large number of infrequent formulae, and entropy will shape most of these into a left-hand tail. Then the fact that there is a cap on the number of regular formulae ensures that, except on the bizarre chance that no regular formulae occur more than 7 or 8 times, we will have a low right-hand tail.

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Appendix I: The Birth of Infrequent Formulae in Homer[41]

The purpose of this appendix is to fill out the picture we have just painted of the various materials the oral poet had on hand, and the techniques in which he was trained, that enabled him to create or employ infrequent formulae in the course of composition. In addition to his regular store Homer possessed, before he composed, a generic store, a store of patronymics, and probably but not necessarily some distinctive formulae that lent themselves to Hainsworth-alteration—a precompositional distinctive store. He had been trained in the process of alteration and in the process of creating a compositional distinctive store as he composed. He had learned how to meet rare needs by creating infrequent formulae with these processes and materials.

As a result, our 70 nouns display a total of 652 infrequent formulae, of which 380 fall in a minor colon and 272 in a major colon. Those

[41] Let me stress once more that all that follows is little more than a detailed examination, mathematically oriented, of the account of composition in performance given in Lord 1960:37-67. Also, the process I shall be describing whereby infrequent formulae are born has a great deal in common with the descriptions given by Visser 1988:21-37, and Bakker 1988:151-95.

infrequent formulae that fall in *minor cola*, though they sometimes put the noun at the localization-point, most often supply a formula for a noun that has wandered into an unusual position in the verse. Such formulae are therefore almost certain to be answering rare needs; the need for a particular formula in an unusual position is necessarily rare, though the general need for a formula of this type is very common. It is often met with a generic epithet or verb, or a patronymic. Ἕκτωρ. . .Διὶ φίλος is found in positions 2 through 8 three times; Ἕκτωρ. . .Βοὴν ἀγαθός in 1 through 9 just once; Ἕκτωρ μεγάθυμος in 2 though 5.5 just once; Ἕκτωρ. . .ἀκόντισε δουρὶ φαεινῷ spread over the whole line occurs 3 times. Another very common device is to place a regular formula in a different position in the line: δολιχόσκιον ἔγχος after the penthemimeral caesura, for instance, instead of after the hephthemimeral; or to alter it further, by inversion (Ἀπόλλων Φοῖβος), separation (κορυθαίολος ἠγάγεθ' Ἕκτωρ), inflection, and so on. Or an infrequent formula can be similarly altered: Αἴας. . .φέρεν σάκος running from 2-3 and 5.5-8 is an instance. Or the poet may combine generic with distinctive: Αἴας δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠύτε πύργον, or give something quite distinctive: Αἴας. . .πελώριος ἔρκος Ἀχαιῶν. (Naturally there can be almost no distinctive phrases—phrases that neither contain a generic or patronymic nor are Hainsworth-alterations—that occur just once: we would not be able to identify them as formulae.)

The motive for using such minor-colon infrequent *noun-epithet* formulae is probably primarily (not exclusively) metrical, since most of the epithets are like φαίδιμος, fine and colorful but not highly specific to the context. The poet has decided to let the noun wander, and must accomodate it by filling an unusual colon. But a few have distinctive epithets, such as πελώριος ἔρκος Ἀχαιῶν, and these tend to add real power. The motive behind the *noun-verb* formulae, on the other hand is—as it almost always is––primarily semantic, the need to refer to an unusual action or state of affairs. There are a number of generic verbs that exist for this purpose (ἀνίστατο, κορύσσετο, ἐκέκλετο, to name just a few) but a great many of these formulae are distinctive.

In the relatively infrequent case where a formula in a minor colon puts the noun at the localization-point, we can of course no longer speak of accommodating the wanderer. The motive for noun-verb formulae of this sort is again semantic, to say something that, as with most noun-verb formulae (see below), is not often said; these formulae tend to occupy a whole line, or else to be found in enjambement. Noun-epithet formulae of this sort, on the other hand, are most often alterations of regular formulae

(sometimes infrequent formulae), or else patronymic or generic formulae, that put the epithet in an unusual position: κορυθαίολος. . . Ἕκτωρ, Κρονίδης. . .Ζεύς. The motive for most of these appears to be metrical; and it is clear that the need is unusual, not merely because of the position of the epithet but because of the unusual colon occupied.

Of the 272 *major-colon* formulae, 151 are noun-verbal and 121 are noun-epithetic. We had already observed that most of the 164 major-colon total (regular and infrequent) *noun-verb* formulae were infrequent formulae and answered rare needs, and there is little useful to add here. A noun-verb formula is prima facie more likely to be uncommon than a noun-epithet, since the latter has but one referent—the person, thing, concept, and so on that it means—while the noun-verb formula has two, the person and the action. You will simply mention someone far more often than you will say that he or she is engaged in a particular deed. As a result, there are only 5 noun-verb formulae that do not answer rare needs. These I classify as "accidental infrequent formulae"; they might have been regular formulae in another poem. Three of these are, indeed, regular formulae in the other poem and need not be cited here; the other two occur 5 times each and might well have occurred a sixth: Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ(α) and μήδετο ἔργα (the subject of the latter is Zeus). The 121 *noun-epithetic* infrequent formulae, however, need some additional discussion to show which ones answer a need that really is rare, and which should be classified accidental infrequent formulae. First, the 35 that answer rare needs of a *metrical* nature.

We have 23 that occupy the *rarer* major cola, and are obviously meeting rare needs. Five of these (μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί, for example) are nominative noun-epithets after the penthemimeral caesura; only oblique cases and common nouns have regular formulae here. One, Ἀτρείδης Ἀγαμέμνων in position 3-8, pulls the noun out of the localization point, which it almost always occupies. Six (Αἴας διογενής, for instance) place a spondee or a trochee in 1-5; the regular formulae almost always put such words at the end of the line. Six (such as ἀργυρόπεζα Θέτις in 1-5) are Hainsworth-alterations putting the formula in an unusual place. Two (Τηλέμαχός θ' ἥρως, for instance) create a formula in 1-5 for a choriambic (first paean) noun; such nouns form regular formulae in 3-8. And three have generics that are never used to form regular formulae: ἀντίθεοι Μνηστῆρες, τεύχεα μαρμαίροντα, Ἴλιον αἰπεινήν.

There are 12 more that occupy *common* major cola, where the rarity of the need is slightly less visible. All are metrical alternatives (e.g. initial

vowel instead of consonant) to other formulae: 9 to regular formulae, 3 to accidental infrequent formulae. Of the 9 alternatives to regular formulae, 5 begin with a double-consonant used to make position (πτολίπορθος ᾽Οδυσσεύς in both poems, for instance); there are no cases known to me where a noun has 2 regular formulae in the same colon and one has a double-consonant of this sort, and so I consider the need met by the infrequent formula to be rare.[42] We have an example of the reverse situation among the other 4 infrequent formulae that alternate with regular formulae: Μενέλαος ἀμύμων, where a generic epithet produces a single-consonant alternative to a regular formula beginning with a double consonant, ξανθὸς Μενέλαος. Of the remaining 3, two (ὑπέρθυμος Διομήδης and ᾽Αλαλκομενηὶς ᾽Αθήνη) fall in 6-12; for proper nouns in this colon the poet usually prefers a regular formula that will extend backwards from a shorter colon later in the line, with generics (ἄναξ, γέρων, Θεά, μέγας) or not (ποδάρκης, πολύτλας, βοήν). We might cite a situation which could provide us with an analogy for declaring these two to be accidental infrequent formulae: ἐυκνήμιδες ᾽Αχαιοί and κάρη κομόωντες ᾽Αχαιοί are both regular formulae. What keeps me from making this declaration is first, that the generic ὑπέρθυμος is never found in a regular formula, and second, that ᾽Αλαλκομενηὶς ᾽Αθήνη only occurs twice, both times in combination with ῞Ηρη τ᾽ ᾽Αργειή. It seems needed only in this unusual circumstance. The ninth and last alternative to a regular formula is νώροπι χαλκῶι, used when the meaning "armor" is intended and when an initial consonant is needed in place of αἴθοπι χαλκῶι. The specialized nature of this need made me reluctant to classify the formula as an accidental infrequent formula.

The three common-cola metrical alternatives to *infrequent* formulae are ἥρωες ᾽Αχαιοί (beginning with a vowel) and μεγάθυμοι ᾽Αχαιοί (beginning with a double consonant), both alternative to *F*ελικῶπες ᾽Αχαιοί (beginning with a single consonant) in 8-12, and εὐήνορα οἶνον, alternative to μελιηδέα οἶνον. The reasons why the need for μεγάθυμοι ᾽Αχαιοί is rare are akin to those discussed at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, and I therefore have classified *F*ελικῶπες ᾽Αχαιοί as an accidental infrequent formula. The phrase ἥρωες ᾽Αχαιοί may be rarely needed because of the uncertainty over whether *F*ελικῶπες ᾽Αχαιοί begins with a vowel or a consonant as the digamma begins to go; it only

[42] The Κρ- in Κρόνου πάις ἀγκυλομήτεω (which falls in the same colon as πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε Θεῶν τε) never makes position.

occurs once (and once in the *Odyssey*, not included in the count since Ἀχαιοί in the *Odyssey* lacks a regular formula). When inflected the phrase is a regular formula in the accusative; but in the nominative there are only six occurrences all told of formulae that fill position 8-12. I classify μελιηδέα οἶνον without hesitation as an accidental infrequent formula, since it occurs 5 times; I am not sure why εὐήνορα οἶνον is needed rarely, but I infer that it is from the fact that it occurs only once.

There are 40 *semantic-aesthetic* alternatives to regular formulae, falling into two groups: formulae with epithets specific to the context (such as Θέτις κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα, used instead of θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα) and formulae used for special effect (such as μεγάθυμος Ἀχιλλεύς for πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς, mentioned above). We have 28 cases of the former, all of them used to say something particular to a situation that does not often arise, such as when Thetis is weeping. They may replace a regular formula in the same colon, as when Telemachos might have completed *Od.* 3.98 with πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδύσσευς, but chose the much more appropriate πατὴρ ἐμὸς ἐσθλὸς Ὀδυσσεύς. Or they may occupy an alternate colon, as when δεύτερος αὖτ' Αἴας begins the line. Many combine two nouns, not in order to bring two separate ideas into a doubling formula, but to produce a larger single idea, as when Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες is used to mean "Priam's family." I shall not list the rest; these examples should make clear what they are like.

There are just 12 cases where it seems appropriate speak of special effect.[43] Often, as with μεγάθυμος Ἀχιλλεύς, the effect is merely the avoidance of ugliness. Parry calls attention to the simile where Zeus is said to move "the thick cloud from the high peak of a great mountain" (16.297-98). It would be unsuitable to call Zeus "cloud-gathering" here, but that is the regular formula for the colon with which the poet is confronted; and so we have instead "lightning-gathering,"

[43] The remarks in the next two paragraphs owe a great deal to the careful criticism of Richard Janko, who calls my attention to the large number of apparent *equivalent* formulae that are used for a special effect or are specific to the context. See Janko 1981 and Janko 1992:434, s.v. "equivalent formulae." To the extent, of course, that they are specific to a context or create a special effect they are not really equivalent.

στεροπηγερέτα.[44] In *Iliad* 2.645 Homer, had he used his regular formula, would have found himself saying, "Of the Cretans, Idomeneus, leader of the Cretans, was the leader." This would hardly have done, and so he dug into his bag of generic epithets and said instead, "Of the Cretans, Idomeneus the spear-famed was the leader."[45] The 2 formulae ἤνοπι χαλκῶι in both poems are used in unusual circumstances to avoid the military or death-dealing connotations of the regular formula. Then there are 4 formulae, employed just once, where the poet is not so much avoiding ugliness as using a colorful and unusual epithet: χρυσάμπυκας ἵππους (used of divine horses), *F*ερυσάρματας ἵππους (seemingly to bind two passages together),[46] ὑψηχέας ἵππους (a strange epithet, perhaps used in *Iliad* 5.772 to mark the divinity of the horses), and ὑψηχέες ἵπποι (in *Iliad* 23.27, perhaps marking the extraordary presence of the horses next to the pyre). The phrase ἀσπίδα θοῦριν, used just twice, has an epithet strange for the object, and we would therefore not expect to find it used often; in πίονα ἔργα the epithet gives the noun a sense unusual for it in the *Iliad*; in μέρμερα ἔργα the epithet itself is relatively rare.

There are 3 infrequent formulae whose existence I find it hard to account for: δῖοι ᾽Αχαιοί does not appear to be a necessary alternative to κοῦροι ᾽Αχαιῶν, nor Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος (in both poems) to νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς. In all 3 cases the meaning is different from the meaning of the regular formulae, but in the first there is a net loss of color, and in the second and third I cannot hear any gain. It is just possible that the force of n- as a double consonant in νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς was being lost, but this is just guessing. To have three cases where we are just puzzled does not seem demoralizingly high.

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[44] Parry 1971:187. Parry thought that Homer—or rather the tradition—was avoiding the doubled *sound* here, νεφέλην νεφελη-, and that may be the reason (see my next example); but what prevented him from considering the reason I prefer is his theory that the fixed epithet was not heard by the audience, and this view I find unacceptable: see Sale 1989:388-90 and Janko 1992:356.

[45] ᾽Ιδομενεὺς δουρικλυτός running from 3-8 actually occurs 5 times in all, once a few lines later in Book 2 and for the same reason, the other times in individual battle scenes where the poet, now fully equipped with the alternative to the infrequent formulae, apparently wished to use it when Idomeneus was fighting; the regular formula occurs off the battlefield and mostly to introduce speeches.

[46] *Iliad* 15.354 and 16.370, where the Trojans cross and recross the ditch; the epithet is used in the latter to extend the regular formula. See Janko 1992:266.

The other 42 infrequent formulae (7% of the total 652 for our 70 nouns) are probably infrequent formulae by accident. They fall in common major cola for their nouns, almost all put the noun at the localization-point, they are noun-epithets and their epithets are context-free; several are regular formulae in the other poem. These do not form exceptions to the general rule that infrequent formulae answer to rare needs; it is perfectly natural that a certain percentage of rare needs should arise by accident—should arise because the poet is using a given noun less often, or in different contexts, or in different metrical circumstances, than he might otherwise be doing.

It may be useful to examine a typical formulaic set. Ajax (the word Αἴας), for example, has 23 different formulae to go with his 80 total occurrences in the nominative. Not surprisingly, his localization is low, at 40%: because the word Αἴας can wander into 6 different parts of the line, it is free to develop infrequent formulae in 5 of them, more infrequent formulae than Ἀχιλλεύς, which occurs over twice as often (171 total occurences) but has a localization of 94%. Twenty-two of the 23 different Ajax formulae are infrequent; the one frequent formula, Τελαμώνιος Αἴας, sometimes extended with μέγας, occurs 21 times, filling the verse from the hephthemimeral caesura (or the trochaic caesura when extended) to the end.[47] His lack of a regular formula in 9-12 is compensated for by the infrequent formulae φαίδιμος Αἴας, which occurs 5 times. This accidental infrequent formulae would probably have been a regular formulae if Ajax' localization had not been so low, and the number of verse-positions he can occupy so large.

Ajax has 14 formulae that occur only once, 4 that occur twice, 2 that occur thrice, one 4 times, one 5; a total of 22 different infrequent formulae, 37 infrequent formulae-occurrences, somewhat lower than the average ratio of 1.96. Only 6 of the infrequent formulae fall in a major-colon, 27%, whereas 42% of the total of 652 infrequent formulae fall there. This low figure is largely accounted for by Ajax' low localization and the number of different positions he occupies. Two of the 6 major-colon formulae, 33%, are noun-verb formulae, as opposed to 56% for all 70 nouns; the numbers are too low for statistical significance. Not that Ajax lacks noun-verb formulae, quite the contrary; he has 11, but only 2 fall in major cola.

1. Just 3 (21%) of the 14 once-only formulae fill a major colon; in

[47] It is important to keep in mind that the extension of a formula, regular or infrequent, is not counted as a different formula, since it contains a formula that is exactly repeated. See above, note 2, and Sale 1989:382.

contrast, 30% of the total 310 once-only do this. None occupies the same colon as any other: we have 14 formulae in 14 different positions. Two (67%) of the major-colon are noun-verb formulae; contrast 59% of the total 94 major-colon once-only formulae. The other is δεύτερος αὖτ' Αἴας, specific to the context; it overlaps Αἴας διογενής metrically but not, of course, semantically. There is no violation of the principle of economy. Two put the noun at the localization-point; in the others Αἴας has wandered to 3 different unusual positions.

2. Two (50%) of the 4 twice-only formulae fill a major colon, and 2 do not; in contrast, 44% of the total 190 twice-only formulae do this. Again we find none in the same colon as any other: 4 formulae, 4 different positions. Neither of the major-colon formulae is a noun-verb formula; contrast 56%. One is Αἴας διογενῆς, a major-colon noun-epithet formula occupying a rare colon; the other is Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας. This can be analyzed as the regular formula in a new position, after the penthemimeral, and separated, in which case it occupies a rare major colon; or it can be seen as ἄλκιμος Αἴας extended, occupying a common major colon and consisting of an accidental infrequent formulae. One of the twice-only formulae puts the noun at the localization-point; in the others Αἴας has wandered to 2 different unusual positions.

3. Neither of the two three-times formulae fills a major colon; contrast 50% of the total of 76 thrice-only. Neither is in the same colon as the other. Neither puts the noun at the localization-point; but both put it in the same unusual position.

4. The four-times formula does not fall in a major colon; contrast 70%. It is not a noun-verb formula; in fact it is Αἴας. . .Τελαμώνιος, the regular formula in a new position, 1-8, and separated. The noun is not at the localization-point.

5. The five-times formula falls in a major colon; so do 80% of the total of 30 five-times. It is not a noun-verb; contrast 50% of the total 24 major-colon formulae. It is φαίδιμος Αἴας, which we consider an accidental infrequent formulae. The noun is at the localization-point.

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The Interrelationship Between the Oral and the Written in the Work of Alexander Campbell

Raymond F. Person, Jr.

Various studies have looked at the interrelationship between oral and written language within different historical periods. Some of these studies concern the changing relationships between the oral and the written when a society moves from a primarily oral culture with a limited use of writing to a "document-minded" culture (Thomas 1989:36)[1] that has a "literate mentality" (Clanchy 1979). Other studies concern the changes imposed by the increased use of printing technology (e.g., Eisenstein 1979; Kernan 1987; McLuhan 1962). All of these studies concern societal changes, even though representative historical figures may be emphasized as a description of these social changes (e.g., Samuel Johnson in Kernan 1987).

Rather than studying the societal changes involved in the transition from a primarily oral culture to a document-minded culture or from a document-minded culture to a print-oriented culture, this study concerns the tension between document-mindedness and the persistence of oral dimensions within a single historical figure, Alexander Campbell. Campbell, a principal founder of a nineteenth-century reformation movement on the American frontier, had his own printing office that he effectively used to further his cause of Christian unity; he thus clearly participated within a document-minded society and developed further the use of printing technology within his community. However, his use of scripture in his writings betrays strong oral features—for example, he seems to rely on his own memory when quoting the Bible rather than referring to a printed text. Thus, Campbell's use of scripture illustrates one way in which oral modes may remain dominant within certain domains even within a highly literate, print-oriented society.

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[1] Although Thomas states that she borrowed the term "document-minded" from Clanchy (1979), I have not found the term in Clanchy's work. On the contrary, Clanchy used "The Literate Mentality" for the title of his Part II, a term that Thomas describes as having "misleading connotations" (1989:36).

I. Clarification of Terms

Before beginning the discussion of Campbell, some clarification of terms is necessary. First, what constitutes a "document-minded" society, that is, one that possesses a "literate mentality"? This study proceeds from the characteristics identified in Michael Clanchy's work, *From Memory to Written Record* (1979).[2] Clanchy attributed the following six elements to a culture with a "literate mentality." Documents and writing technology must be (1) sufficiently *available* to political leaders and merchants and (2) *necessary* for their business purposes (57; Troll 1990:107). (3) Written records must become as *trusted* as oral records, if not more so, to faithfully preserve the "truth" (211; Thomas 1989:34-45). (4) Written texts must no longer function simply as mnemonic aids, but become a reliable *record* that can be stored for future reference (147; Stock 1983:3; Thomas 1989:51, 55). Finally, the processes of reading and writing become removed further from their close oral connections so that reading aloud and voicing while writing are replaced by (5) *silent reading* (183; Graham 1987:31-33; Troll 1990:108) and (6) *silent writing* (218; Ong, 1982:95; Graham 1987:31-33; Troll 1990:113).

A document-minded society could exist without printing technology; however, a document-minded society that has been influenced by "print logic" (Kernan 1987:48-55) contains additional characteristics. Drawing upon the work of McLuhan (1962) and Eisenstein (1979), Kernan identifies the three leading characteristics of print logic as multiplicity, systematization, and fixity. Multiplicity refers to the variety of books available and the reproduction of numerous copies of the same book, systematization to the systematic production and organization of a book that likewise structures knowledge, and fixity to the objective permanence a book seems to preserve.

From the characteristics of a document-minded society, we can infer some characteristics found within primarily oral contexts, including the use of limited written texts primarily as mnemonic aids rather than as reference works. Possibly related to this inference is the observation that oral and written language have different effects upon human memory (Hildyard and Olson 1982:20):

> In oral language, the point, intention or significance of the language, the "speaker's meaning" is preserved in the mind of the listener; as the actual

[2] Clanchy's work has been generally well received; see Ong 1982, Stock 1983, Graham 1987, Thomas 1989, Troll 1990.

> words, syntax, and intonation are ephemeral, they are rapidly exchanged for those interpreted meanings which can be preserved. In written language, the words and syntax, the "sentence meaning," is preserved by the artifact of writing, and mental recall becomes the precise reproduction of that artifact.

That is, in a primarily oral culture, written documents function as mnemonic aids to the "speaker's meaning" or, to use the terminology of speech-act theory, the performative or perlocutionary act *represented* in the document (e.g., promise); these mnemonic aids may never be referred to because the emphasis is upon the oral testimony of the witnesses to the speech-act. In contrast, in a document-minded culture written documents function as an enduring reference to the "actual" words themselves, a reference that is trusted as preserving the "true" meaning of the interaction.

In what follows, details of Campbell's life and his use of scripture will be presented as an example of a tension between his document-mindedness and the persistence of oral dimensions in his use of scripture. The first section will present biographical information demonstrating his document-mindedness and orientation to printing technology. In the second section, the relationship between his understanding and use of scripture will illustrate the continuing prominence of oral language within a document-minded, print-influenced society.

II. Alexander Campbell: Written Documents and Oral Tradition

Biographical Information

Alexander Campbell (1788-1866) was one of the principal founders of the nineteenth-century reformation movement to which three present North American denominations—Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Church the Christ, and the independent Christian Churches—trace their beginnings.[3] He lived in a document-minded society influenced significantly by printing technology, as his own life clearly demonstrates. His environment not only meets all of the characteristics of a document-minded society, but his own use of printing technology enhanced the availability and necessity of written documents for his readership. In addition, Campbell's document-mindedness will be demonstrated in a

[3] For further historical background to the movement, see the standard history of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) used in its denominational seminaries (Tucker and McAllister 1975).

discussion of his personal library and his work as an author/publisher.

At the time of his death, Campbell's personal library included 655 volumes (Anon. 1947:33). It was described in a letter from his daughter, Decima Campbell Barclay, to the librarian at Bethany College, which he founded and to which he bequeathed his collection (34): "His Library was not as extensive as it was select, and his books, in various languages, especially Hebrew, Greek, Latin and French, were many of them on religious and educational subjects." In this same letter, his daughter described how Campbell risked his own life to save some of his "beloved" books when he was shipwrecked on his arrival to America from his native Scotland.

Realizing the power of the printed word, in 1823 Campbell purchased a printing press, the necessary type, and built an outbuilding for his print shop in order to begin publishing the monthly *The Christian Baptist*, which continued until 1830 (Richardson 1870:49-51; Tucker and McAllister 1975:127). Thus he launched his career as an author and publisher and in the first seven years of his business "no less that forty-six thousand volumes sold" (Richardson 1870:51). A partial list of works authored/edited/published by Campbell includes the following with the date of original publication given in parentheses: the monthly journals, *The Christian Baptist* (1823-30) and *The Millennial Harbinger* (1830-62); his own translation of the New Testament, *The Living Oracles* (1826); his magnum opus on hermeneutics, *The Christian System* (1835); *The Christian Hymnbook* (1835); and a biography of his father, *Memoirs of Elder Thomas Campbell* (1861). Most of his books came out in different editions. For example, *The Christian System* was itself a revision of an earlier work entitled *Christianity Restored*, and yet still went through various editions.

Campbell was also well known as a debater; he had prominent, public debates with other clergy (e.g., Presbyterian, Roman Catholic) and the "skeptic" Robert Owen.[4] Although these debates certainly involved oral presentation, his involvement during and after these debates further demonstrates his document-mindedness. The participants in the debates, especially Campbell, often read prepared statements, which followed an agreed-upon printed format and program for the issues to be discussed within the debate. They also often referred to printed documents, including works supporting their own position as well as those refuting their opponent's position, and their own publications as well as the publications

[4] See Campbell and Maccalla 1948, Campbell and Owen 1829, Campbell and Purcell 1837, Campbell and Rice 1844.

of their opponents. Hence, even the "oral" debates were heavily influenced by written documents. In addition, stenographers were hired and the debates, including background material (e.g., letters concerning the agreements preceding the debates), were published; the earlier debates were published by Campbell himself (Campbell and Maccalla 1948; Campbell and Owen 1829). Thus his skills as a debater became widely known primarily because of the publication of these debates.

In this section we have seen clear evidence that Campbell not only lived in a document-minded culture, but fully and directly participated within this culture in his utilization of printing technology. Not only were written documents available and necessary for his business purposes but his work included making more documents available to his readership. His own writings and speeches (preserved in written form) demonstrate that he, his followers, and his opponents referred to printed documents as reliable records. Thus Campbell clearly deserves the description "document-minded" in that he participated in a print-influenced society.

In the following section, we will look at the tension within Campbell concerning scripture, for, on the one hand, he greatly emphasized the importance of the literal written text of the Bible for faith and practice, but, on the other hand, his own use of scripture betrays a dependence upon his memory that can be seen as representative of an oral dimension of his culture.

Campbell's Use of Scripture[5]

Campbell saw his life's mission as restoring the "New Testament church" based upon biblical study without the "prejudiced" influence of the various creeds. This mission, which became the guiding force behind the movement he helped found, is succinctly expressed in the slogan "No creed but Christ, no book but the Bible." Although this theme permeates all of his writings, it is especially central to *The Christian System*. In this work, Campbell presents his understanding of the centrality of the Bible for

[5] My primary research was undertaken when I was a research assistant at Texas Christian University under the direction of M. Eugene Boring. I assisted him with an article on Campbell's principles for biblical interpretation, including the first index to biblical quotes in *The Christian System* (Boring 1987). However, it was not until later, after having studied oral and written discourse during my doctoral program, that I realized the implications of the tensions in Campbell's use of scripture. For a fuller discussion of Campbell's hermeneutics, see Boring 1987.

knowledge of Christ and Christian faith and outlines his principles for interpretation. This emphasis was not simply upon an English translation of the Bible either, for "Campbell considered it essential for ministers to know the biblical languages" (Boring 1987:28).

Campbell himself knew the biblical languages (Hebrew, Greek) and the content of the Bible well. His writing typically included biblical quotations, and his "own style was so steeped in the biblical idiom that hundreds of allusions to New Testament language are used in expressing his own ideas" (Boring 1987:8). Not only did he know the Bible well, but he expected the same of his readers. For example, *The Christian System* is saturated with biblical quotes, but rarely is a notation to the book, chapter, and verse given; rather, the reader was presumed to recognize the quotes and know their location.

For Campbell, the Bible was definitely a written document, divinely inspired, to which all Christians must refer for matters of faith and practice. It was an object of necessary, intense study that must be interpreted by paying close attention to its content and language. Given this orientation, it is ironic that he sometimes presumes to quote scripture but either harmonizes different texts as if he is quoting only one or introduces his quote incorrectly by attributing it to the wrong biblical writer. In the following paragraphs, I discuss some of these instances, which are found in *The Christian System* (1901). These quotations, which do not refer to any one particular text accurately, as would be expected in today's print-oriented society, include three different types of departures: grammatical/syntactical changes, the harmonizing of synoptic parallels, and the combination of texts.

In each case, the biblical material is demarcated by the use of quotation marks in Campbell's text. With the use of various concordances, the closest biblical passages were identified and compared to Campbell's translation of the New Testament (1951), the Authorized Version (the "King James"), and the Hebrew or Greek texts. The form used for each of the quotations is as follows: the quotation from *The Christian System* is given first, followed by the English translation from Campbell's translation for all New Testament texts (abbreviated LO for *The Living Oracles*), or from the Authorized Version (abbreviated AV) for all Old Testament texts. Only changes that were probably not the result of different translation techniques are discussed.

1. *Grammatical/syntactical changes*. In the following example, Campbell has made two changes: (1) the use of a proper name "Jesus" rather than a pronoun "me" and (2) the use of a pronoun "him" rather than

the noun "God."

> To Jesus every knee shall bow, and to him every tongue confess (1901:209)
>
> Surely every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God (Isa 45:23 as quoted in Rms 14:11; LO)

In each change, he has simply identified Jesus as the speaker of this saying and made necessary changes to explicate this understanding.

The next example consists of a paraphrase of the biblical text:

> I have appeared to you to make you a minister and a witness for me—to send you to the Gentiles (1901:20)
>
> I have appeared to you, to ordain you a minister and a witness, both of the things which you have seen, and of those which I will hereafter show you: delivering you from the people, and from the Gentiles; to whom I now send you. (Acts 26:16-17; LO)

In this paraphrase, he (1) added the phrase "for me," (2) abbreviated the saying, (3) changed the syntax so that the infinitive construction continued ("to send you"), and (4) supplied the now-omitted antecedent "Gentiles" for the pronoun "whom."

In the following, the only substantial change that cannot be explained by different translation strategies is the change from "all men" (which literally follows the Greek πάντας ἀνθρώπους) to "the offspring of Adam":

> by one man sin entered into the world, and death by that one sin; and so death, the wages of sin, has fallen upon all the offspring of Adam (1901:14)
>
> Wherefore, as sin entered into the world by one man, in whom all sinned, and by sin, death: thus death came upon all men. (Rom 5:12; LO)

This change is consistent with the context—that is, Paul clearly understood the "one man" who brought sin and death into the world as Adam and "all men" as descendants of Adam; Campbell simply made this understanding explicit.

In the above instances, Campbell made various grammatical and syntactical changes that all had the same basic function: to remove possible

ambiguities, thereby making his particular understanding of the texts more explicit. In other words, although in his own translation of the Greek original he faithfully followed the literal "sentence's meaning" as expected in a document-minded society, he nevertheless recalled the "quotations" in *The Christian System* based upon his memory of the "speaker's meaning" of each verse, thereby making the "speaker's meaning" more explicit by his (unconscious) changes. Viewed from the standpoint of today's generally accepted standards of quotation and documentation (and Campbell's own standard in his published translation), these instances constitute mistakes that violate the "sentence's meaning." However, if viewed from the standpoint of the "speaker's meaning" in these verses, one might argue that they are improvements because they remove possible ambiguities. Hence, here we may have evidence of the oral dimension in Campbell's use of scripture.

2. *The harmonizing of synoptic parallels.* New Testament scholars now generally assume that the similarities between the synoptic gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke) stem from the use of Mark and another document (denoted as Q for the German *Quelle*) as sources for Matthew and Luke. However, despite these similarities, certain differences remain—differences that are the result of the different viewpoint expressed in the use of these sources (Mark, Q) and the addition of unique materials. Because of these differences, modern scholars carefully refrain from harmonizing the differing, but similar, accounts in the gospels.

Campbell's understanding of the gospels was pre-critical in that he understood each gospel as an independent, accurate account of the life of Jesus and believed that the gospels could be fruitfully harmonized (Boring 1987:24-25). The following instances of Campbell's quotation of the gospels are examples in which he harmonized the differing accounts in the synoptic gospels, thereby creating a problem for assigning any of the quotations to one specific gospel account.

In this first example, Campbell is clearly drawing most heavily upon the account in Mt 4:12-14; however, he seems to imply that his quotation refers to all of the gospel accounts in that he introduces the biblical quote with the phrase "In this assertion the Evangelists agree:" (1901:138):

> Now Jesus, [after his baptism and temptation in the wilderness,] hearing that John was imprisoned, retired into Galilee; and, having left Nazareth, resided at Capernaum. For thus saith the Prophet, . . (*ibid.*)
>
> Now Jesus, hearing that John was imprisoned, retired into Galilee, and having left Nazareth, resided at Capernaum, a seaport in the confines of

> Zebulun and Naphtali, thereby verifying the words of Isaiah the Prophet; (Mt 4:12-14; LO)
>
> But after John's imprisonment, Jesus went to Galilee, proclaiming the good tiding of the Reign of God. The time, said he, is accomplished, the Reign of God approaches; reform, and believe the good tidings. (Mk 1:14-15; LO)
>
> Then Jesus, by the impulse of the Spirit, returned to Galilee, and his renown spread throughout the whole country, and he taught in their synagogues with univeral applause. (Lk 4:14-15; LO)

Interestingly, here Campbell demarcates what he clearly saw as an intrusion into the biblical quote—the phrase "after his baptism and temptation in the wilderness"—by the use of brackets. However, he does not use any other punctuation to suggest to his readers that he has made any other changes.

Campbell's harmonization is easily seen in the following example. Here he begins with the Markan wording and follows up with the Matthean account (which is very similar to the Lukan account).

> If a kingdom be torn by factions, that kingdom cannot subsist. And if a family be torn by factions, that family cannot subsist. By civil dissensions any kingdom may be desolated; and no city or family, where such dissensions are, can subsist. (1901:85)
>
> By intestine dissensions any kingdom may be desolated; and no city or family, where such dissensions are, can subsist. (Mt 12:25; LO)
>
> If a kingdom be torn by factions, that kingdom can not subsist. And if a family be torn by factions, that family can not subsist. (Mk 3:24-25; LO)
>
> By intestine broils, any kingdom may be desolated, one family falling after another. (Lk 11:17; LO)

In the following example, Campbell not only harmonized the gospel account, but also made grammatical and syntactical changes:

> They should believe in him that was to come after him (1901:295)
>
> but he who comes after me, is mightier than I (Mt 3:11; LO)
>
> One mightier than I comes after me (Mk 1:7; LO)
>
> but one mightier than I comes (Lk 3:16; LO)

Here his wording disallows any accurate identification of which gospel account he is quoting, although it is clear that he is referring to one or more of these accounts. The grammatical/syntactical changes he made are consistent with changes made when one makes an indirect quote: he changed the first-person pronouns referring to John the Baptist to third-person, singular pronouns and the implied second-person audience to third-person plural pronouns. Also, he paraphrased the biblical texts by setting his quote within the larger context of John's message—the preparation of the coming of the Christ. Although he made these significant changes, he nevertheless includes all of these changes within quotation marks, suggesting that he possibly understood his quotation as faithful to the biblical text.

Although Campbell understood that each gospel was an independent witness to the life of Jesus, he nevertheless believed that each gospel's message pointed to the same reality; indeed, this belief is sometimes manifested in his harmonization of biblical quotations of the synoptic gospels. This emphasis upon the harmonized message of the gospels recalls the oral emphasis upon "speaker's meaning" rather than the literate emphasis upon the "sentence's (or in this case, sentences') meaning." Hence, these instances provide further evidence of the oral dimension in his use of scripture.

3. *The combination of passages*. In the following two examples, we have clear cases where Campbell combined different biblical passages. Although the combined biblical accounts are related in their content, they are not parallel accounts of the same event or saying; in other words, these instances differ from those in the preceding section because those were harmonizations of parallel, synoptic accounts and these are combinations of non-parallel accounts.

In the first case, Campbell took a phrase from a synoptic account of Jesus's healing of a paralytic (Mt 9:5 // Mk 2:9 // Lk 5:23) and combined it with a phrase from the Johannine account of the woman caught in adultery (Jn 8:11):

> Your sins . . . are forgiven you: go and sin no more. (1901:214)
> Your sins are forgiven you. (Lk 5:23; LO)
> Your sins are forgiven. (Mt 9:5 // Mk 2:9; see also Lk 7:48; LO)
> Go, and sin no more. (Jn 8:11; LO)

Here he took Jesus' words from one account and augmented them with Jesus' words from another account to create a more explicit message—in other words, he emphasized the "speaker's message" in their combination,

downplaying the "sentences' meaning."

The following example is the clearest case of a mistake in Campbell's quotation of scripture. Here he attributed the quote to "the Apostle John" even though it clearly includes Paul's words as well:

> "Beloved," says the Apostle John, "now are we the sons of God; and what manner of love God has bestowed upon us, that we should be called sons of God! If sons, then we are heirs of God—joint heirs with Christ." (1901:158)

> Behold how great love the Father has bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God! For this reason, the world does not know us, because it did not know him. Beloved, now we are the children of God; but it does not yet appear what we shall be. (1 Jn 3:1-2; LO)

> We are children of God. And if children, then heirs; heirs, indeed, of God, and joint heirs with Christ. (Rms 8:16b-17; LO)

Not only has he combined the passages from 1 John and Romans, but he has also paraphrased those elements that he took from each of the passages and transposed the words in 1 John 3:1-2.

In this section, we have the strongest evidence that Campbell depended on his own memory of the written texts rather than copying directly from a written text. As a result, he made what today would clearly be called mistakes from the view of generally accepted standards for quotation. These include grammatical and syntactical changes, the harmonizing of synoptic parallels, and the combination of different passages. Although the strongest evidence concerns the combination of different passages, each type of evidence suggests that Campbell's use of scripture was characteristically more "oral" than "literate"; that is, he focused upon the more oral "speaker's meaning" rather than the more literate "sentence's meaning." These instances can only be called "mistakes" when viewed from the perspective of the more "literate" level of the "sentence's meaning" as presumed in the generally accepted standards for quotation. However, from the perspective of the more oral "speaker's meaning" they can be viewed as improvements since his changes remove ambiguities, making his understanding of the "speaker's meaning" more explicit. This emphasis upon the "speaker's meaning" is probably related to an aspect of his hermeneutics, for "it was the authority of the *message* of the Bible as a whole. . ., which concerned Campbell, not the infallibility of 'every jot and tittle'" (Boring 1987:41). That is, Campbell's changes to the "sentence's meaning" were probably not, in his opinion, a change in the

"speaker's meaning" or the "Word of God," but rather a more explicit statement of the "speaker's meaning."

In other ways, Campbell's use of scripture could be understood as in tension with his own mission of careful study of the Bible as a basis of his reformation movement—that is, he made some errors in his own use of scripture. These few mistakes, however, point to the effectiveness of Campbell's memory, an effectiveness even from the standpoint of the "sentence's meaning," for Campbell's quotation of scripture is, on the whole, quite literally correct.[6] These errors, then, simply suggest the probability that Campbell generally depended upon his own memory for biblical quotes rather than referring directly to a printed text.

III. Conclusions

Whereas many studies concerning orality and literacy have focused on the changes made when a society moves from a primarily oral culture to a literate culture, this study has focused upon a different aspect of the relationship between oral and written dimensions—the oral dimension within the life of a historical figure who certainly has a "literate mentality" and lived in a "document-minded" and print-influenced society. Alexander Campbell's "literate mentality" or "document-mindedness" is illustrated by his devotion to studying written documents and his industriousness as an author and publisher. However, evidence has been presented above suggesting that Campbell depended upon his own memory when referring to scripture rather than upon a printed text. This evidence consists of various types, all concerning his quotation of the Bible— grammatical/syntactical changes, the harmonizing of synoptic parallels, and the combination of passages. This dependence upon memory and the emphasis on the "speaker's meaning" rather than the "sentence's meaning" corresponds more closely to the characteristics of oral language than written language. Therefore, even within the document-minded Campbell there is a significant domain of what might be called "*oral*"-mindedness.

Although this study has focused upon one particular historical figure, Campbell is certainly not unique in the tension exhibited in his use of scripture. In *Beyond the Written Word* (1987), William Graham surveys various religious traditions to understand the nature and function of

[6] The examples discussed above are only a small portion of the biblical quotations found in *The Christian System*, most of which can be seen as faithful English references to the Hebrew and Greek texts. See the index compiled in Boring 1987:55-59.

scripture. He begins his preface (1987:ix):

> This is a book about the fundamental orality of scripture; that is, about the significant oral roles of written sacred texts in the history of religion.

This "fundamental orality of scripture" involves the religious practices of recitation, liturgically reading aloud, chanting, and so on. Included in his study are Graham's observations about those religious leaders, especially reformers, who "speak scripture" (144):

> It is remarkable how completely a Martin Luther, Martin Bucer, John Calvin, or John Bunyan speaks a scripturally saturated language—that is, thinks, speaks, and writes in the vocabulary, stylistic modes, thought-world, and imagery of the Bible. . . . Such persons do not so much quote scripture or use it for proof-texting as they simply "speak scripture"—a scripture in which they are literally and spiritually, linguistically and theologically "at home"; one that they can and do recite largely if not wholly by heart, often to the point of mixing its words and phrases almost unconsciously with their own expression, and always to such a degree that their own vocabulary and manner of speech are resonant with the idiom and cadences of the Bible.

Thus, the oral dimension in Campbell's use of scripture is, by no means, unique, but is just one example of this "fundamental orality of scripture."

The observation that scripture maintains strong oral aspects even within a document-minded culture has significant consequences for future studies of the relationships between the oral and written modes. Although religious scribes may provide important influences that lead a specific culture towards document-mindedness (Clanchy 1979:2, 5), the religious realm of that same culture may be the last to be influenced heavily by a "literate mentality." Therefore, religious literature and life should be studied more carefully on its own terms rather than simply as one aspect of a particular culture, for, as demonstrated above, Alexander Campbell participated fully in a document-minded culture heavily influenced by printing technology even within the realm of religious publications, but nevertheless refers to the written text of scripture by memory, thereby suggesting that for some individuals in certain situations the written text of scripture may become more of a mnemonic aid than a reference text.

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Strategies for the Presentation of Oral Traditions in Print

Eric L. Montenyohl

The study of literature entails several fundamental concerns. These usually include matters of creation, form, history, meaning, and significance. However, if "literature" is no longer restricted only to written works[1] and encompasses all works of verbal art (oral and orally based, as well as written), then other matters must also be considered. Oral traditions occur in contexts (cultural, social, linguistic), and without consideration of these contexts one cannot begin to deal with questions of function, meaning, and significance. Learning to present and analyze performances of oral traditions—at all levels—as literature may teach scholars a great deal more about how and how not to view all literature.

In the study of literature, certain forms have been privileged and have attracted most of the attention of scholars and critics. In written literature, drama, lyric and narrative poetry, and certain kinds of prose fiction (the novel and short story) dominate in Western culture. In the study of oral traditions, it has been the epic, with lesser interest in folktales and ballads. Yet the range of forms available for study is much broader. In oral tradition this may include forms as diverse as legend and proverb; folktale and belief; myth and personal narrative; riddle, joke, and anecdote. These may be found among nearly all familial, regional, occupational, social, and

[1] I take literature to be verbal expression valued for its aesthetic qualities. While the term "literature" derives from a Latin word associated with writing, attempts to restrict literature today only to written materials is an appeal to the past and a denial of realistic dynamics.

ethnic groups as well as in events at which different groups interact.[2] Each of these traditions is important *per se*, and any one of them may shed light on much earlier texts now preserved only in written form.[3]

Scholars have now been collecting, analyzing, and interpreting oral traditions—and in particular, oral narrative forms—for well over 175 years.[4] Over this span, many views have changed, including the romantic notion that the folk are the true poets of the nation and that only marginal (rural, peasant, primitive, unlettered, illiterate) peoples have oral traditions.[5] Now scholars can study oral traditions from epics to sermons, from sagas to curses, from charms to beliefs. And topics such as compositional techniques, aesthetic qualities, and meaning have been and are being pursued at long last. Yet one aspect of the study of oral traditional materials has been questioned very little, if at all, since the very beginning of scholarly notice: the manner of presentation of oral traditions.

When Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm brought out their *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (1812, 1815), the work was clearly intended for a scholarly audience. The brothers included an introduction that contained statements about how they gathered their collection of tales, how they viewed its significance, and even how much of it was appropriate to an audience of children. In 1819 they brought out a third volume to the collection containing scholarly notes for the tales. This format—a scholarly introduction, usually by the collector/editor, followed by the collection of

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[2] As yet there is no adequate measure of the oral traditions of any one culture as manifest in and between these different kinds of groups. Rather, there are only contributions towards this goal. Even for families, full studies would involve considerable work. Leonard Roberts's work (1959, 1974) on the Couch and Harris families serves as an excellent example. Multi-volume collections such as the *Frank C. Brown Collection of North Carolina Folklore* (White 1952-64) and James Walker's works on the Lakota (e.g. 1980, 1983) would be dwarfed by more rigorous collection of other forms and larger groups.

[3] The work of Milman Parry and Albert Lord has been significant in recognizing that some of the stylistic traits of the Homeric epics are directly related to their oral composition. However, the Parry-Lord collection of traditional Serbo-Croatian poetry is priceless not just because the texts provide insights into the Homeric materials but also for what they contain of South Slavic culture.

[4] The origins of scholarly interest in oral traditions is usually acknowledged as the publication of Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm's *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* in 1812.

[5] On the point, see Alan Dundes, "Who Are the Folk?" (1980:1-6).

texts *per se* and then scholarly comparative notes—set the model for collections of oral traditional materials ever since. Certainly the format has evolved somewhat over 175 years, but the changes have consisted only of minor refinements and additions based on approaches to the material. For example, introductions to recent collections have included more attention to the role of the oral traditions in the culture, to individual performers' skills, and to repertoire analysis.[6] Early introductions tended to focus primarily on the question of the origins of oral traditions, with a lesser interest in the transmission of the materials.[7] Nevertheless, this tripartite organizational format for presenting scholarly editions of oral traditions, begun in 1812, has remained the standard up to the 1980s.[8]

What are the problems inherent in this scheme? There are three major faults with this format for presenting oral literature: (1) the pretense of "scientific" objectivity on the part of the scholar/collector; (2) the treatment of oral traditions as discrete textual units; and (3) the decontextualization of the cultural materials. In the first place, the separation of collector/scholar from the oral traditional performer harks back to the beginnings of ethnographic collections, with the fundamental assumption being the distinction of "we" versus "they"—the familiar, literate writer as differentiated from the other, the "bearers of tradition." Here, the pretense of scientific objectivity is created through the entire organization. The introduction is intentionally scholarly, methodical, and analytical—quite unlike the texts themselves. The writer is, by convention, dispassionate and apparently even disinterested in the materials except in a "scientific" discussion—that is, as to what the texts "reveal about" the particular informants and group. The methodology for the research is sometimes explained, usually with appropriate scholarly references for major

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[6] See, for example, Dorson 1967. The form is certainly not dead: Daryl Cumber Dance uses the format in *Shuckin' and Jivin'* (1978), as does the current Pantheon Fairy Tale and Folklore Library with volumes such as Abrahams 1985.

[7] See, for example, Sir George Webbe Dasent's introduction to Asbjornsen's collection of folktales (1888) or Andrew Lang's introduction to Margaret Hunt's translation of the Grimm tales (1884).

[8] This format is not unique to collections of oral literature. In fact, this pattern is the most familiar one for literary texts, whether in translation or not, whether ancient or modern. Exactly what this convention implies about contemporary readers and their ability to comprehend written texts without the scholarly (and contextualizing) frame is left to others.

theoretical questions. The culture is frequently described by way of a summary of data, including anything from climate and kinship systems to social organization and linguistic categories.

Yet this convention of distance on the part of the scholar/collector is misleading. Fundamentally, the study of oral traditions is one involving human interactions, direct as well as indirect. Value judgments and personal reactions are part of that research and should be acknowledged as such. In particular, separating the introduction from the texts tends to dramatize the division between the scholar/collector (read *literate*) and the culture from which he drew the texts (read *oral*, *primitive*, *exotic*, and so forth). That is, this format juxtaposes material written by a highly educated scholar for a literate audience with, printed next to it, oral traditional materials. It is no wonder that a reading audience sometimes finds orally collected texts very strange and generally quite different from familiar written forms—after all, the audience has just *read* the scholarly introduction, a form familiar to these readers. This organizational format works against the efficacy of the texts, either as oral tradition *or* as literature.

Furthermore, this "scientific objectivity" encourages (and is based upon) an unconscious ethnocentrism. Since the introduction is written by a scholar, (reading) audiences see print and that scholar's tradition as the norm. In fact, they rarely question or consider the culture, values, or concerns of the collector/scholar. Indeed, the data is presented as though the collector and audience have *no* culture—which is of course impossible—because the organizational format has made it completely transparent. The pretense is that one culture can be found and collected in isolation. Instead of acknowledging that the material inevitably involves the interaction of at least two cultures, most collections pretend that oral traditions from only the one culture are being presented with scrupulous scientific care.

As to the second objection, oral traditional materials tend to be presented as discrete units, often even numbered for reference by the scholar as in collections of ballads (Child # 23), epic poetry texts (Lord # 35), folktales (originally Grimm # 21; now Aarne-Thompson 510A), or legends (Christiansen # 3040). But is what is printed in the collections (much less the indexes) really representative of traditional behavior? Surely no one performs oral literary materials that are viewed within their own culture as quantified.[9] What culture really enumerates narratives and songs,

[9] See Dundes 1975 and Ben-Amos 1976.

or counts words, narratives, or jokes in an evening?[10] What audience reacts to a traditional performer with pleasure or disappointment simply because he/she has generated x more verses than other performers? Oral traditions are not naturally (emically) categorized in the way that most scholars have presented them.[11] The interest in accumulating masses of textual units ("data") has led to confusing *knowledge* (data) for *wisdom* (understanding). Perhaps Walter Ong has in fact understated the impact of the printed word. It seems that as people have become more used to writing/print (literacy in one sense), they also have become fascinated, even mesmerized and blinded by the word as record.[12] Printing and newer forms such as magnetic tape and digital recording have permitted amazing accumulations of data. But to what purpose? Data accumulation does not make a superior individual or culture—only one that has more records.[13]

In sum, human behavior is not so neat and discrete as these textual collections seem to indicate. In fact, the representation of situated human behavior as an isolated series of texts says a good deal about the scholar's view of the culture and the performances, including what is meaningful and

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[10] There are, admittedly, jokes about folklorists who tell jokes or tales by simply referring to the appropriate number. This is part of the folklore of folklorists. However, even folklorists normally utilize type numbers primarily for scholarly reference, not in performance.

[11] Compare, for example, the numerous folktale collections from around the world to recent, more focused studies on specific cultures: Abrahams 1983, Glassie 1982, and Gossen 1974.

[12] Walter Ong has written extensively on the impact of literacy; see especially 1981, 1982.

[13] To cite but one example from folkloristics, consider the case of Marian Roalfe Cox, who worked for several years with a team of English scholars to accumulate variants of the Cinderella tale. In 1893 she published a monograph containing 345 variants of the folktale. Folk narrative scholars eagerly expected that this definitive collection would reveal the origins of this story (and presumably, by association, other Märchen). Yet Cox's collection could not demonstrate this lineage and therefore support any one particular theory of the origins of this tale or of folklore in general. Ironically, the frustrations over this massive collection of data convinced the Folk-Lore Society, then the dominant group of folk narrative scholars in the world, not to pursue such studies any further and thus led to the decline of English folk narrative scholarship.

significant to the scholar.[14] In effect, the traditional scholar has carved human interactions into familiar units, usually with little regard for the views of informants and their culture.

Finally, the texts presented *per se* are decontextualized; that is, the oral traditional materials have been removed from their original contexts and are presented simply as printed texts. Admittedly, part of the purpose of the scholarly introduction is to provide some insight into the culture (and sometimes other contributing aspects such as the performer's style). Rarely, however, does one find individual performers differentiated by their own behavior in verbal interactions—such aspects are usually noted in a summary by the scholar. Because the reading audiences are presented only with decontextualized texts, they are limited as to how they can view the material. Individual items (jokes, tales, epics) can always be approached *as texts*—that is, as written literature—since textual approaches are the only ones available. Thus, one can study form, structure, character, compositional techniques, style, and even the relationship of a particular text to the tradition as a whole. But questions of function, meaning, and significance remain speculative so long as the works are considered only textually. Since oral traditions emerge in varying contexts, one cannot truly discuss the impact of the work on the culture and the tradition until context is added. And since the traditional text-based collection format described above does not consider the social, cultural, and linguistic context of the performances, this model proves inadequate for the contemporary study of oral traditional materials.

Perhaps more significant than the processes of decontextualization (on the part of the scholar) and contextualization (on the part of the reading audience) is the fact that the texts are now outside of the subculture for which the text generates common images, ones that the performer already knows and counts upon. In this sense, the texts as they are encountered by readers are constantly being contextualized, but not recontextualized, for the texts cannot generate the same associations and meanings outside their native culture and contexts.

Since approximately 1965 scholars have begun to pay attention to

[14] As a result, folklorists and anthropologists have recently begun to reconsider who should be making these decisions. The goals, materials, and meanings of cultural studies now call for collaborative efforts involving informants rather than giving way to programs institutionally superimposed by outside scholars.

oral traditions in context.[15] In anthropology and folklore new paradigms arose based upon linguistics (the Prague School), comparative literature (Parry and Lord's oral-formulaic theory), anthropology (the ethnography of speaking), and cultural studies in general. Many of these ideas were fused in the performance-centered approach to "verbal art."[16] A chief spokesman for the group of young scholars advocating the new approach was Richard Bauman, who defined "performance" as "a mode of spoken verbal communication which consists in the assumption of responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative competence. This competence rests on the knowledge and ability to speak in socially appropriate ways" (quoted in Fine 1984:47). This theoretical paradigm has a great deal to offer in the study of oral traditions, including the perception of appropriate cultural roles; the training of the traditional performer; and the heightened awareness of native language performance categories.[17] Yet one area in which this new paradigm has not succeeded, and indeed has not made coherent advances, is in revising the format for presentation of oral traditional materials in print.

Performance-oriented scholars have specifically addressed the issue of representing performances in print several times. Perhaps the first to question the traditional model was Dennis Tedlock, who pointed out a number of problems with traditional print conventions in his 1971 essay "On the Translation of Style in Oral Narrative." In 1972 he brought out *Finding the Center: Narrative Poetry of the Zuni Indians*, in which he introduced several print conventions in order to represent performance features used by his Zuni narrators. First, he prints the Zuni narratives in English poetic form, arguing that poetry permits the representation of silence: "What makes written prose most unfit for representing spoken narrative is that it rolls on for whole paragraphs at a time without taking a breath: there is no silence in it. To solve this problem I have broken Zuni narratives into lines..." (1972:xix). Tedlock also creates conventions to represent other elements of the oral performances (xxi):

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[15] Dundes 1964 is an early statement of this interest; for a history of this development and scholarship embodying it, see Fine 1984.

[16] For advocacy of the term "þverbal art," see Bascom 1955; for popularization of the term see Bauman 1977.

[17] Cf. Abrahams 1983, Bauman and Sherzer 1974, Glassie 1982, and Gossen 1974 for excellent examples of this scholarship.

> The loudness of Zuni narratives ranges from just short of a shout to just short of a whisper. Representing this on the page is something of a problem, since some of the devices offered by our writing tradition are ambiguous: an exclamation point, for example, most often indicates something loud, but it is also appropriate after a whispered interjection. My present solution to the problem is to use small type for soft passages or words, larger type for middle-level passages, and capitals for loud passages.

In addition, he indicates changes in pitch by moving letters or words above (higher) or below (lower) the normal line. The result is a text which is a bit foreign-looking in its typographic representation (Figure 1; after Tedlock 1972:96-97).

Elizabeth Fine's dissertation, published as *The Folklore Text* in 1984, focused entirely on the question of how to represent verbal art. Ultimately she creates a print representation of a performance of an Afro-American toast ("Stagolee") to demonstrate what a performance record of a speech event should look like (Figure 2). Her keys to the representation are formidable (Figure 3) and include such aspects as paralinguistic and kinesic features as well as traditional textual characteristics. The result is a radically different kind of "text," one that is extremely difficult to read and even more difficult to appreciate fully.

The Tedlock and Fine models have several fundamental shortcomings in their approach to representing performance. First, their goals are unclear. If one goal is to represent the *original* performance as witnessed by the collector as accurately and completely as possible (in order, for example, to study performing styles, audience interaction, and the influence of context upon the performance), then translation is of secondary importance. Print conventions marking pitch and the line separations marking pauses would presumably work for the original language, and this strategy would more accurately represent the original performance. This is not to deny the value of Tedlock's translations of the Zuni oral traditions. And yet the data presented are only his English translations of the original Zuni narratives. On this ground, Alcée Fortier's early collection of Creole French folk tales (1895) is much more useful, for he publishes *both* the original French dialect stories *and* his English translations on facing pages. Fine's one text of an Afro-American toast is set down in exacting, even numbing detail—with so many different aspects represented (as best as they can be by these print conventions) that reading the toast as narrative poetry becomes significantly harder *with* all of her added features.

FIGURE 1

•

During the day his headdress would quiver,

o———n until, in the evening

it would become still:

this was a SIGN for them.

Then they slept through the night.

•

The elder brother Payatamu hadn't come home, and

FOUR DAYS HAD PASSED.

When four days had passed

•

the Payatamu

men said

"Our elder brother hasn't come home and the days

have gone by.

Our Sun Father hasn't come up.

What should we do about this?"

•

That's what they said.

Their society chief spoke:

"Well now

let's try something, even though it might not HELP:

•

we'll ask our grandfathers

to come here.

Perhaps

one of them might find him

for us."

That's what their society chief said.

"Indeed."
"Which one should it be?" he said.
"Well now, our grandfather
who lives in the north, the mountain lion:
let's summon him."

•

Their society chief
summoned the mountain lion.
There in the north he arose, the mountain lion.

•

Coming on and o———n, he arrived at Shuun Hill.
He entered:
"My fathers, my children
how have you been passing the days?" "Happily, our
grandfather, so you've come now."
"Yes." "Now sit down," they said, and they
set out their turquoise seat for him and he sat down.

•

The society chief sat down facing him.
The mountain lion now questioned them: "NOW, my
CHILDREN
for what reason have you summoned ME?
You would not summon me for no reason.
Perhaps it is because of a WORD of some importance
that you have summoned me.
You must make this known to me
so that I may think about it as I pass the days," that's
what the mountain lion said.
"YES, in TRUTH. . . .

If, however, Tedlock and Fine wish to impress a wider (English-language) audience with the verbal art of these oral performances, then they may face a somewhat different task. In that case, one must certainly utilize the characteristics of the target language (presumably standard English) and, to some extent, target medium.[18]

Tedlock's *Finding the Center*, for example, is a translation of Zuni narratives into English. In this regard, the volume seems to be aimed at an English-language reading audience. But the typographical conventions for pauses, pitch, and so forth are based on the original Zuni performances, and not on how they would be performed once they are brought over into English. Thus he has created an odd product, neither a strictly scholarly study of Zuni performance features nor a presentation of the poetic texts in English.

Fine's text of "Stagolee" does not require translation from one language to another.[19] Rather, she believes that a complete record of the performance should include notations of paralinguistic and kinesic features. In so doing, she is adding new material (and systems of representation), and arguing that performances represented in this manner will be better textual data. Yet she ignores the proxemics of the situation (a key part of the physical context) and most of the linguistic context leading up to and following the particular text. Further, one wonders just how much good the new notation systems dealing with her African American performer's style actually are to the reading audience. They represent a record of the performance characteristics of James Hutchinson (rendered as faithfully and accurately as possible). And yet the print representation of a text implies that Fine intends it for a reading audience. This situation opens several possibilities. The most obvious one is that a contemporary reading audience would have to read the performance record several times, concentrating on different aspects each time. Perhaps Fine believes that a reader can learn to read her text the way some musicians can read musical scores, interpreting multiple parts simultaneously. Such a facility seems unlikely for any but the most highly trained audience after some years of practice, and even then

[18] I am indebted to points made by Eugene A. Nida and Burton Raffel on translation. In very different ways and with different examples, both point out the importance of knowing the target culture, audience, and language.

[19] Fine does maintain the performer's African American dialectal usages in her representation. As to the issues involved in this choice, see her text (135-40) and the debate between Fine and Dennis Preston cited in Fine's bibliography.

FIGURE 2


HE had his FO'ty-fo'.
juts rt. hip out
rt. arm down; mimes pulling gun from lt. hip pocket—
HE was REAdy.
—holds gun; rt. hand emphasis
conversational—
Now on this ONE particular occasion
hip/hand stance
STAGolee was playin' cards with Billy
LYons,
and NATurally Stagolee was jest takin'
both hands emphasis
ALL of Billy Lyons' money.
hip/arm stance
emphatic—
BILly got mad.
furrowed brow; both hands clinched, down at sides
He JUMPED UP and
a-KNOCKED Stagolee's Stetson HAT
claps outstretched hands
off his HEAD
hip/arm stance
and-uh HUGHGH-PEW! SPIT in it!
clears throat, mimes spitting, both hands on hips
hip/arm stance
confidential, softer—
Now he coulda done anything in
hip/hand stance—
the WOR-LD but that to StagoLEE
(- - -)
Stagolee looked over at him
struts 1 step; assumes hip/arm stance—
1/2 step higher crescendo
gave him that E--vil evil EYE
(- - -) narrows 1 eye, juts out chin
faster
And Billy got to pleadin',
fists clinched at chest
loud, almost sobbing—
"PLEASE Mr. Stagolee,
fingers interlocked as in prayer, upturned eyes—
I've got a wife and three chillun! PLEASE!"
(- - -)
[chuckles]

lower—	Stagolee say,	*hip/hand, rt. hip out—*
	"Well, that's cool—"	*(- - -) slight shrug of shoulder, eyes down, holds tight-lipped frown after "cool"*
	[loud laughter]	
crisp—	"because the LORD'S gonna take care of *eyes up, throws rt. hand up, shakes it*	*hip/hand stance*
	your CHILlun,	
	and I gonna take care of your WIFE." *thumps chest with fingers*	*holds tight-lipped smile, eyebrows up, hip/hand stance*
	[laughter]	
matter of fact—	That's JEST what he did.	*hip/hand; rt. hand points in emphasis*
	He BLEW Billy Lyons away. *flings rt. hand up in air*	*hip/hand*
cheerful—	WELL, later on that DAY Stagolee went over	
	to Billy Lyons ↑HOUse.	*lt. hand on hip, rt. arm down*
	He KNOCKED on the do'.	*knocks rt. hand in air as he stamps rt. foot on floor three times, lt. hand on hip*
	Mrs. Lyons come to the do'.	*pulls rt. hand back to open door, lt. hand on hip*
rapidly	He say, "My name is Stagolee *taps chest, rt. fingers*	
	your husband's dead *thumbs out at hips* the Lord's *points up,*	
	gonna take care of your chillun *rt. finger*	
	and I'm movin' in." *taps chest, rt. fingers*	
	[chuckles]	*both hands out as if to silence objections—*
truthful	Jest what he did.	*(- - -) cocks head*

FIGURE 3

Paralinguistic Features

words in left margin	Indicates vocal characterizers and voice qualities. A word followed by a dash indicates that the feature continues until the next description. Words without dashes apply only to the line to the right.
"crisp"	Indicates clipped, stacatto-like articulation.
↑ ↟ ↟ ↟	Indicates four degrees of falsetto. / ↑/ is slight; / ↟/ is extreme.
↑- -↑	When more than one word is said in falsetto, these symbols bracket the falsetto passage.
~~	Indicates a rasp, or harsh, gutteral, grating quality.
ALL CAPS	Indicates words said with greater emphasis or stress.
ris^{ing} letters	Indicates a rise in pitch on those letters.
hyphens between letters in a word	Indicate that the preceding vowel is held longer than usual. The longer a sound is stretched, the more hyphens appear.
end of line	Indicates a major pause of about three-quarters of a second. Lines followed by audience response have slightly longer pauses. Indented lines are used when a line is too long for the page; pause only at the end of the indented line.
commas, periods, exclamation marks within a line	Indicate a barely perceptible pause. Do not pause nearly as long as at the end of a line.
question mark	Used only for questions with a rising pitch at the end. Questions delivered with a falling or sustained pitch are marked by falling or sustained juncture symbols.

/ ⁀ / or /?/	Indicates rising juncture; pitch on last phoneme rises slightly.
/—/	Indicates sustained juncture; pitch of last phoneme is retained.
/./ /,/ & /!/	Indicates falling juncture; pitch of last phoneme falls or fades away.
Kinesic Features	
words in right margin	Describes movements that occur with the underlined words in the line to the left.
words in rt. margin followed by dash—	The movements immediately preceding the dash and following the preceding semi-colon continue for the next line.
(- - -)	Indicates the same movements as the line above.
hip/arm stance	Left hand on hip, right arm across chest with hand closed. See Figure 6.
hip/hand stance	Left hand on hip, right hand held up at shoulder level to emphasize points. See Figure 6.
left hand on hip, rt. arm forms swan neck to side	See Figure 7. A stereotyped stance for a sexy woman.
strut	Leans back throwing his chest and head up; swings arms in a slow exaggerated rhythmic way; bends knees as his heels hit the ground, giving a slight spring to the walk.
stylized "cool" walk	Involves the same springy step of the strut, but the arm swing is not as exaggerated nor does he throw his chest and chin up.
stylized running pose	Freezes in the first step of a run, jumping down on his right foot while pulling both bent arms back and snapping fingers on both hands.
arms crooked	Arms bent, akimbo; fists closed.

there are problems with this approach.[20] A more unlikely possibility would be that Fine believes that the audience can not only read her text of "Stagolee," but perform it. This assumption would violate one of the fundamental tenets of oral tradition—that it is spread face-to-face, orally. One hopes that such a recycling is not at all what is intended by those interested in performance studies and the communication of oral traditions.

Ultimately, Fine's model of representing oral traditions in print is based upon *more* data: adding paralinguistic and kinesic features to the text. That is, a more "accurate" record of an oral performance is understood as including features beyond the text. But simply more is not necessarily better (the data versus knowledge distinction). Representation of any cultural behavior is necessarily selective on the part of the recorder, whether the person is a missionary, novelist, ethnographer, film-maker, or native of the culture. *More* (technology, data, views, texts) is not necessarily what is needed.

Finally, and ironically, neither Tedlock nor Fine resolves any of the problems associated with the original tripartite format of presentation—because both authors use it. Both offer scholarly introductions. Fine focuses on one text, while Tedlock provides an entire volume of them. Although they present them in new and different typographical formats, they are still isolated as data. Fine concludes her work with extensive notes and a bibliography, Tedlock with notes.

Thus the models of representation so far pursued by performance advocates do not solve the existing problems in the presentation of oral traditional materials. Is there a manner, then, of presenting oral traditions that will avoid the objections cited above? What is desired is a strategy that will engage and involve the reader at once as an audience. The medium of presentation must be print, and the audience is expected to encounter it as individual, silent readers.[21] The goal is to translate oral traditions from one subculture into appropriate print forms so that a wider, reading audience can experience these verbal artistic expressions (subject to the limitations of

[20] Consider, for example, that Fine does not include aspects such as proxemics in her system and that for many forms of oral performance such aspects are particularly relevant. Does this mean the addition of another layer of data for each text?

[21] The argument for individual, silent reading is based simply upon contemporary cultural norms and is subject to change and variation according to the target culture and time.

translation).[22] This is no simple task, because the process of translation may involve translation of media (oral performance to print), language, and cultural associations.[23] In addition, there should be no pretense of objectivity in the description of cultures, people, and texts. Verbal performances should be situated in cultural, social, and linguistic context rather than enumerated and separated. If at all possible, no new print conventions should be necessary.[24]

It should become clear now why certain oral traditional forms have historically been more privileged than others. Long narrative forms—such as epic, ballad, saga, folktale—can most easily stand alone and engage the reading audience in the story. Thus, even if the traditional tripartite print format omitted the scholarly frame, the reader might accept these oral traditions *as* literature as well as *in* literature. This format (texts alone), however, seems to work best in an anthology devoted to a particular genre in that the collection provides comparative materials for the audience.[25] Even this format, however, fails to resolve some of the problems. First, it is generally limited to long narrative genres, and thus restricts the presentation of cultural expressions to ones most like written literature in terms of length and form. Unfamiliar and short genres, whether rhymes and limericks or customs and proverbs, tend to be ignored—not on the grounds of aesthetics, poetics, or cultural significance but simply because they are not commonly read as literature. Second, because the verbal art is

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[22] On this point Fine cites Nida's discussion of formal and dynamic equivalence; ultimately, Fine argues for formal equivalence. Raffel (1988:21) points out the fallacy of the belief that one can truly have formal equivalence; there and elsewhere (1971) he argues for translation more in line with what Nida calls dynamic equivalence. The goal is to translate the verbal art into a target language and culture and in so doing to create as closely as possible an equivalent meaning and effect for the new audience.

[23] The translation of medium and language are self-explanatory. On cultural associations, see Nida 1964a:4, where he considers how to translate a "simple" comic strip (Maggie and Jiggs), especially Jiggs's favorite food.

[24] This is simply an acknowledgment of the traditions and options already existing in writing and print.

[25] This is one of the reasons why Andrew Lang's colored fairy books, which are devoid of scholarship and are simply accumulations of fairy tales from around the world, succeeded, whereas competing collections by Joseph Jacobs and E. S. Hartland, for example, did not. Other examples dealing with epic, ballad, and other forms could easily be cited.

still presented as discrete texts, the (reading) audience is limited to consideration of the oral tradition in textual form, not in context. And while in an anthology the reader may be able to see relationships between and among the texts, the reading audience has little opportunity to relate the texts to the greater culture, its people, or its other forms of artistic expression. Thus the anthology proves not to be very much better than other strategies for the presentation of oral traditions.

There is one format that seems to offer some hope. It is rather unusual compared to the traditional scholarly format, yet it resolves most of the problems associated with the translation and representation of oral traditions. This format involves contextualization via a personal narrative on the part of the scholar/collector. Utilizing the frame of a personal experience story engages the audience at once in a traditional, familiar, and universal form: narrative. The reading audience is already accustomed to reading (as well as hearing) narratives. Further, the readers encounter the "foreign" culture through an intermediary, an intercessor, who is familiar in that he/she is a member of their own (target, reading) culture. In this sense, translation need not focus so much on formal versus dynamic equivalence of the text, since the audience encounters the text framed by a larger narrative. This frame helps situate the oral traditions inside the experiences of the narrator. Further, a personal experience narrative is, by nature, a personal story—and therefore cannot be scientific, "objective." Thus "scholarly distance" and the "pursuit of science" are eliminated. Texts are presented as part of the experience of the collector, ordered in whatever manner he/she wishes; they are not accumulated and quantified. There is less need for new printing conventions, since personal experience narratives are already a familiar genre in both oral and literary traditions. To be sure, the collector still faces the choice of how best to represent verbal performances on the page—as drama, prose, poetry, or some combination of them. But there is less need to depict the performance characteristics of a particular narrator by way of complex orthographic devices when the oral tradition is being presented by a literate collector who has the opportunity to describe these characteristics in their context as part of the frame. Finally, and obviously, all performances can be situated in cultural, social, and linguistic context.

Two very brief examples may help illustrate this strategy:

> I. Several years ago, one of the folklore graduate students at Indiana University invited a number of others over for a birthday party. The host's apartment was soon crowded with twenty-odd grad students along with a number of spouses, dates, and friends. Most brought some form of alcohol (beer, wine) and stashed it

in the kitchen, and their coats in a bedroom, before joining the others. Small groups formed in several areas, primarily in the kitchen and the living room. One of the groups (of which I was a part) stood in the living room, alternating occasional jokes with complaints about particular courses and professors. As another couple entered the room, one person asked "*How many hillbillies* [residents, presumably natives of Kentucky] *does it take to change a light bulb*?" (I began to smile, anticipating a clever response.) "*None. Why would people with no electricity bother to change a light bulb*?" The joke was greeted with a modest amount of laughter and was followed by another light-bulb joke in response.

II. My wife and I are both Southerners, and when we finished graduate school we hoped to move south. Louisiana certainly was south, but, with the exception of one cousin, we were still nearly a thousand miles from our closest family. The birth of our daughter showed us a great deal more about the special culture into which we had moved.

We discovered in the fall that we were expecting and spread the good news among family and friends, neighbors and colleagues. Everyone, especially those in the neighborhood and at the university, was pleased, and looked forward to the baby's arrival. The fall semester was relatively uneventful, and we took some time to make preparations for the baby. In the spring, Margaret suggested that we prepare the nursery over Mardi Gras (a week-long school holiday), so we painted the room and moved furniture around as needed. By that time, one of the secretaries in her office had already predicted that we would have a girl.

"Why ?"

"*Because Margaret sits so long at a computer terminal. There's something about the radiation from those screens. They just seem to cause girls.*"[26]

Over the Easter holidays, Margaret wanted to take advantage of the beautiful weather to do some gardening. So we went out and bought a bunch of shrubs and trees and started to dig up the front yard. Barbara, our next door neighbor, saw Margaret—then eight months pregnant—and came running over.

"*You shouldn't be digging in the yard. It'll bring on the baby.*"

"Oh." This was a good enough excuse for Margaret to take a break and watch while I dug and planted for a while. Soon, however, she decided to take a walk around the neighborhood. When she came back, our neighbor across the street, Gail, came over to check on her.

"*You know you really shouldn't go walking like that. That will bring on the baby.*"

The baby was not quite so eager, though. During that spring semester I felt obliged to announce to my classes that we were expecting a child and that I might

[26] The remark was likely based on the fact that recent births to computer science faculty had all been girls. However, since Margaret was one of only two female faculty and the only one of them pregnant within the last four years, the generalization was based on the assumption that male faculty using computer terminals generated female children. This relationship was still valid in our case, so presumably the prediction was still good.

miss a class whenever that occurred. My students immediately became interested—not in missing school, but in what we were going to have.

"Do you know what you're going to have ?"

"No, we didn't have an ultrasound scan."

"*You don't need all that fancy equipment. Just tie your wedding ring on a string and hang it over her stomach. The way the string swings will tell you whether it will be a boy or a girl.*" Other students added that it could also be done with a needle on a string.[27] We resisted the temptation to discover the sex of the baby this way. Nevertheless, another secretary also predicted that we would have a girl.

"Why ?"

"*Because of the way Margaret's carrying the baby. When they carry high, it'll be a girl. When they're low and wide, it's a boy.*"

By now, I could hardly wait to see if all the predictions were going to be accurate. Finally, on April 18, Margaret went into labor. When we checked into the maternity ward the head nurse there also announced that we were going to have a girl.

"Why ?"

"*Phase of the moon. Last weekend was a full moon and we had all boys. This weekend we're due for girls.*"

She later confirmed her prediction based on how Margaret was carrying the baby. By 4:00 p.m. that afternoon she and all the others were proven correct.

There are a number of points that need to be made about these examples. First, they were selected because both the expressions of oral tradition and the resulting overall narratives are short, and thus manageable within the scope of a short paper. In point of fact, the "texts" here are a joke and several folk beliefs, not extended narratives. Nevertheless, they are bona fide oral traditions collected in southern Indiana and Louisiana. The overall effect of the narrative may be unrepresentative in that it is telescoped, with too much of the text focusing on the collector himself, rather than the cultures under consideration. That is an unavoidable problem with the notion of a "short example."

Second, the texts are symmetrical expressions. The riddle joke is in the form of question and answer, a binary opposition.[28] The second example includes several manifestations of folk belief, expressed in a binary structure: if a, then b (if you dig in the garden when you're eight months

[27] Other variations included using either partner's wedding ring and having to perform the ritual only in the spot where the pregnancy began. The meaning of the swinging varied because different families seemed to interpret the same motion differently.

[28] For more on the structure of the riddle in general, see Dundes and George 1975.

pregnant, this will bring on the baby). This structure is common to expressions and belief systems of many other cultures around the world. Neither the form nor the themes (in the first, regional identity; in the second, pregnancy and childbirth) are unique to a particular culture.

Third, Indiana Hoosiers are no more boastful or egocentric than other groups. Indeed this was one of the few times when such an expression of the "difference" between Hoosiers and "hillbillies" was expressed to me. Similarly, Louisiana Cajuns are neither more ignorant nor more superstitious than other American ethnic subcultures. None of the friends, students, or neighbors quoted above holds less than a high school diploma and most of the informants have at least two years of college. Literacy (in Cajun French or English) therefore seems to be very definitely *not* the issue. In fact, most of the friends and students in the second example are conversant in Cajun French as well as English but were forced to perform in English since we were not fluent in their other tongue. Indeed, as Deborah Tannen has suggested, "oral" and "literate" may be more akin to strategies (1982b) than states of consciousness (Ong 1982). "Oral" and "literate" here do not differentiate cultures but worldviews, *strategies for dealing with situations*. Although I had been training for a couple of years when the first example occurred and had experience collecting already, I had not heard the Hoosier-hillbilly rivalry expressed in performance. And later, although I had worked as a folklorist in southern Louisiana for a year and a half, I had not encountered the range of beliefs that emerged from neighbors, students, and colleagues during this term. Yet this "folk knowledge" (if you will pardon the term) was there to be used when needed. Unlike literate knowledge, no one accumulates it (as in libraries and private collections). Folk knowledge may seem to be contradictory, frustrating, and irrational—according to one logic. But there is an internal and consistent logic underlying it.[29] And such knowledge always remains available to those in the community.

Further, the oral traditions were all expressed to meet a need. At first, I thought that the riddle joke was told to help bond a group of graduate students from around the world, in Bloomington for similar training, by forcing them to view themselves as Hoosiers in contrast to the "hillbillies" of Kentucky, a regional rival. And to be sure, the joke did serve this purpose. But *in context*, there is substantially more to the joke. The performer began the joke as a new couple entered the room—in this case, a male grad student and his wife, both of whom were from Kentucky.

[29] See Toelken 1976 and Glassie 1982 for excellent examples of this point.

The performer knew this, and the joke on hillbillies—Kentuckians—then was selected from the performer's repertoire because it was appropriate. Here it served several functions simultaneously. It still served to bond the graduate students together by laughing at the neighboring "hillbillies." Numerous rivalries around the United States and world exist that generate such jokes and blason populaires.[30] And yet the joke served, in context, as a device to invite the newly arrived couple to join an already established group in their ongoing activity (conversation and joke-telling). The insult to Kentuckians invited an approach and a verbal response. In fact, the couple did join our group, but without responding (themselves) with another light-bulb joke immediately. That is, they chose to accept the invitation to the group activity without responding to the invitation to respond to the insult to their home. Thus this simple two-line joke, when described in context, has multiple functions and meanings—and more significance than a textual record of the event can possibly indicate in and of itself.[31]

Likewise, there is more to the folk beliefs about pregnancy than meets the eye. The warnings from our neighbors Gail and Barbara about what behavior would "bring on the baby" were expressions of concern that Margaret might be doing too much. Yet instead of simply saying that, they used expressions based in cultural authority, not personal feelings. Certainly, their attitudes may have been a holdover from an earlier generation that recommended longer periods of rest and inactivity for women going through pregnancy and childbirth. Yet expressing their beliefs in a culturally traditional form was an appropriate means to indicate concern without making the message too personal.

The other folk beliefs dealt with how to reveal the gender of an unborn baby. Explaining the full significance of this practice would require beginning with a cultural history of the Cajuns in southern Louisiana and their struggle to retain a distinct identity under hostile conditions. In short, however, the Cajuns highly value the family, including additions to it. Large families are common, with the average family in Lafayette Parish containing about six children. Such beliefs serve as a source of traditional wisdom and can shape the family's expectations for the birth of the child. Both male and female children are valued among Cajuns (albeit somewhat differently), so the prediction of a girl was not, to my knowledge, a

[30] See, for example, Fuller 1981.

[31] For another example of the complexity of oral traditions performed in context, see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1975.

particular kind of wish for us. All of the predictions were based upon natural signs (from the lunar cycle and its relationship to childbirth to how the baby is carried in the womb). The task, then, is to read and interpret them correctly. There are multiple signs available for analysis, and this richness may be indicative of the relative importance of the event within the culture.

These very brief illustrations hardly constitute more than a hint at a strategy for presenting oral traditions in print. Perhaps, however, they at least point out how limiting texts, and especially just those privileged forms most like literature, can be for the understanding of other cultures. With records of performances in context presented through the collector's narrative, an audience has a greater opportunity to understand the value of other verbal forms and traditional performances.

There are some ramifications of this proposal that need to be addressed in conclusion. First, in terms of impact, this format could help change how fieldwork itself is performed. Collecting would no longer be something that could be done on quick visits (days or weeks), as a tourist might do in visiting a strange culture. The task now becomes a matter of knowing different languages (perhaps), cultures (certainly), and their respective worldviews. The very notion of "knowing" multiple groups or regions, even within the United States, is a huge task.

Second, the personal experience narrative *can* work as a strategy for presenting the oral traditions in print to the wider reading audience. The scholar does become something of a performer (although perhaps not as dramatically as my illustrations suggest), but then what he is doing is bringing his work before an audience of his own design. There is no wholesale change, however, since it has always been the collector/scholar who has won praise or damnation for collections, not the culture or the informants. What has changed is the discarding of the pretense of scientific objectivity, of distance from the culture under study. Because the collector is now also the narrator, such distance is a disadvantage.

Third, the proposed narrative format avoids the quest for more complex print formats proposed by Tedlock and Fine. What becomes significant is not better records in and of themselves—more data, presumably recorded with more equipment—but more skill on the part of the ethnographer in making connections and expressing them clearly in the narrative. Thus Henry Glassie's presentation of a Northern Ireland community in *Passing the Time in Ballymenone* (1982) is radically different from the models proposed by Tedlock and Fine, while still conveying much of what those models strive to convey.

Finally, this format would seem to work for any verbal form. Dance, music, drama, and other multi-media forms may also be worth considering, but virtually every genre of oral tradition (from belief to epic) can be presented in this fashion. Perhaps if more fieldworkers utilize such a strategy, future scholars will not be limited to only a few privileged forms. There will still be genres preferred by any particular scholar, but hopefully there will also be data on other cultural expressions as well as on how the forms interrelate. This wide-angle perspective would then open up literature to a true study of its verbal art.

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Alterities: On Methodology in Medieval Literary Studies

Ursula Schaefer

The Albert Lord and Milman Parry Lecture for 1991-1992

Prologue

Medieval literary studies hold a privileged position in methodological and theoretical argumentation. The privilege is based on the limitedness of and the in-immediate access to their "material." The latter is created by the philological barrier that virtually keeps theoretical and/or methodological intruders out. In that sense medieval literary studies potentially enjoy a sanctuary privilege: theoretical and methodological novelties may enter the sanctuary only if the philologically trained so warrant. That is, literary medievalists are very much in control of theoretical and/or methodological import because, due to *their* philological training, they are the only ones who can handle the "material" in the first place.[1]

Due to the limitedness of their material, medieval literary studies do, however, have another kind of privilege. The concept of some monolithic entity called "the Middle Ages" creates a kind of laboratory situation where new approaches/methods/theories can furnish quick results. Since the Middle Ages—or any period within it, or any ensemble of phenomena from remote periods that are made the object of research—are constructs in the mind of the scholarly beholder to begin with, the (sometimes sparse) building blocks, as it were, out of which the respective constructs are built, can more easily be shuffled about according to one's (methodologically

[1] I am excluding here the possibility of gaining access to medieval texts through modern renderings and am thus arguing within the vein of the "Old Philology."

geared) *Erkenntnisinteresse*.[2]

When speaking about methodology, there is yet another point that I think necessary to bring to mind. This is the particular medievalist "insider feeling" of philologically common ground that so temptingly facilitates (international, and in particular transatlantic) scholarly exchange—or dismissal—of methodologies and/or theories in (medieval) literary studies. This common assumption can lead to a potentially deceptive disregard of what otherwise is—or should be—so much in the medievalists' (as in anybody else's) mind: the matter of historically developed differences. This may appear to be such a hermeneutic triviality that most of us probably shun away from admitting it to begin with. Nevertheless, it is necessary to put the fiction of the universal academic community in its proper place in order to adequately appreciate what "the (contemporary) other" has to say.[3]

The great honor of being invited to give the 1991 presentation that, *in memoriam* of the late Albert Lord has been renamed into the *Albert Lord and Milman Parry Lecture*, has given me the opportunity to formulate my own methodological position in a distinguished forum. The lively discussion that followed the lecture has motivated me to go into more detail about the theoretical basis of this position for the printed version of my original lecture. In this way my present essay is meant to bear witness to the fact that "face-to-face" exchange, the oral-aural encounter, is still most fruitful for our scholarly endeavors.[4]

Methodologies

Methodological discussion in literary studies of the Middle Ages has

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[2] This is a notion from methodological discussion in Germany for which I cannot find an English equivalent. Analogously to the English translation of Habermas' title *Erkenntnis und Interesse* of 1968 into *Knowledge and Human Interests,* one may perhaps render it as *knowledge interest*, although I do not find this completely satisfactory, as the German *Erkenntnis* carries a more procedural note. Thus *cognitive interest* may be more to the point, if *cognitive* is not understood as a psychological term. Cf. below, note 28.

[3] I am very much indebted to Adam B. Davis, who spent the 1991-92 academic year in Freiburg as a Humboldt scholar, for many fruitful discussions à propos "transatlantic differences" in scholarly research.

[4] For various shared *tours d'horizon(s)* I owe my kindest thanks to the host of this lecture.

recently been revived under the headings of "New Philology" and "New Historicism."[5] What I am subsequently outlining has not yet received such a handy tag, and it should be regarded neither as a substitute nor as a rival to "New Philology" or "New Historicism." On the contrary, it must rely on the methods of Philology—old and new—and it also is indebted to Historicism in respecting the historicity both of the subject and object of understanding and thus also of the analyzer and the analyzed. Moreover, I want to thematize the historicity of the theory itself: its orginal shaping, its development, and the recent complementation that has given the method a new forceful momentum.

The theory under discussion is what has become known as "Reception Theory," and the recent complementation may provisionally be termed "the Orality/Literacy Question." The reasons why I am insisting on maintaining—for the time being—the possibly disconcerting word *question* in the notion are as follows. What the last thirty or so years of research into orality and literacy from various angles have brought to light are not simply "facts" that one adds to the material under investigation—such as one would do with, for example, a second manuscript of *Beowulf* that shows no traces of Christian ideas whatsoever. The consequences of research into orality/literacy go rather to the methodological heart of the medievalists' matter, as the insights and findings gained from this research necessitate the thematizing of heuristic and hermeneutic agreements, agreements that up to now have been not only tacit but largely pre-conscious. As such, the realization of the Orality/Literacy Question comes close to the effects of a discovery in natural sciences. Thus I am contending that with the integration of the Orality/Literacy Question (of both its "factual findings" and its heuristic consequences) reception-oriented medieval literary studies are "able to account for a wider range of...phenomena or to account with greater precision for some of those previously known" (Kuhn 1962:66). This is no less than postulating that with this integration a specific line of medieval literary studies has undergone a paradigmatic change.

Of course my use of the term *paradigmatic change* is indicative of the source for the quote I have just given: Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The appropriation of Kuhn's observations on "scientific revolutions" for the humanities is obviously not very original. In 1969, for instance, Hans Robert Jauss published his article "Paradigmawechsel in der Literaturwissenschaft," in which he accounted for

[5] For a discussion of "New Philology" from various aspects, see vol. 65.1 of *Speculum* 1990; the outstanding representative of "New Historicism" in medieval studies is Lee Patterson (1987, 1991).

the history and the contemporary state of literary studies under aspects suggested in Kuhn's book: paradigmatic changes occur when another paradigm has finally proven insufficient for the explanation of given phenomena. Jauss sees the causes for paradigmatic changes in literary studies in a realization that an established approach is no longer able "to wrench works of art from their state of being past through permanently new interpretation, to translate them into a new present" ("Werke der Kunst durch immer neue Interpretation dem Vergangensein zu entreissen, sie in eine neue Gegenwart zu übersetzen;" 55). Here Jauss is also dealing with the question of whether it is legitimate to transfer observations made in the history of the sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) to the humanities (*Literatur- oder Geisteswissenschaften*).[6] In the humanities, and particularly in literary studies, Jauss argues, paradigmatic changes are not caused by anomalies because in the humanities there is "no area of empirically verifiable observations comparable to that of the (natural) sciences" ("kein der Naturwissenschaft vergleichbares Feld empirisch verifizierbarer Beobachtungen;" 54). However, as we will see later, "anomalies" may be of

[6] Here as in other places in this article I am facing the difficulty of translating the German *Wissenschaft*. Recently it has been translated by *science* even in compounds such as *Literaturwissenschaft*. It may have been under the influence of the texts he has been translating that Timothy Bahti (in the "Translator's Preface" to the 1982 translation of a collection of articles by Hans Robert Jauss), for example, is speaking (in his own text) of *the human sciences*, obviously referring to "the humanities." On the other hand, the term *Literaturwissenschaft* in the title of Jauss' *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft* is turned by Bahti into *Literary Theory*, the phrase *der literaturwissenschaftlichen Methoden* (e.g., Jauss 1967:7) into *of the literary critical methods* (Jauss [Bahti] 1982a:4). In trying to find some terminological consistency I will use the "original" English terms—such as *humanities* (= Germ. *Geisteswissenschaften*) or *literary studies* (= Germ. *Literaturwissenschaft*). When giving my own renderings of German quotations into English I will use *science/scientific* when it seems appropriate to reflect a specific methodological and/or theoretical claim. For a discussion of this problem in view of the translation of Gadamer, cf. "Translators' Preface" to *Truth and Method* (1989:xviii). The fact that in German the term *Wissenschaft* is extended to the humanities points, of course, to a concept of such studies that is quite different from that in the English-speaking countries. I suppose that this terminological difference is also a symptom of the "alterity" question with regard to the mutual reception and translation (in the broad sense of the word) of theories in (and to) the States and Europe respectively. In his recent article "Auszug der Wissenschaften aus dem Deutschen" (1991:espec. 587-91), Hans-Martin Gauger deals with these terminological differences between English and German in the context of the observation that the German language is constantly and increasingly withdrawn from scholarly/scientific publication. For a discussion of the applicability of Kuhn to linguistics, see Oesterreicher 1977.

relevance for literary studies as well, since the "discovery" I have in mind has very much to do with anomalies and how to account for them.

Now, the name with which I have preliminarily dubbed this "discovery"—the Orality/Literacy Question—is admittedly quite vague. Yet up to now there is no more precise notion to refer to the growing awareness in fields such as linguistics, anthropology, psychology, history, and literary studies that orality and literacy are phylogenetic conditions as well as conditions of cultural communities. What we have become increasingly aware of is the fact that *orality* and *literacy* do, on the surface, pertain to the absence or presence of the "technology of writing" as a communicative medium for an individual and/or within a community, yet that, on a deeper level, this absence or presence accounts for very different setups of cognition and conceptualization.[7] These different setups are intricately interrelated with different modes of abstraction, different concepts of language, different concepts of "tradition," different concepts of history and so forth.

If we look more closely into the research that has brought about the realization of the Orality/Literacy Question, and if we look at its connection to medieval studies, we very soon see why Kuhn's observations with regard to scientific discoveries apply here (1962:55-56):

> discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one which involves recognizing both that something is and what it is. . . . if both observation and conceptualization, fact and assimilation to theory, are inseparably linked in discovery, then discovery is a process and must take time. Only when all the relevant conceptual categories are prepared in advance, in which case the phenomenon would not be of a new sort, can discovering *that* and discovering *what* occur effortlessly, together and in an instant.

As to literary studies, those "conceptual categories" for the realization of the Orality/Literacy Question have most certainly not been "prepared in advance," because what has basically been discovered is the conditioning of those categories themselves. In other words, the awareness of the Orality/Literacy Question involves the awareness of being oneself part of the question. The consequent self-reflection and critical introspection necessitated by the Orality/Literacy Question seems to carry such a forbidding potential that it evidently sometimes blocks the acceptance of the

[7] For a comprehensive view of these implications, cf. espec. Ong 1982 and 1986, Havelock 1986, Goody and Watt 1962-63.

question in advance.

In various places Walter Ong has criticized the fact that *orality* has mostly been seen and defined from the point of view of *literacy*, a process that views *orality* as a deficiency (1986:23):

> The term "illiterate" itself suggests that persons belonging to the class it designates are deviants, defined by something they lack, namely literacy. . . . [The] views of writing as a mechanical skill obligatory for all human beings distort our understanding of what is human if only because they block understanding what natural mental processes are before writing takes possession of consciousness.

It appears to me that this taint of deficiency has led some medievalists either to ignore the question entirely or to just briefly look into it and then put it aside as not pertinent to the Middle Ages after all. If we have manu*scripts* from this period, so their defensive argument runs, if we know that people (at least those in some way or other "relevant" for us because they have provided us with written records of their time) could read (and write), then why bother?

To counter this preconception, one has to put forward the argument that after taking note of the findings furnished by the research into orality and literacy as briefly indicated earlier, those scholars who are willing to check the conditioning of their own heuristics will consider it an epistemological neglect—if not fraud—if the pertinence of those findings for the Middle Ages be denied. To be sure, for medieval studies there has always been a kind of implicit understanding that this period was not that all-pervasively literate after all.[8] Or, at least, that there was some kind of peaceful coexistence of *litterati* and *illitterati*.[9] Once aware of the Orality/Literacy Question and this heuristic opposition (which until recently resulted in a concentration on the *litterati*), the medievalist may develop a sensitivity for the "oral mind" very much present also in the *litterati*.[10] From the historical perspective, the *litterati* vs. *illitterati* opposition translates into accounting for such a "coexistence" as symptoms of transition, conceiving of the Middle Ages, particularly in relation to the

[8] Cf. Grundmann 1958.

[9] For a critical discussion of Grundmann, cf. also Green 1990:275-76.

[10] The notions of the "oral mind" and the "literate mind" have been created by Havelock (e.g., 1986).

Germanic cultures, as a transitional period underway from (primary) orality, before their Christianization, to (almost fully developed) literacy in the Renaissance.

Now, the view of the Middle Ages as a "transitional" culture is controversial, since it potentially implies denying this period a position in its own right.[11] Nevertheless, I suggest that as long as we bear in mind our own perspective, the notion of transitionality should not be dismissed completely. It can still provide a heuristics that causes us to reconsider one of the most cherished—and perhaps most abused—concepts with regard to the Middle Ages: that of medieval *alterity*. Later I want to take up this notion once again and try to place it within the methodological discussion of medieval literary studies. Since Hans Robert Jauss, one of the founders of Reception Theory, has made this notion the center of his methodological discussion of medieval literary studies, it will be necessary to review some historical implications of Reception Theory against the background of recent methodological discussions in the United States. This will bring to light another kind of "alterity," namely that of American and European (more precisely German) medieval literary studies and their methodologies as historical and/or political idiosyncrasies.

The Historicity of Reception Theory

Let us look now at how American "New Historicism" as represented by the work of Lee Patterson deals with Jauss' concept. In his recent publications Patterson rides a forceful attack against all kinds of well established approaches to medieval literature, most of all against "historicism in its positivist phase," which harbored the belief that "natural science was successful because its methodology partook of the certainty and universality of the natural laws it sought to uncover" and hence "assumed for itself a similar methodological purity" (1987:15). This kind of criticism has obviously been valid until well into the second half of our century. Thus in the foreword to the second edition of *Wahrheit und Methode* Hans-Georg Gadamer characterized "the methodology of modern historical sciences" [*der modernen historischen Wissenschaften*] as "making what has grown historically and has been transmitted historically an object to be

[11] I am indebted to the historian Hans-Werner Goetz (Hamburg) for pointing out to me in a private communication that my "evolutionary perspective" (as advanced in Schaefer 1992 for the earlier English Middle Ages) "may bar the view of the autonomy of the era where the 'oral' and the 'literate' were also intimately interrelated."

established like an experimental finding—as if tradition were as alien, and from the human point of view as unintelligible, as an object of physics" (1989:xxxiii-iv).[12]

Another refutation Patterson produces, although it appears only in a footnote (1987:7-8, n.8), is that of the receptionalist approach as formulated by Hans Robert Jauss. For reasons I find hard to follow, Patterson, on the one hand, credits Jauss with being the "obvious exception" to the rule (stated in the main text) "that the issue of historical understanding per se has received virtually no general discussion within the context of medieval Studies" (7). On the other hand, he accuses Jauss of declining "to confront the historicity of the observer" (8, n.9 from previous page). Whenever a scholar takes up the concept of "horizon" as spelled out in Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode*, he cannot possibly do so and, at the same time, be oblivious to the observer's historical situatedness (how else could he want to aspire to the "fusion of the past horizon...with the present one"? [Jauss 1979:183]).

I wonder whether Patterson's judgment has to do with another observation he makes in this context (8):

> The inhospitality of Anglo-American literary culture as a whole to a philosophically informed historicism has largely condemned historical criticism to the benighted positivism of the nineteenth century, a darkness that is only now gradually yielding before the arrival of phenomenological hermeneutics, Marxism, and other European imports.

Obviously the methodological discussions within the humanities have followed very different paths on either side of the Atlantic. First and foremost, if we view things from the present situation, the "revolutionary years" of 1968-69 have forever shaken the positivistic complacency of the humanities in all West German universities. The debate about "political correctness" that pervades the American academy these days reminds me very much of the methodological—and hence, ideological—screening any

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[12] In particular with Gadamer it is sometimes instructive to savor the original (1972:xxi): ". . . wo die Methodik der modernen historischen Wissenschaften Platz gegriffen hat und das geschichtlich Gewordene, geschichtlich Überlieferte zum 'Objekt' macht, das es 'festzustellen' gilt wie einen experimentellen Befund—als wäre Überlieferung in dem selben Sinne fremd und, menschlich gesehen, unverständlich wie der Gegenstand der Physik (1972:xxi). I use the second edition of the English translation of *Wahrheit und Methode* (*Truth and Method*), revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, which appeared in 1989. The German quotes are taken from the third revised edition of 1972.

professor in those days had to face from the students.[13] This screening checked *richtiges Bewusstsein*—something that had to be a *kritisches Bewusstsein*. Of course this was a highly political and politicized discussion, the language of which was charged with belligerent terminology.[14]

I am by no means claiming that each and every professor of German or English or History in those days suddenly and irrevocably turned into a scholar with a *kritisches Bewusstsein* in the sense the Revolution prescribed. However, we had our extensive share of agitation with the ubiquitous and persistently reformulated question of "relevance."[15] The reason I am making this historical remark is simply to point out that an accusation against Jauss or any other representative of the Konstanz School for declining to "confront the historicity of the observer" must be dismissed, if only for those contextual (historical) reasons! And there is yet another aspect that needs to be thematized with regard to Reception Theory, an aspect that is indispensable for the appropriate assessment of this theory (or method, or approach) within the methodological discussion that is currently going on in North America.

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[13] It may be the European recollection and/or witnessing of totalitarian systems that gives such a disturbing ring to the commitment to "correctness."

[14] To give a faint impression of what the discussion sounded like in West Germany, cf. the following statement: "Was ist die heutige Verfassung dieser Wissenschaft [i.e., der Germanistik]? Im Polizeistaat Adenauers verriet sie das Geschäftsgeheimnis ihrer Existenz: Opportunismus. . . . [Die] Studentenrevolte [hat] die schmutzige Verfilzung dieser Wissenschaft mit dem Faschismus angeprangert, ihre Geschichtsfeindlichkeit unter der Parole 'Die Germanistik lehrt das Interesse an der Literatur als Desinteresse an der Gesellschaft' bekämpft. . . . Die Stosskraft dieses Kampfes gegen die bürgerliche Germanistik resultierte aus den antiimperialistischen Kämpfen der Studentenrevolte" (Autorenkollektiv 1971:1; "What is the present state of this science [*Wissenschaft*, i.e. Germanistics]? During Adenauer's police state it gave away the trade secret of its existence: opportunism. . . . [The] students' revolt has pilloried the dirty intertwining of this field and fascism, fought against enmity towards history with the slogan '*Germanistik* teaches interest in literature by way of disinterest in society.' The impact of this battle against bourgeois *Germanistik* was a result of the anti-imperialistic battles of the students' revolt").

[15] For a splendid contemporary discussion of the "crisis of the university" and its consequences, see Hartmut von Hentig, *Magier oder Magister. Über die Einheit der Wissenschaft im Verständigungsprozess* (1972).

Reception Theory is deeply indebted to phenomenology.[16] Without taking into account this philosophical background, Jauss' claim that, among other factors, an historical "horizon of expectation" may also be reconstructed through the "opposition between fiction and reality, between the poetic and the practical function of language" (1982a:24) may cause misunderstandings. Thus, Patterson has to advance substantial criticism: what Jauss' "theory amounts to," he summarizes, "is traditional literary history...supplemented with a comparison of the work to 'reality,' a reality whose constitution Jauss does not specify" (1987:8, n. 9).[17] Nowhere does Jauss demand that one compare the work to "reality (as such)." The term "reality" is used and relativized in the appositional dichotomy of "fiction and reality" (*Fiktion und Realität*) and "the poetic and the practical function of language" (*poetischer und praktischer Funktion der Sprache*) (1982a:24/1967:35). Yet I suppose that from the post-structuralist, decontructivist stance these distinctions are void anyway. But Patterson draws his notion of "reality"—and thus his footnote criticism of Jauss—from yet another concept: "If social reality is inherently and inescapably theatrical, then the distinction between the real and the fictive (*lege* history and text) need not be sustained" (1987:61). True enough, yet it should also be noted that the constructedness of social reality is by no means a recent discovery.[18] Yet I doubt whether this insight also by necessity erases the distinction between "reality" and "fiction."

Jauss' objective is not, in this context, to say of what "reality" exactly consists. His point is the *difference* between how language is used in literature or poetry *as opposed* to its function outside, thus obviously using structuralist or formalist concepts of language and communication. Again, post-structuralism may put all of this in doubt. However, even if we agree with Derrida's dictum—I do not—that *il n'y a pas de hors-texte* we may also agree that *within* this all-pervading text words "do different things." Thus, for instance, Wolfgang Iser sees the distinction between literary and non-literary fiction in fundamentally different manifestations of the

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[16] Cf., e.g., for Husserl's notion of "horizon," Gadamer 1989:245-49; the affiliation is well outlined in Jay 1982.

[17] Cf., in contrast to this position, Frantzen 1990:122-26.

[18] The phenomenologically oriented "Sociology of Knowledge" (first developed by Karl Mannheim) seems largely to have escaped the attention of the present type of literary criticism; cf. Alfred Schütz's *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932/74, for English versions, 1971/74); cf. also (in Schütz's wake) Berger and Luckmann 1966.

respective narrative with regard to those who are exposed to these fictions (1985:215):

> ... fiction plays a vital role in the activities of cognition and behaviour, as in the founding of institutions, societies and world-pictures. The difference between all these and the literary text is that the latter reveals its own fictionality. Because of this, its function must be radically different from that of other activities that mask their fictional nature. The masking, of course, need not necessarily occur with the intention to deceive; it occurs because the fiction is meant to provide an explanation or a foundation, and could not do so if its fictional nature were to be exposed. The concealment of its fictionality endows the explanation provided with the appearance of reality, which is vital because the fiction functions as the constitutive basis of this reality.

Rainer Warning, another scholar from the Konstanz School (and Jauss' student) retains, as it were, the metaphoric language of the theater that Patterson (independently) uses when he speaks of literary fiction as "staged discourse."[19]

It certainly has to be conceded that in view of the nature of medieval literature the classification of a text as "fictional" is problematic to begin with.[20] Yet I think there is common agreement that "conscious/intended/known" fictionality in narrative literature had been reestablished in the high Middle Ages. And, what is particularly interesting for our present point: this (re-) establishing of fictional narrative was a "consequence of literacy," as Franz H. Bäuml has sketched out from a phenomenological point of view in his seminal article on "Varieties and Consequences of Medieval Literacy and Illiteracy" (1980).[21] I do not want to elaborate on the notion and concept of fiction any further here; the point Bäuml has so convincingly made, however, indicates the path on which Reception Theory and studies in orality/literacy are eventually bound to meet. Instead I want to follow further—from the European point of view—the path that has led to this point of convergence. For this I suggest taking a closer look at Jauss' notion of the *alterity* of the Middle Ages.

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[19] Cf. Warning 1980; the notion of *inszenierter Diskurs* has subsequently been adopted by Iser (1982/85). For a phenomenological assessment of *fictionality*, cf. also Hamburger 1968.

[20] Cf. Jauss 1982b.

[21] Cf. also Schaefer 1991.

First of all, it is easily overlooked that Jauss actually uses this term in two very dissimilar senses.[22] In the sense of "otherness" it has the most intensive impact for his theoretical deliberations. Therefore it may escape our attention that Jauss has explicitly said that he is using *alterity* also in the sense delineated by the Rumanian linguist Eugenio Coseriu who speaks of "the dimension of the alterity of language" ("Dimension der Alterität der Sprache") as a universal, for "language is...always...directed toward somebody else" ("die Sprache ist...immer...auf einen anderen ausgerichtet;" 1971:187-88). In this sense a work of medieval literature is for Jauss "an aesthetic object which, thanks to its linguistic form, is directed toward an *other*, understanding consciousness—and which therefore also allows for communication with a later, no longer contemporary addressee" (1979:187).[23] Now, to insist on the communicative nature of (any) piece of literature is trivial unless specific methodological consequences are drawn from this statement. In other words, we should not only make the observation that literature is communicative, but go on asking *how* this communication works.

After the initiatory steps taken by Jauss and Iser in the late 1960's and early 1970's, Reception Theory quickly saw a further development with substantial qualifications in this very direction. Thus Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in 1975 made a convincing effort to elaborate Receptional Aesthetics into what he calls "Literaturwissenschaft als Kommunikationssoziologie" ("literary science as a sociology of communication").[24] Relevant for our present issue is the fact that Gumbrecht wanted the "new literary studies" (as initiated by Jauss and Iser)

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[22] The two senses are, as a matter of fact, *so vastly* dissimilar that one may suspect Jauss of having somehow been trapped here in the fallacy of a homophony.

[23] The English translation of the article "Alterität und Modernität . . . " reads (1979:187, boldface added): "It is not by accident that this term [*alterity*] became the focus of interest in the debate over Paul Zumthor's *Essai de poétique médiévale*. Along with **his usage**, I follow Eugenio Coseriu's theory. . . ." In the German original this reads: "Dieser Begriff ist nicht zufällig in der Debatte über Paul Zumthors *Essai* . . . in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses getreten. Ich Folge **in seinem Gebrauch** zugleich der Sprachtheorie Eugenio Coserius . . ." (1977:14). The English version suggests that the term is taken over from Zumthor. As my colleague Richard Matthews has pointed out to me, the reference in *his usage* is ambiguous (that is, it could also refer in advance to E.C.). I would nevertheless suggest as a "more correct" translation: "Simultaneously I follow in **its** use [i.e., the use of the term *alterity*] the linguistic theory of E.C. . . ."

[24] Programmatically so in Gumbrecht 1975.

to be conceived of as a "Wissenschaft von den Bedingungen der Sinnbildung" ("science of the conditions of the constitution of meaning;" 1975:397). This modification of the original Reception Theory is momentous. As Gumbrecht specified earlier in this same article, literary studies—in this heuristic line—are no longer meant to seek the "evaluation of constitutions of meaning over a text as more or less 'correct ones'" ("Bewertung der Sinnbildungen als mehr oder weniger 'richtige';" 390)—in other words, evaluation of an interpretation as correct or not.[25] What Gumbrecht demands of this *neue Literaturwissenschaft* is that it strive for "the detection of the correlation between the conditions of constituting meaning over a text and the constitutions of meaning themselves" ("das Aufdecken des Zusammenhangs zwischen den Bedingungen von Sinnbildungen über Texten und diesen Sinnbildungen selbst;" *ibid.*).

Turning away from questions of "interpretative correctness" meant not only turning away from "text-immanent criticism" (= New Criticism). It also meant giving a new bent to the kind of Receptional Aesthetics that had "blurred the difference between normative and descriptive history of reception."[26] Gumbrecht's advancement of Reception Theory results in an (almost) final farewell to traditional philological studies (thriving discontentedly until the arrival of trained linguists in the various language departments during the 1960's and well beyond). Moreover, it has integrated the "sociological" question—which was so forcefully (and sometimes violently) posed by the Marxist faction—with the methods of then modern linguistics, which started to receive the increasing attention of literary studies in the mid and late 1960's.[27]

What Gumbrecht (and Stierle) so convincingly formulated in order to contribute to the "discussion about the 'knowledge interests' and methods

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[25] Cf. Patterson's similar criticism of "interpretative correctness" (1987:45).

[26] Gumbrecht said this in view of Iser's concept of the "implied reader," which he sees as suffering from the fact "dass er [i.e. Iser] den Unterschied zwischen normativer und deskriptiver Rezeptionsgeschichte verwischt" (1975:391).

[27] It is worthwhile noting that—apart from the well-established departments of more or less traditional comparative linguistics (usually "*Indogermanistik*")—linguistics in Germany has remained within the various "philologies" (that is, the "Language and Literature departments"). This is true at least for the "traditional universities." Thus for German students of English, for instance, linguistics—usually including the history of the language—is an integral part of their curriculum.

of literary science" ("Erkenntnisinteressen und Methoden der Literaturwissenschaft;"[28] Gumbrecht 1975:388) met with (more or less latent) disapproval within the community of students of the humanities in that period.[29] In the meantime the Marxist challenge of the late sixties and early seventies has since long petered out,[30] but the questions it raised so loudly and clearly have brought about an irreversible *methodisches Bewusstsein*, even if it was of no more avail than recognizing one's own positivism (which miraculously has somehow managed to survive undercover).

In a way medieval studies was exempt from the hardest "blows" of the time. Nevertheless, for those scholars able and willing to look beyond the walls of their philological *hortus conclusus* the impetus of that methodological discussion has proven extremely fruitful. Thus it was a lucky coincidence—or was it really a coincidence?—that scholars like Hans Robert Jauss and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht are solidly trained medievalists.

What I have said up to this point may suggest that, since the 1970's, Receptional Aesthetics or Reception Theory has been the all-pervading "paradigm" of (German) literary studies in general and medieval literary studies in particular. A claim to this effect would thoroughly distort the overall picture. It is certainly fair to say that most literary scholars—among them also medievalists—took note of the works of Jauss, Iser, and their

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[28] For a brief discussion of the difficulties in translating the notion *Erkenntnisinteresse*, cf. note 2 above.

[29] This aspect is knowledgeably sketched at various points in Holub 1984.

[30] Obviously it is a "continental" misconception—perhaps only my own—to suppose that as the "Revolution of '68/'69" took place on both sides of the Atlantic, the Marxist attack on literary studies and its academic institutions must have been as ubiquitous. However, critical harassment such as the "*Ideologieverdacht*" seems to be quite recent in the United States (if we leave the "McCarthy era" aside), now fostered by confluences of Deconstruction and Marxist criticism; cf., for instance, Frantzen 1990:112-13. It is remarkable that the work of Erich Köhler—in part strongly influenced by (moderated) Marxist ideas—is obviously missing in the methodological discussion in the United States. With his *Ideal und Wirklichkeit* Köhler produced perhaps the most convincing mediaeval study in the "sociology of literature" as early as 1956 (2nd ed. 1970); for further moderating qualifications of the Marxist-oriented claims, cf. Köhler 1974. *Literatursoziologie* as developed by Köhler has obviously received very little attention in the U.S. in general. Thus Holub (1984) does not mention Köhler in his section on "Literary Sociology" within the chapter "Influences and Precursors [of Reception Theory]." For an application of Köhler's approach to Chaucer, cf. Schaefer 1977.

followers. Yet just as Reception Theory proved to be a very integrative approach, it also appears to have lent itself to a subsequent integration into the work of scholars who perceive their research as largely a-theoretical or, at least, not biased toward any particular theory.

As far as I am aware, medieval studies in North America have been, all in all, as much or as little theory-biased as in Germany. Nevertheless, whenever theories (such as Exegetics and New Criticism)[31] intruded into medieval research in America, these theories have been more or less of an exclusive kind. This also holds for initial studies done in what has come to be called the Oral-Formulaic Theory, which, by the way, seems to be of so little interest to Patterson that he does not even bother to reject it.[32] Yet there is one voice that has advocated a more comprehensive and integrative approach to medieval vernacular literature. The voice is that of Franz H. Bäuml.

Reception Theory and the Orality/Literacy Question

In the postscript to a 1979 reprint of his article "Der Übergang mündlicher zur *artes*-bestimmten Literatur des Mittelalters," which first appeared in 1968, Bäuml stated (247; italics added):

> Aufgrund genauerer Definition der Begriffe "mündlich" und "schriftlich" im jeweiligen Bezug auf Tradition, Komposition, Text oder Vortrag, Publikum oder Publikumsorientierung, soziale Funktion der dadurch gekennzeichneten Überlieferungstypen u.dgl., eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit, die *Literatur des Mittelalters als Produkt einer auf Schriftlichkeit fussenden Kultur, getragen von einer überwiegend analphabethischen Bevölkerung*, zu erfassen. Sofern nun der *Funktion der Literatur innerhalb dieser Kultur* und der ihre Funktionen bestimmende Überlieferungs—und *Rezeptionseigenschaften* Rechnung getragen werden kann, ist es erst möglich—zum Teil in Anlehnung an die von der *Semiotik* erarbeiteten Begriffe—sie *historisch als kommunikativen Prozess*, als

[31] I am naming these two because Patterson (1987) discusses them in detail; for a critical evaluation of the Neo-Exegetical approach to Old English poetry, see Busse 1984.

[32] The fact that literary studies in orality/literacy (which have long abandoned the first rigid concepts of Oral-Formulaic Theory) have, up to now, reached anything but an overall acceptance in American medieval studies may be deduced from the fact that Suzanne Fleischman's (1990) contribution "Philology, Linguistics, and the Discourse" in the *Speculum* volume dedicated to "New Philology" deals with the Orality/Literacy Question mainly from a *linguistic* point of view.

> durch identifizierbare Gestaltungs—und Überlieferungsmomente bedingte sprachliche Manipulation zu sehen.[33]

This is a manifesto for the merging of two kinds of approaches developed from different historical backgrounds and with different methodological claims.[34] As is well known, Bäuml put this program into forceful scholarly practice with his article on "Varieties and Consequences" a year later. Here he successfully unites the one approach—Jauss' and Iser's Reception Theory, which was hardly taken note of in America—with the research performed in the wake of Milman Parry and Albert Lord—which was, for its part, almost totally ignored in Germany.

Oral-Formulaic Theory, if we may use this simplifying tag, was or has been a "production-oriented" concept just as much as many other approaches preceding or contemporary with it. Thus it took some time before it was realized that what the Parry/Lord approach had brought to light could be unified with anthropological, psychological, and linguistic findings that, in their turn, made it obvious that "features of orality" in poetry are not only—and sometimes not at all—indications of a compositional technique, but rather of cultural states in a very general sense. Thus the *alterity* of its texts results from encoding that follows different semiotic rules (this is what Zumthor's 1972 *Essai de poétique médiévale* had brought to the fore). Moreover, this difference (and this is the point Zumthor did not yet fully grasp in 1972) results in its turn from different anthropological conditions.

I cannot delineate here all the findings that have contributed to the insight that oral and literate encoding of meaning—and hence also oral and

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[33] "On the basis of a more precise definition of the notions "oral" and "literate" in their respective relation to tradition, composition, text or recital (/performance), audience or audience orientation, social function of the types of tradition thus marked, and the like, the possibility arises of considering the literature of the Middle Ages as the product of a literacy-based culture, sustained by a prevalently illiterate population. Now, within this culture and for the traditional and receptional properties determining their function, we are enabled—partly in borrowing from notions developed by semiotics—to see them historically as a communicative process, as linguistic manipulation conditioned by identifiable elements of form and tradition."

[34] In a similar way Bäuml had advanced those ideas in his essay "Medieval Literacy and Illiteracy: An Essay Toward the Construction of a Model" (1978). There he stated that the "question of perception as determinant of 'meaning' is of obvious relevance to medieval literature with its parallel oral and written forms of transmission" (41).

literate decoding of meaning—work very differently.[35] In general one may say that written communication requires much more extensive linguistic planning and explicit manifestation, whereas oral-aural communication may rely to a much greater extent on the extra-linguistic context.[36] Suffice it to quote David Olson's dictum that in "oral communication the meaning is in the context" while in written communication "the meaning is in the text" (1977:*passim*). Of course we have to concede two things in view of these statements. For one thing, Olson's generalizations are not formulated particularly with regard to poetic communication. Secondly, Olson's considerations are largely historical; that is, he speaks of the historical development from orality to literacy. As to the first point, literary historians evidently do not deal with "spontaneous speech," with discourse that has not been planned in advance (even if the "planning" is a matter of traditional encoding). As to the second point, we definitely have to take care not to enter the heuristic circle of proving the validity of a theory by applying it to the material from which this theory has been abstracted. However, if the axiom that the strategies of the encoding (and decoding) of meaning are analogous in literary and "non"-literary communications is acceptable, then we may, with the necessary precautions, adopt Olson's observation for our investigations into literature.

This brings us back to my initial claim that the "discovery" of and research into the Orality/Literacy Question (the recognition *that* something is and the simultaneous finding out of *what* it is [Kuhn 1962]) has much to do with "anomalies." Let us recall: Jauss observed—correctly—that the paradigmatic changes in the humanities differ from those in the sciences as there are no disturbing "anomalies" in the scientific sense in the humanities, since as the latter avail themselves of "no area of empirically verifiable observations comparable to that of the [natural] sciences" ("kein der Naturwissenschaft vergleichbares Feld empirisch verifizierbarer Beobachtungen;" Jauss 1969:54). However, in medieval literary studies there are, from the modern point of view, "anomalies," findings that are, at first glance, disconcerting for the modern reader. One such outstanding "anomaly" in medieval poetry is its verbal repetitiveness, its "formulaicness." In the established paradigm of literary analyses this observation has been relativized and newly aestheticized by claims such as

[35] Cf. Schaefer 1992:ch.I.3; there and elsewhere in that book I speak of *Sinn**ver**mittlung* and *Sinn**er**mittlung*. The English notions ***en**coding* and ***de**coding of meaning* only imperfectly render the German.

[36] Cf. for this from a linguistic point of view Koch and Oesterreicher 1985.

Randolph Quirk's, who postulates with regard to Old English poetry (1963:153)

> that an expectation of the congruous and complementary, expressed through recurrent collocations [= formulae], is built into the poetic system of Old English, and it may be supposed that this is close to the starting point in estimating the original audience's pleasureable experience....

This kind of "aesthetic explanation" has obviously been the only one available.

However, John Foley has recently shown that formulaicness should neither be simply regarded as the prime indication for a compositional technique nor as some kind of aesthetic "anomaly" of medieval (as well as other) poetry. In his recent book *Immanent Art* (1991) he has, instead, made it convincingly clear that the formulaicness of Old English poetry bears witness to a specific encoding of meaning—an encoding that he calls traditional—that is largely alien to a literate culture and thus requires specific semiotic attention. Moreover, Foley's book illustrates how Jauss' demand for the "reconstruction of the horizon of expectation" can successfully be applied to texts from various times and cultures (such as Homeric epic, the epic of the *guslari*, and the Old English *Beowulf*) by reconstructing—or, in the case of the Balkan epics, observing—this horizon with regard to the "pre-understanding of the genre" (here the epic) and "from the form and themes of already familiar works" (Jauss 1982a:22).[37]

A line of thought such as Quirk's, on the other hand, argues away a manifest finding—in this case the formulaicness—that is an anomaly within our modern literary standards of originality, by subjugating it to the aesthetic pleasure principle and simply (re-)defining what must have been pleasurable in that culture. Now, I am not saying that the formulaicness of Old English, or, for that matter, any other medieval vernacular poetry cannot possibly have caused aesthetic pleasure in its audience. My point is just that by using such an argument the need to seek any other reasons for formulaic diction is suspended if not altogether cancelled. However, on the basis of the findings furnished by research into the Orality/Literacy Question, we are now in the position to see that poetic linguistic encoding may follow rules that are subject not only to historical (secondary) rules of aesthetics but also to historical (primary) rules of communication that depend on the culture's situatedness on the scale of the orality/literacy

[37] Foley expounds his theoretical orientation on Jauss in chap. 2 of *Immanent Art*.

continuum.[38]

A second case of an "anomaly" consists of those various types of vague references that cannot be made out intratextually. Such vague (or even totally unintelligible) references range from the opaque use of personal pronouns, through the indeterminacy of cause and effect in narrative sequence (cf. the Old English *Wife's Lament)*, and on to "co-textual" allusions that forever remain opaque for the modern reader (cf. the Finnsburh episode in *Beowulf* or the mythological references in *Deor*[39]).

The discovery of the Orality/Literacy Question has furnished us with insights for reading such "anomalies" as these as indicative of encoding strategies closer to the oral than to the literate mode. Again, this is not to say that texts displaying such features are oral in the sense that they are "orally composed." Given the material circumstances of the (earlier) Middle Ages (e.g., no "scrap" paper but wax tablets for sketchy notes), we will at any rate have to give up the idea of poets sitting or standing at their desk, "making up" their poetry while they write. Yet apart from such "external" conditions, what have sometimes been identified as residuals or "traces" of orality (in the archeological sense of remainders, or indications that the text in question ultimately goes back to times before literacy became available) should rather be seen as symptoms of different textual strategies. From the historical point of view these anomalies may ultimately be left-overs from (primary) orality. But since they appear in texts otherwise indisputably literate, we should conceive of these strategies as functioning in their own right.

The latter idea seems to point to the necessity that the implicit dichotomy in the notion of the "Orality/Literacy Question" that I have created here eventually be resolved. I myself have made a step into this direction by suggesting for Anglo-Saxon England the term *vocality* (borrowed from Zumthor 1987) to denote a cultural situation that very much depended and relied on the voice for mediation of verbal communication even though writing had already been well established.[40] However, orality and literacy in the sense of "communication in the

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[38] With the notion of "orality/literacy continuum" I here want to refer to the observation that the spectrum from (primary) orality to (fully developed) literacy is a wide one with various intermediate stages.

[39] A fine analysis of *Deor* within the (early) framework of Reception Theory has been given by Wienold 1972.

[40] Cf. Schaefer 1992.

oral/aural medium" and "communication in the written/read medium" are not just heuristic fictions made up to account for historical phenomena. Present-day findings from psychology, anthropology, and—up to now to a deplorably small extent—from linguistics show that the strategies of encoding and decoding are fundamentally different and that we too avail ourselves of the different strategies in different communicative situations (for instance, hopefully, in drawing up a lecture or writing an article for publication). Moreover, the cognitive differences between literates and illiterates have been extensively investigated and documented.[41] Hence, unless we share the Derridarian postulate that *l'écriture* precedes the spoken word, a postulate that can only be made on a-phenomenological grounds, the dichotomy as well as its translation into a continuum between the "poles" of orality and literacy is more than a heuristically convenient concept.[42]

Conclusions

(1) More or less tacitly, all *Textwissenschaften* have shared the assumption that the human faculty for encoding as well as decoding verbal communications works in the same way both synchronically and diachronically. Lee Patterson's knowledgeable and forceful discussion of the literary medievalists' attempts to gain adequate hermeneutic access to their material shows that the dominant objective has been to make out a "proper" (I am not saying "the correct") understanding of that literature. Yet, while New Criticism and Neo-Exegetical Criticism were struggling with such "proper" understanding, German Reception Theory had long passed beyond this stage and had thematized the goal of "the understanding of the understanding of texts" ("das Ziel des Verstehens des Textverstehens"; Gumbrecht 1975:400).

This self-imposed task of advanced Reception Theory was, as we have seen, a consequence of the specific history of post-war German literary studies. Historically speaking, the stage of search for "understanding understanding" was skipped in America. Instead theory-oriented scholars in literary studies—and among them also some medievalists—committed

[41] Cf. Carothers 1959, Bruner et al. 1966, Lurija 1976.

[42] For a discussion of orality/literacy as dichotomy and continuum, cf. Koch and Oesterreicher 1985.

themselves at once to understanding that "understanding no longer has either a basis or a subject" ("Verstehen wird zum Verstehen dessen, dass das Verstehen keinen Boden und kein Subjekt mehr hat";[43] Stierle 1990:20) by adopting the post-structuralist stance.[44]

(2) As we may observe at present, medieval literary studies in the last decade of our century are recalling methodologies and theories, such as Philology and Historicism, that have been suspended (up to the point of being completely discredited and/or incriminated) by providing them with a methodological and theoretical update.

If, as Stephen Nichols has stated, it is "manuscript culture that the new philology sets out to explore" (1990:7), then Katherine O'Brien O'Keeffe has substantially contributed to this exploration with her book *Visible Song: Transitional Literacy in Old English Verse* (1990), at the same time allowing the Orality/Literacy Question to provide Philology an impetus toward a new paradigm.[45]

If, on the other hand, "New Historicism" is grounded in the observation that man "is a creature who is constituted by his own constitution of the symbolic activity that is culture," as Patterson has phrased it (1987:60), then we cannot avoid taking into account the cognitive bases for this "symbolic activity." This is where the integration of the

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[43] Stierle has called the post-structuralist approach an "epistemological surrealism" (1990:26); cf. LaCapra's (early) observation that the "aspects of the work of recent French figures (for example Foucault, Deleuze, Sollers, Kristéva, and Derrida) [may] be seen in terms of processes of carnivalization" (1982:72); cf. also Hayden White, who speaks of the "absurdist moment" of Post-Structuralism (1976/85:269). There is much talk about *writing* (*écriture, s'inscrire,* etc.) in Post-Structuralism/Deconstruction. However, this notion—if it is a "notion" at all (a doubt that is raised by Deconstruction itself since it has a built-in mechanism that coalesces discourse and meta-discourse)—has virtually nothing in common with how studies in orality/literacy conceive of writing. This point is spelled out by Foley 1991:xiii-xiv.

[44] With regard to New Criticism Patterson has remarked (1987:19): "It [i.e., New Criticism] privileged . . . secular pluralism over doctrinal conformity, and above all else the independence and self-reliance of the individual, who is understood . . . as an autonomous being who creates his historical world through his own self-directed efforts." Could it be that Post-Structuralism exactly matched this "pluralism," this "self-reliance," this "world-creation" through one's own "self-directed efforts," by providing a superstructure that finally sanctioned this pluralism, and so on "theoretically"?

[45] For the observation that the Orality/Literacy Question may also be very successfully integrated into historical research proper, cf. Vollrath 1981 and 1991.

Orality/Literacy Question into Reception Theory contributes to "New Historicism," in that it historizes the semiotics of the encoding and decoding processes of this activity.

As we medievalists are left only with meaning "as it is encoded," in other words what we usually call "the text," it appears heuristically logical to "historicize" simultaneously (if not in advance) our own activity of *de*coding. The awareness of differences in this activity has, again, been brought about by the Orality/Literacy Question: not only to name the *alterity* of the decoding procedures but also to account for this alterity on *both* sides of the the "categorical epistemological gulf" (Haidu 1974:3b). We are thus brought closer to "understanding the understanding" of medieval literature—and eventually to a more adequate understanding of this literature itself.

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